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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the early 1960s computing was dominated bymainframes: these were massive
pieces of hardware, very expensive, and very powerful (even by today’s stan-
dards). The typical mode of operation for mainframes was batch processing—
execution of a series of programs (”jobs”) without human interaction. Only the
biggest companies/universities could afford to own/operate a mainframe; as a
result, there were only a limited number of such machines throughout the world.
The first hardware revolution occured in the late 1960s, with the emergence
of minicomputers. Minicomputers were scaled-down versions of mainframes,
less powerful, but costing orders of magnitude less. Their existence was made
possible by the emergence of the transistor and core memory technologies. With
decreasing prices, minicomputers became more widespread in the commercial
and research sectors; now even medium-sized organizations could afford one.
For the first time, it became common for some organizations to own more than
one computer.
Finally, in the early 1980s, further advances in hardware allowed the emer-
gence of microcomputers. These were small and inexpensive machines, equipped
with a multi-purpose microprocessor (this was their main difference compared
to minicomputers, which had many separate chips dedicated to various tasks).
Microcomputers quickly became ubiquitous in the commercial sector; for the
first time regular people could also own and operate a microcomputer (dubbed
in this case a “personal computer”—PC).
In parallel to this hardware revolution, communication networks have also
experienced dramatic changes. Communication networks have evolved from 110
bps point to point connections in the early 1960s, to 1200 bps links, and finally to
packet-switched networks. In the earlier stages, communication was dominated
by local area networks (LANs) connecting a limited number of computers in
close physical proximity. In the late 1960s, the ARPANET started an ambitious
project to connect individual LANs using wide-area links; this has eventually
evolved into today’s Internet.
This convergence of pervasive and inexpensive computers and high-speed
wide-area network connections has been the catalyst for the development of dis-
tributed systems. According to [179], a distributed system is:
“.. a collection of independent computers that appears to its users as a single,
coherent system”
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Essentially, commercial enterprises came to realize that large numbers of
computers become more valuable when they are connected and programmed to
work together for a given task. One of the earliest applications motivating the
development of distributed systems was workflow management—the movement
of documents and tasks throughout a business process. From this ingenuous
starting point, distributed systems have emerged as potential architectural so-
lution in many other application scenarios, such as Internet searching, content
distribution, and even multi-player computer games.
When discussing about distributed systems, it is important to keep in mind
one point, first mentioned in [179]: “Just because it is possible to build distributed
systems does not necessary mean that it is a good idea [to do this]”. Briefly,
distributed systems are typically designed with the following goals in mind:
• Economies of scale by connecting users to remote resources. This is par-
ticularly important for resources that are not continuously used, so it does
not make (economic) sense to provide them for each computer. Examples
of such resources include printers, scanners, backup storage, and so on.
• Transparency in using remote resources. This may include access trans-
parency (a remote service should be used in the same way regardless of
its implementation), location and migration transparency (users should
not be aware of the physical location of a resource, or whether that re-
source changes location between requests), concurrency transparency (the
integrity of remote resources should be maintained even when multiple
users access them simultaneously), failure transparency (remote resources
should be accessible even when facing failures of various parts of the dis-
tributed system), and so on.
• Scalability. The distributed system can be easily altered to accommodate
changes in the number of users and resources affected to it. This may
be related to load scalability (the system should make it easy to expand
and contract its resource pool to accommodate heavier or lighter loads),
geographic scalability (the system should maintain usefulness and usability
regardless of how far apart its users or resources are), or administrative
scalability (the system should be easy to manage no matter how many
different organizations need to share it).
Distributed systems and object-based middleware
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, distributed systems are typically
designed as a three-layer architecture:
• The top layer consists of distributed applications, which connect users
to remote resources in order to implement the application-specific func-
tionality. Examples include document processing (a user working on host
A opening a document stored on host B, and printing it on printer C),
backup services (a file stored on host A is backed-up on host B), group-
ware (three independent users working on hosts A, B, and respectively C
are teleconferencing), and so on.
• The middle layer (not surprisingly called middleware) is responsible with
hiding the heterogeneous nature of the multiple hosts that make up the
3distributed system, and providing a uniform resource model for the appli-
cations running on top of it.
• The lower layer consists of the actual hosts (computers) part of the system,
as well as the operating system software running on these computers.
In order to accomplish the goals mentioned earlier, the middleware layer
typically provides an object model to the distributed applications running on
top of it. As part of this model, resources are represented as objects which can
only be accessed via standard interfaces. This model is particularly useful in
providing transparency, since applications do not have to be concerned with the
internal working of remote resources, or with the low level network protocols
for accessing them. Instead, an application can use a remote object by simply
invoking one of its methods (exported by the object as part of a standard in-
terface). The middleware layer is responsible for actually locating the resource,
sending it the invocation request, and returning the result. Examples of object-
based middleware include CORBA [25], DCOM [81], and Globe [107].
Security and distributed systems
An important aspect in the design of any distributed system is security. Com-
pared to a stand-alone computer, securing a distributed system is much harder,
for the following reasons:
• Interactions between different parts of the system typically take place over
an insecure network, which introduces new threats such as loss of com-
munication integrity (an adversary modifies the data being exchanged),
or communication confidentiality (an adversary snoops on the data being
exchanged).
• Given that application functionality is distributed over multiple hosts,
there is no central authority for enforcing a security policy. As such, secu-
rity architects are faced with the problem of deciding what constitutes the
system’s trusted computing base—TCB (the collection of hardware and
software components that enforce the system’s security policy). Quite of-
ten this requires keeping a delicate balance between assurance and flexibil-
ity: a small TCB (for example a few highly-trustworthy hosts performing
all the sensitive operations) provides good assurance, but makes life more
difficult for application developers who may need to integrate security fea-
tures into the application design (for example, operations performed on
untrusted hosts may need to be audited). On the other hand, having a
large TCB (for example including the operating system and middleware
layers for all hosts part of the system) may simplify application logic,
but would likely reduce the overall assurance level of the system (a larger
TCB also means a larger number of programming errors which could be
exploited by attackers).
In general, earlier work on securing distributed systems [126] focused on
authentication and access control. While these aspects are certainly of great
importance, they do not address all the security problems that may appear in
the design and operation of modern distributed applications. More specifically,
in the recent years, a number of new operational models for distributed applica-
tions have emerged (we introduce these next, and we further elaborate on them
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in Section 1.1). These new models introduce additional security problems, and,
to the best of our knowledge, no existing security architecture for object based
middleware has addressed them in a systematic manner. The purpose of this
thesis is to come up with such a comprehensive security architecture.
New operational models for distributed applications
During the 80’s and 90’s the majority of distributed applications were designed
according to the traditional client-server model. As such, object-based mid-
dleware supporting such applications was also designed in order to facilitate
client-server-like interactions. However, in the recent years, alternative opera-
tional models have emerged, including content delivery networks [175], network
storage [3], computational grids [90], peer-to-peer [159], and massive multiplayer
games [6, 22, 8]. In general, the response to all these technological changes has
been to come up with application-specific solutions. For example, there are
numerous platforms for peer-to-peer file sharing [9, 4], commercial [2, 12] and
cooperative [166] Web content delivery, and for management and integration
of computational grids [104]. On the other hand, general-purpose, distributed
middleware [25, 81] has been slow to adapt to these changes.
The motivation for this thesis is the current lack of understanding of the
security requirements that arise in the context of a general-purpose, wide-area,
object middleware designed to cope with all these technological changes. Such a
general-purpose middleware should enable seamless integration and deployment
of a variety of applications falling in the above-mentioned operational models
(e.g. peer-to-peer, CDNs, grids, etc.). Given such a middleware, we want to
find out the best way to make it secure.
To make this discourse concrete, we focus on Globe [107]—a wide-area mid-
dleware architecture based on distributed shared objects (DSO), which has been
specifically designed to cope with the above-mentioned emerging operational
models. The notion of a DSO stresses that objects in Globe are not only shared
by multiple users, but also physically replicated at possibly thousands of hosts
over a wide-area network. Thus, a single object may be active and accessible on
many hosts at the same time. Object replication, combined with the fact that
(some of the) object replicas may run on third-party (marginally trusted) plat-
forms introduce a number of interesting security issues, which are the motivation
of this work.
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a security architecture
for the Globe middleware. Although centered on Globe, we believe our architec-
ture is quite general; our design principles could potentially be applied for any
object-based, wide-area middleware, where replication, de-centralization, and
hosting on third-party platforms are the goals.
The secure middleware architecture we describe has been implemented (in
Java) and is available under a BSD-style license from http://www.cs.vu.nl/
globe. This thesis also provides extensive performance measurements for evalu-
ating the overhead introduced by our security mechanisms. These measurements
validate our architecture, and show that with a careful design, overhead due to
security can be acceptable.
Overview of this chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 1.1 we examine in
more detail the emerging operational models and technological developments
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that motivate the existence of systems like Globe, and point out some of the
security problems that are the focus of this work. In Section 1.2 we describe the
contributions of this work, and in Section 1.3 we provide an outline of the rest
of this thesis.
1.1 New Developments Motivating this Work
In this section we focus on two technological trends that have recently emerged.
Their implications on distributed system security (or, more specifically, the cur-
rent lack of understanding of these implications) is the motivation for the work
presented in this thesis. More specifically, we look at the following developments:
• Data and application replication. This is the case when copies (replicas)
of the application data need to be placed on multiple hosts. The main
reason for this is bringing data close to clients (reduce network latency
when clients access this data), and improving scalability and fault tol-
erance (when one replica becomes unavailable because of failure, or has
reached the maximum number of clients it can handle, additional clients
can be redirected to other replicas). Furthermore, the actual processing
of the application data can also be replicated, either in order to reduce
processing time (in the case of parallel programming), or in order to im-
prove fault tolerance (the same operation is executed by multiple replicas
and is accepted only if the majority of them agree on the final result).
• Migrating data and applications to third-party platforms. The main rea-
son for this is achieving economies of scale when using such “outsourced”
computing resources. This is the case when a given distributed applica-
tion has an irregular resource utilization pattern, with occasional “bursts”
when its computing resources requirements (for example network band-
width, CPU power, storage space) are orders of magnitude above typical
average values. Having a dedicated infrastructure capable of handling
such “bursts” amounts to waste, since resources would rarely be used at
hundred percent capacity. As such, it makes economic sense to develop
commodity computing infrastructures. Such infrastructures bring together
large numbers of computers, and “lease” them (on demand) to interested
third parties (i.e. those parties operating distributed applications with ir-
regular resource utilization pattern). Depending on the economic model,
resources part of the commodity computing infrastructure could be oper-
ated by one company (this is the case for CDNs and network storage), by
a number of cooperating institutions (in the case of computational grids),
or even by volunteers (in the case of peer-to-peer networks).
Application scenarios involving replication and third-party
platform hosting
It is important to stress that the two technological trends mentioned above
have not “come out of thin air”, but rather have emerged in the context of
new application scenarios for distributed computing. We first examine some of
these scenarios in detail, and then point out the security implications of such
emerging operational models (which are the motivation for this thesis).
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Content delivery networks have emerged as a solution to flash crowd events
(also known as the Slashdot effect). Most commonly, a flash crowd corresponds
to a sudden increase of the popularity of a website, with the number of download
requests growing over a short period of time to several orders of magnitude
above the normal average. This is most typically seen with news sites, where a
particularly spectacular/dramatic event suddenly catches everybody’s attention.
The net result is that the Web server hosting the flash crowded site is incapable
of coping with request load (as a concrete example, the CNN site was de-facto
unreachable in the morning of September 11, 2001). Flash crowds are not
restricted to news websites; the same can happen when new versions and patches
of popular software are released, or when application servers are subject to
distribute denial of service attacks.
The typical solution for handling flash crowds is data replication. Essentially,
copies of the flash crowded site are placed on additional servers, and the request
load is evenly distributed across these mirrors, to the point where the load for
each of the servers becomes manageable. The problem is that flash crowds are
rare, unpredictable, and typically do not last very long. Running additional
servers continuously just as a backup for a potential flash crowd amounts to
wasting computing resources. As such, economies of scale can be achieved by
commoditizing the Web hosting infrastructure, essentially creating a network of
Web servers (a Content Delivery Network—CDN) spread across the globe that
can host third-party Web sites. Whenever one of the hosted sites experiences a
flash crowd, the CDN can quickly react, and create additional copies of the site.
Computational grids have emerged as a solution for handling massive, com-
putationally intensive applications, mainly related to life sciences (e.g. protein
sequencing, complex molecular simulations, weather prediction, etc.). Such ap-
plications are typically handled by means of parallel processing (the main prob-
lem is divided into many simpler problems which are then solved concurrently).
However, such massive parallel processing requires a hardware infrastructure
that is way above the economical reach of an average research institution. As
such, economies of scale can be achieved by having research institutions link
their computing infrastructure via high speed networks. The resulting federated
infrastructure is known as a computational grid, and provides the equivalent of
a (virtual) super-computer architecture that is able to distribute process execu-
tion in a parallel fashion across individual machines. In this case, the resource
being commoditized is CPU power.
Network storage has emerged as an inexpensive alternative for providing
highly available and reliable mass storage. A highly available and reliable mass
storage infrastructure can be quite complex: it may involve data partitioning
across multiple disks, integrating enough redundancy in the architecture in or-
der to tolerate disk failures (as it is done with disk arrays [162]), and providing
multiple backup layers (for example tape backup combined with an archiving
facility for tapes). Despite the fact that the price of storage has dropped dra-
matically in the past years (hard disks are three orders of magnitude larger and
cost a fraction of their price ten years ago), the cost of deploying, and more
importantly, administering such a complex architecture can be quite significant.
As such, economies of scale can be achieved by outsourcing the entire storage ar-
chitecture to a third-party provider, which takes care of all design, deployment,
and administrative aspects. This outsourced storage architecture can then be
accessed by all interested parties over the Internet, via a simple file system-like
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interface. A example of this is the S3 architecture [3] developed by Amazon.com.
In this case, the commoditized resources are storage and administration.
Massive multiplayer games provide a virtual world environment allowing
large number of players to interact with one another. Examples include Ev-
erQuest [6], World of Warcraft [22], or GuildWars [8]. The typical architecture
for such games involve a central server (run by the company operating the game)
which stores the persistent state for the entire virtual world; individual play-
ers interact with the central server, and receive state data related to their game
character (e.g. game objects and other players in their vicinity). Players operate
on their local data (moving game objects for example) via the game interface.
Any changes on the game state are then reported to the central server. As
such, most of the game functionality is executed on the players’ computers. In
this case, replication and migration of functionality to third-party platforms is
required by the very nature of the application.
Peer to peer (P2P) is a new type of network architecture that relies primar-
ily on the computing power and bandwidth of the participants in the network
rather than concentrating it in a relatively low number of servers. P2P networks
are typically used for connecting nodes via largely ad hoc connections. One ap-
plication where such networks have proven particularly effective is file sharing.
Essentially, each participant in the network supplies a number of files which are
accessible for download for the other participants. In order to facilitate par-
ticipants to find the files they are interested in, P2P networks support various
distributed search protocols. The distinguishing feature of these protocols is
that they require the participation of a large fraction of the nodes in the net-
work. For example, in the Gnutella [7] search protocol, each query is flooded to
the entire network; each participating node locally evaluates the query against
the files it shares, and sends back to the query originator the potential hits.
The originator collects all these hits, selects those of interest, and downloads
the actual files directly from the nodes sharing them. In this case, both data
replication (which naturally occurs when multiple nodes share the same file),
and migration of functionality to third party platforms (which occurs for every
query which is locally evaluated by each participating node) are integral to the
application.
Security consequences of data replication and third-party
platform hosting
Data and application replication, and migration to third-party platforms
have a number of security consequences:
• The access control model becomes more complex. In traditional client-
server systems, the access control model only needs to deal with two types
of players—the service provider, and its clients. With services hosted on
third-party platforms, at least three classes of players emerge: the service
provider, the infrastructure provider, and the clients. Furthermore, service
replication may lead to the situation where some replicas may be more
trustworthy than others. For example, a limited number of replicas may
be hosted directly by the service owner, while the vast majority may run
on marginally-trusted third-party infrastructure. In such circumstance,
it may be useful to have an access control model that allows restricting
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the execution of the most security sensitive operations on the trustworthy
replicas (we define this as the reverse access control problem).
• Some replicas may act maliciously (in security terms, this is Byzantine-
faulty behavior). For example, unscrupulous administrators of third-party
servers may “hijack” hosted replicas for their own benefit; players partici-
pating in massive multiplayer games may attempt to manipulate the game
software installed on their computers in order to cheat; nodes in a P2P
network may choose not to follow the correct query protocol (for example
by not forwarding other nodes’ queries in order to preserve their band-
width). In this context, it is important to have Byzantine-fault tolerance
mechanisms allowing replicated services to function correctly, even in the
situation where some of the replicas act maliciously.
• Platform protection mechanisms are necessary to counter the threats posed
by foreign code. The bottom line is that the business model for commodity
computing infrastructure owners is running other people’s code. For ex-
ample, this could be code for performing large-scale scientific simulations
(in the case of grid computing), or code for dynamically generating Web
pages (in the case of CDNs). Regardless of the application, it is impor-
tant to ensure that this foreign, untrusted code cannot harm the hosting
platform, either by compromising its integrity (e.g. a virus hidden in the
foreign code infecting the host system), or by resource exhaustion (e.g. a
hosted application uses all the CPU/memory/bandwidth available on the
host).
To summarize, the emergence of new operational models, such as content
delivery networks, grid computing, network storage, massive multiplayer games,
and peer to peer file sharing networks, have introduced the need for data repli-
cation, and for migrating data and computation to third party platforms.
This introduces a series of new security problems, such as the need for platform
protection, Byzantine fault tolerance, and more complex access control
models. These are the types of issues the security architecture presented in
this thesis deals with.
1.2 Contributions
Given this preamble, in this section we summarize the contributions of this
thesis. On a very high level, these contributions can be grouped in three main
categories:
First, we provide a comprehensive threat analysis for the broad spectrum
of distributed applications emerging in a computing environment characterized
by wide-area replication, mobile code, and third-party computing infrastructure
(i.e. the setting described in the previous section). Based on this threat analysis,
we identify a set of security requirements relevant for a middleware architecture
targeting such an environment. As we will show in Chapter 3, these requirements
fall into five categories:
• Trust management requirements.
• Authentication requirements.
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• Access control requirements.
• Byzantine fault tolerance requirements.
• Platform security requirements.
Second, we present a comprehensive security architecture that addresses
these requirements. Our design strategy is to make use of well-known security
technologies/mechanisms, which we treat as building blocks. For example, this
includes employing well-known authentication protocols such as the SSL/TLS
suite [79], well-known Byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms such as state ma-
chine replication [176], or well-known platform protection techniques such as
sandboxing, or code signing. In the end, we believe that despite such low-level
building blocks reuse, the result (our security architecture) is very much original
(“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts”!).
In order to keep our discourse concrete, this security architecture is tailored
to the Globe middleware. However, we believe our design is quite general;
its basic principles could potentially be applied for any object-based, wide-
area middleware, where replication, decentralization, and hosting on third-party
platforms are the goals. Furthermore, our security design has been implemented
as part of the (Java-based) Globe prototype. As part of this thesis, we also
provide extensive performance measurements, which show that security does
not introduce insurmountable performance penalty.
Finally, this thesis introduces a number of novel security techniques specifi-
cally designed for wide-area, replicated applications. These include:
• A novel symmetric key authentication protocol relying on an oﬄine trusted
third party (Chapter 6).
• An access control policy language supporting reverse access control, and
Byzantine fault tolerance policy statements (Chapter 7).
• A novel mechanism for providing Byzantine fault tolerance, based on prob-
abilistic auditing (Chapter 8).
1.3 Overview of this Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2 we introduce the Globe architecture. This includes an overview
of the Globe distributed object model, the middleware services provided, the
object lifecycle, and the operational model from the point of view of application
owners, infrastructure providers, as well as end users.
In Chapter 3 we analyze the potential security threats that may arise in a sys-
tem like Globe, taking into account the (possibly contradicting) points of view
of the various classes of participants involved (application owners, infrastructure
providers, end users). Based on this analysis we identify a comprehensive set of
security requirements which serve as basis for our security architecture design.
In Chapter 4 we present this security architecture, and show how it meets
the identified requirements. At the end of the chapter we also describe the
lifecycle of a secure Globe DSO. This includes the way objects and replicas are
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created, the way new users register with objects, and the step by step procedure
for secure remote method invocation.
In chapters 6 to 8 we present a number of novel security techniques specifi-
cally designed for wide-area, replicated applications:
• In Chapter 6 we introduce a novel symmetric key authentication protocol
relying on an oﬄine trusted third party.
• In Chapter 7 we present an access control policy language supporting
reverse access control, and Byzantine fault tolerance policy statements.
• In Chapter 8 we present a novel mechanism for providing Byzantine fault
tolerance, based on probabilistic auditing.
The secure Globe prototype implementation is presented in Chapter 9, to-
gether with extensive performance measurements.
In Chapter 10 we discuss related work. We focus on other security ar-
chitectures targeting distributed object middleware, including CORBA [26],
DCOM/.NET [81, 48] and Java [103].
Finally, in Chapter 11 we conclude. There we review the contributions of
this thesis, the lessons learned, and point out directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Overview of the Globe
Middleware
Globe is a middleware infrastructure for building wide-area distributed appli-
cations. In this chapter we give an overview of Globe. The concepts intro-
duced here will be used in the following chapters when describing the specific
mechanisms employed in the Globe security architecture. For a more detailed
description of Globe the reader is referred to [107].
As already discussed in Chapter 1, specific security mechanisms were initially
omitted from the original Globe design. Instead, this original design focused
on placing “security hooks” in various parts of the middleware, to allow easy
integration of future security extensions. In this chapter, we describe Globe in its
original specification (i.e. without any security extensions). This should make
it easier for the reader to understand our security design process (covered in
Chapter 4), and the numerous trade-offs we had to make in order to incorporate
security in the Globe middleware.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 explains the fundamental
concepts behind the Globe architecture, and its application model based on dis-
tributed shared objects. Section 2.2 explains the structure of Globe distributed
shared objects. Section 2.3 describes the Globe operational model from the
user’s perspective: this covers issues such as object naming and location, the
way client processes interact with Globe objects, and the way objects handle
method invocations. Finally, Section 2.4 looks at the Globe operational model
from the application developer’s perspective: this covers the Globe programming
model, mechanisms for hosting object replicas on special-purpose object servers,
and the middleware services that facilitate the discovery of object servers for
placing new replicas.
2.1 Fundamental Concepts
The Globe middleware has been designed to meet the following set of require-
ments:
• Uniform model—Globe aims to provide a consistent and uniform view
of how to organize applications built on top of it. This is what middleware
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platforms typically do: DCOM [81] and DCE [171] support client-server
computing using only remote procedure calls (RPCs), while CORBA [25]
provides a remote-object model for all its applications.
• Flexible implementation framework—Globe aims to hide the hetero-
geneity inherent to wide-area systems from its applications, and provide an
implementation framework facilitating cross-platform compatibility and
reusable design.
• Worldwide scalability—Globe has the ability to support millions of
users and billions of applications. Globe applications are scalable and
fault-tolerant: they can potentially handle large numbers of users, and
deal with high network latencies, congestion, unreliable communication,
overloaded servers and limited resources.
The Globe unified application model is based on distributed shared objects
(DSOs). A Globe DSO encapsulates the data (state) of an application and the
methods for manipulating it. As shown in Figure 2.1, a Globe DSO consists
of a number of local objects (also known as local representatives), each residing
in its own physical address space. A user process can access a Globe DSO by
invoking the object’s public methods (which are exported in a number of public
interfaces) on a local representative in its own address space. Depending on the
particular DSO implementation, when an object method is invoked, the execu-
tion may be entirely local, or it may involve the local object interacting with
other local objects part of the DSO; regardless of what happens, any interac-
tions among local representatives are hidden from user processes by the Globe
middleware layer.
Local
Object
A3
A5
Network
Distributed object
Address space
A1 A2
A4
Figure 2.1: A Globe DSO replicated across four address spaces
By encapsulating application state inside objects, Globe achieves separation
between interfaces and implementation. Essentially, as long as a DSO’s public
interfaces are not modified, its implementation can be changed without affecting
user processes. Furthermore, this also leads to cross-platform compatibility;
by writing object interfaces in a high-level, platform-independent language, it
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is possible to have local representatives of the same DSO hosted on different
computing platforms. However, this heterogeneous DSO structure is invisible
to user processes, which only have to deal with the platform-independent DSO
interfaces.
Finally, Globe achieves world-wide scalability through object replication.
Replication is implicit in the Globe object model; essentially, each local object
part of a DSO can be seen as replicating some part of the DSO’s state and func-
tionality. The Globe middleware provides individual DSOs with mechanisms for
dynamically instantiating new local representatives in order to handle increased
load (improve scalability), or compensate for local objects that may be tem-
porarily unavailable due to network or host problems (improve fault-tolerance).
Furthermore, Globe allows individual DSOs to control of all their implemen-
tation aspects, including the functional (application-specific), but also extra-
functional ones. Typical extra-functional aspects include mechanisms used by
local objects to communicate with each other, mechanisms for ensuring state
consistency among local objects, or the mechanisms for enforcing a global DSO
security policy across all its local representatives. As a result, each DSO can
select the communication protocols, replication algorithm, and security model
that are best suited to its needs. By not mandating a “one-size-fits-all” ap-
proach to handle extra-functional implementation aspects, Globe can support
a wide variety of application types, which is the key to ensuring world-wide
scalability.
2.2 The Internal Structure of a
Globe Local Object
One goal of the Globe middleware is to facilitate re-usable design, and this has
influenced the way Globe local objects are organized. Essentially, Globe re-
quires that local objects follow a modular structure, consisting of a number of
subobjects separated through standard interfaces. Each subobject implements
one particular aspect of the object’s extended functionality (in this extended
functionality we also include the extra-functional aspects of the object’s im-
plementation, such as support for replication or security). Because subobjects
are standardized, application developers can re-use the same subobject imple-
mentation for an entire class of applications that share some common extended
functionality. In this way, only subobjects that implement application-specific
functions have to be rewritten.
Figure 2.2 shows the internal structure of a Globe local object. Each sub-
object implements one particular aspect of the DSO’s extended functionality as
follows:
• The semantics subobject implements the actual application functional-
ity, and (logically) holds the application state. In many cases, this is the
only subobject that the application developer has to actually code. Given
the separation of functions introduced by the modular structure of the
Globe local object, all extra-functional aspects of the DSO implementa-
tion, such as network communication, replication, and security should, in
theory, be transparent to the semantics subobject. In practice, this may
not be always possible, since in certain cases the distributed nature of a
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Figure 2.2: The internal structure of a local object. Round-corner rectangles indicate subob-
jects. Square boxes indicate interfaces. Standard interfaces are drawn in solid lines. Dashed
lines indicate interfaces that need to be defined by the developer. Dotted lines indicate
security-related interfaces, not defined in the original Globe design. Arrows indicate possible
interactions among component subobjects.
DSO will affect the application semantics. For example real-time appli-
cations need to be aware of the fact that communication over wide-area
networks may be unreliable and may introduce high latencies. Also, as we
will discuss in the next chapter, in some cases security issues are integral
part of the application semantics, so the semantics subobject will have to
implement and enforce at least part of the DSO’s security policy.
• The replication subobject manages all aspects related to the DSO’s
replication policy; this includes keeping the state of local objects consis-
tent (according to the DSO’s consistency model), and dispatching method
invocation requests for local or remote execution. In order accomplish
this, replication subobjects on different local representatives of the same
DSO communicate using a DSO-specific replication protocol. Different
local representatives of the same DSO may contain different replication
subobjects, each implementing a different role in the replication protocol
(for example master and slave subobjects, in the case of the Master-Slave
replication protocol).
• The communication subobject takes care of all communication be-
tween local objects part of the same DSO, and provides a standard inter-
face for sending and receiving messages. The communication subobject
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implements the communication model required by a given DSO; this may
involve either reliable or un-reliable network communication, inter-process
communication (for local representatives running on the the same host),
point-to-point or group communication primitives, and so on.
• The security subobject is responsible for enforcing the global DSO se-
curity policy on each local representatives part of it. This subobject is
an example of a “security hook” included in the original Globe design for
supporting future security extensions. The security subobject is intended
to act as a reference monitor, essentially mediating any security-sensitive
action performed by other subobjects against the global DSO security
policy.
• The control subobject accepts method invocations from client processes,
and controls the interaction between the semantics and replication sub-
objects. This subobject is needed in order to bridge the gap between the
programmer-defined interfaces of the semantics subobject and the stan-
dard interface of the replication subobject. For example, the semantics
subobject marshalls and unmarshalls method invocations and replies. In
general, the control subobject is generated using a stub compiler.
Not all globe local objects need to implement all the subobjects described
so far. The typical situation is that the semantics subobject is implemented
by a subset of all local objects of a given DSO; these local objects are the
DSO’s replicas and collaborate to implement the functionality of the application
modeled by that given DSO. Essentially, their task is to accept user requests,
execute them, return the results, and possibly propagate state changes (due to
specific requests) to other replicas. Users interact with replicas through user
proxies, these are smaller, “stripped-down” local objects running in the user
address space. Normally, user proxies do not incorporate the DSO’s semantics
subobject, and do not hold the DSO’s state; instead, they simply forward the
user method invocations to a replica that can execute them.
2.2.1 Interaction among subobjects
Subobjects part of a local representative interact through functional interfaces,
as shown in Figure 2.2. Some of these interfaces are defined by application de-
velopers, but most of them are standardized in order to facilitate re-usable sub-
objects. For the rest of this thesis we will use the interfaceName::methodName()
syntax to indicate a call to method methodName of interface interfaceName.
The application interface
In order to provide access to the application functionality, the semantics sub-
object exports an application-specific interface (see Figure 2.2). This is a non-
standard interface, and needs to be defined by the application developer (we
will show how this is done in Section 2.4.1).
To allow user processes to invoke the DSO’s methods, the control subobject
exports the same application interface as the semantics subobject. For each
request there are two possible courses of action: the request can be handled
locally (by the semantics subobject) or it can be dispatched to one of the other
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local representatives as a remote method invocation. The replication subob-
ject is responsible for making this decision, according to the DSO’s replication
protocol. For example, for Master-Slave replication, slave replicas can locally
execute read requests, but write requests need to be shipped to the master.
The method invocation state machine
In order to keep track of the way user requests are handled, the control and
replication subobjects follow the state machine shown in Figure 2.4. When a
DSO method is invoked, the control subobject is in the START state. The
control subobject then calls repl::start() on the repl standard interface (see Fig-
ure 2.3) of the replication subobject, passing a numeric Id corresponding to the
application-specific method being invoked. The mapping between the names of
the methods part of the application-specific interface and the numeric IDs used
by the replication subobject is generated by the stub compiler used to create
the control subobject.
enum action_t {SEND, INVOKE, RETURN};
interface repl{
/* start ivocation start machine */
action_t start(in uint16 methodId);
/* send request to remote replica */
action_t send(in uint16 methodId,
in sequence<byte> marshalledRequest,
out sequence<byte> marshalledReply);
/* indicate successful local invocation */
action_t invoked(in uint16 methodId);
};
Figure 2.3: The repl standard interface. For simplicity, initialization functions and error pa-
rameters have been omitted
According to the replication protocol used, the replication subobject returns
either INVOKE or SEND on the repl::start() call. INVOKE specifies that the
method should be executed locally, so the control subobject first invokes the ap-
propriate method on the application-specific interface of the semantics subobject
and then calls repl::invoked() on the replication subobject to indicate the exe-
cution has completed. On the other hand, SEND specifies the method needs to
be executed remotely; in this case, the control subobject marshalls the method
name and parameters and passes them to the replication subobject by calling
repl::send(). Finally, the RETURN return value (for either repl::invoked() or
repl::send()) indicates to the control subobject that it can return the result of
the method invocation to the calling process.
Handling remote method invocations
The replication subobject is responsible for dispatching remote invocation re-
quests and keeping the DSO state consistent. Marshalled requests are received
from the control subobject (via the repl::send() call). The replication subobject
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Figure 2.4: The state machine controlling method invocation. The A execution flow cor-
responds to local method invocation, B corresponds to remote method invocation, and C
corresponds to active replication (local and remote method invocation).
dispatches them to a remote replica via the communication subobject, by call-
ing comm:send() on the comm interface of the communication subobject (see
Figure 2.5). After the request has been sent, the replication subobject blocks
the client process, until it receives the result.
interface comm{
/* connect to another LR */
void connect(out uint16 connId, in sequence<byte> contactPoint);
/* send a message to another LR */
void send(in uint16 connId, in sequence<byte> msg);
/* listen for incoming connections */
void listen(in sequence<byte> contactPoint);
/* close a connection */
void close(in uint16 connId);
};
Figure 2.5: The comm standard interface. For simplicity, error parameters have been omitted
On the remote replica, the communication subobject creates a pop-up thread
for each request packet received from the network. This thread is responsible
for carrying out the method execution. First the request packet is passed to
the replication subobject via a commCB::msgArrived() call on the commCB
standard interface of the replication subobject (see Figure 2.6). The repli-
cation subobject forwards the request to the control subobject by calling re-
plCB::handleRequest() on the replCB standard interface (see Figure 2.7). In
turn, the control subobject unmarshalls the request, and invokes the appropri-
ate method on the application specific interface of the semantics subobject (for
more details on remote method invocation see Section 2.3.3).
Handling state updates
Methods that change the DSO state need to be executed sequentially. The
replication subobject keeps a lock that ensures that only one process/thread at
a time can invoke write methods on the semantics subobject. When the DSO
state is modified, the replication subobject is also responsible for propagating
the changes to other replicas. State updates that occur simultaneously at differ-
ent replicas are handled according to the DSO’s state consistency model, which
18 CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBE MIDDLEWARE
interface commCB{
/* a message has arrived on one of the open connections */
void msgArrived(in uint16 connId,
in sequence<byte> replProtMessage,
out sequence<byte> replProtReplyMessage);
};
Figure 2.6: The commCB standard interface. For simplicity, error parameters have been
omitted
interface replCB{
/* pass a marshalled request to the control subobject */
void handleRequest(in sequence<byte> marshalledRequest,
out sequence<byte> marshalledReply);
/* request the marshalled LR state from the control subobject */
void getState(out sequence<byte> marshalledState);
/* pass the marshalled state to the control subobject */
void setState(in sequence<byte> marshalledState);
};
Figure 2.7: The replCB standard interface. For simplicity, error parameters have been omitted
is implemented by the replication subobject. Depending on this model, DSO
replicas may have to engagge in complex negotiation before accepting write
requests (for example in the case of a total order consistency model). The
replication subobject can request the local state by calling replCB::getState()
on the control subobject. The control subobject in turn obtains the state from
the semantics subobject by calling semState::getState() on the semState stan-
dard interface (see Figure 2.8). When a state update is received from the net-
work, the communication subobject passes it to the replication subobject via
a commCB::msgArrived() call. The updated state is further propagated to the
control subobject via a replCB::setState() call, and finally to the semantics sub-
object via a semState::setState() call (for more details about state updates see
Section 2.3.3).
interface semState{
/* get the LR state from the semantics subobject */
void getState(out sequence<byte> marshalledState);
/* update the LR state on the semantics subobject */
void setState(in sequence<byte> marshalledState);
};
Figure 2.8: The semState standard interface. For simplicity, error parameters have been
omitted
Security subobject interfaces
Because security was not covered in the original Globe design, no interfaces
are defined for the security subobject. A preliminary security design evalua-
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tion [128] suggests providing two additional security interfaces—secComm and
secRepl—for interaction with the communication and replication subobjects.
The assumption was that the sec-comm interface would be used for link en-
cryption and authenticating network connections to the local object, while the
repl-comm interface will be used for enforcing access control on DSO method
invocation. Furthermore, the security subobject may also need to support a
non-standard (programmer-defined) interface for interacting with the semantics
subobject, in order to deal with application-specific security mechanisms.
2.3 The Globe Operational Model—
User’s Perspective
So far we have described the Globe uniform distributed object model and the
way Globe local objects are internally organized. At this point, it is time to
explain how Globe DSOs are actually deployed and used. In this section we
examine this problem from the DSO users’ point of view.
Before a client process can interact with a Globe DSO, a user proxy for the
object needs to be instantiated in the client’s address space, and connected to
one of the DSO’s replicas. This process is known as binding to a DSO. Once a
client is bound to a DSO, it can interact with it through method invocation on
the local proxy. The proxy passes method invocation requests to the replica to
which it is bound, and returns the results to the client process. Before describing
object binding and method invocation in detail, we first discuss the way naming
and locating objects are handled in Globe.
2.3.1 Object naming and location
Each Globe DSO is identified by a 128 bit object ID (OID). Object IDs are
globally unique and location-independent. However, dealing with such long
bit strings is not a human-friendly solution; to improve usability, Globe allows
objects to be also identified through symbolic (human-readable) names. The
mapping between object names and OIDs is done by the Globe Name Service
(GNS). The GNS is a distributed service, and has been designed following the
same principles behind the Domain Name Sevice (DNS) [161], so it can po-
tentially scale to handle billions of objects. Furthermore, using the GNS for
the binding process is not mandatory; individual DSOs may use it for conve-
nience, but they can also implement their own naming infrastructure should
this be more appropriate. For DSOs serving closed communities (for example
e-banking applications) an alternative could be to distribute OIDs to users by
out-of-band mechanisms (e.g. on a CD-ROM “snail-mailed” to customers); an-
other alternative would be to incorporate OIDs in a hyper-linked structure (in
the case of DSOs modeling Web documents, as described in [181]).
OID
Replica
PropertiesImplementation Identifier
Figure 2.9: The Structure of a replica contact address
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OIDs are useful for uniquely identifying a Globe DSO, but, since they are
location-independent, they cannot be used to locate the DSO’s individual repli-
cas. This process requires an additional mapping, and is facilitated by another
middleware service—the Globe Location Service (GLS) [45]. For a given DSO,
the GLS maps the OID to a set of contact addresses corresponding to the ob-
ject’s replicas. A contact address is just a long bit string; its structure is shown
in Figure 2.9. The contact point part of the contact address specifies where a
DSO replica can be contacted; it is basically the replica’s network address. The
implementation identifier part of the contact address specifies how the replica
should be contacted; this describes the complete protocol stack that needs to be
implemented on the client side in order to interact with the DSO. Essentially,
the implementation identifier is a high-level description (in terms of compo-
nent subobjects) of the user proxy that needs to be instantiated. Finally, the
replica properties part of the contact address describes the role a given replica
plays in the overall DSO functioning. For example, a DSO using a master-slave
replication protocol will have Master and Slave replicas. Further differentiation
of replicas can be based on their security properties, as described in the next
chapter.
GLS implementation details
Since every client process needs to query the location service before binding to
a DSO, the GLS presents a potential scalability and performance bottleneck.
To overcome this problem, the GLS is implemented as a distributed search tree,
as shown in Figure 2.10. In this tree, the world is divided into a hierarchical
set of domains. At the lowest level, there is a domain per site; a collection
of sites form a region, and so on. An object is recorded at each site where it
has a contact address, pointers to that node are then stored recursively in each
enclosing region, up to the root of the tree.
When a process performs a location look-up, the search starts with the node
corresponding to the site where the process is located, and recursively progresses
up the tree. Once a record is found, the look-up follows the pointers down to
the tree leaf where the contact address is stored. In this way the look-up time
is proportional to the distance between the originating site and the site where
the replica is located.
A potential problem with this design is that the root node, or in general,
the higher-level nodes in the hierarchy, have to store lots of forwarding pointers,
and handle lots of requests, so they are a potential scalability bottleneck. The
GLS overcomes this problem by partitioning each directory node into multiple
subnodes. Each subnode is made responsible for a specific part of the OID space
via a special hashing technique. More details about the design, implementation
and performance of the location services can be found in [36, 45].
2.3.2 The binding process
The process of binding between a client and a Globe DSO is shown in Fig-
ure 2.11.
The client process starts with a symbolic DSO name (step 1 Figure 2.11).
The Globe run-time contacts the GNS and resolves the symbolic name into the
DSO’s OID (step 2). The OID is then passed to the GLS, which returns a set of
2.3. THE GLOBE OPERATIONAL MODEL— USER’S PERSPECTIVE 21
World
Europe
Utrecht
Domain
Holland Domain
Europe Domain
World Domain
Utrecht
Holland
Figure 2.10: The hierarchical structure of the Globe Location Sevice
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Figure 2.11: Binding to a Globe DSO. Arrows indicate actions. Replies to these actions are
implicit.
contact addresses corresponding to the DSO’s replicas (step 3). The client run-
time selects one of these addresses (based on network proximity for example);
it then uses the implementation identifier part of the address to create the user
proxy. The implementation identifier specifies the individual subobjects (see
Section 2.2) that need to be instantiated as part of the proxy. The Globe run-
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time retrieves the required class objects from an implementation repository (step
4), and combines them to create the user proxy (step 5). Once the user proxy
is in place, the client process connects it to the selected replica, by invoking a
special bind() (public) method provided by the replica (step 6); this completes
the binding process. At this point, the client process can start interacting with
the DSO by invoking methods in the DSO’s application interface (step 7).
An essential part in the binding process is played by the Globe run-time. Es-
sentially, this is a collection of library functions that perform the various steps in
the binding process. For example, the run-time includes service resolvers (stubs)
for contacting the GNS and the GLS; methods for loading object classes from the
implementation repository, and for combining the object classes corresponding
to the various subobjects in order to instantiate a DSO local representative.
The Globe run-time is tied to a specific programming environment. For
example, the Globe middleware prototype developed at the Vrije Universiteit is
based on Java, so its run-time consists of a collection of Java libraries.
2.3.3 DSO method invocation
Once a user proxy has been instantiated in the client’s address space, the client
process can start interacting with the object by invoking the methods exported
part of the proxy’s public interfaces.
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Figure 2.12: DSO method invocation. The dashed subobjects are not implemented. The user
proxy does not implement the semantics subobject. In the original Globe design the security
subobject acts as a “hook” for future security extensions, and it is not implemented by any of
the local objects. Arrows indicate the control flow for the four phases of the method invocation
process.
Figure 2.12 shows the control flow during a method invocation on an DSO
implementing a Master-Slave replication strategy. Logically, the method invo-
cation process can be divided in four distinct phases:
• Phase 1—the client proxy propagates the method request to the master
replica.
• Phase 2—the master replica executes the request.
• Phase 3—the master replica propagates state changes to slave replicas.
• Phase 4—results are returned to the client.
We will discuss each of these phases in detail.
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Phase 1
Figure 2.13 shows the control flow during the first phase of the method invoca-
tion process. We assume the application-specific interface exported by the DSO
is called appSpecific, and the client invokes a method m part of it. We make use
of the standard interface specifications introduced in Section 2.2.1. There are
five distinct steps:
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Network
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 5
process
User
proxy
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   replCB
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Control 
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      repl
Replication
sub-object
    comm
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Figure 2.13: Phase 1 of DSO method invocation
1. The client process invokes appSpecific::m() on the control subobject in the
proxy.
2. At this point the control subobject is in the START state on the method
invocation state machine (see Section 2.2.1). Accordingly, the control
subobject invokes repl::start(methodId(m)) on the replication subobject.
Here methodId(m) denotes the method ID assigned to method m of the
appSpecific interface (see Section 2.2.1).
3. Because m cannot be execute locally (the proxy has no semantics sub-
object), the replication subobject returns SEND. The control subobject
moves to the SEND state, marshalls the method name and parameters,
and passes them to the replication subobject by calling repl::send().
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4. The replication subobject incorporates the marshalled request into a repli-
cation protocol-specific request message and passes it to the communica-
tion subobject by calling comm::msgSend().
5. The communication subobject encapsulates the request message into a
network packet and sends it to the peer communication subobject of the
master replica. The comm::msgSend() call successfully returns in the repli-
cation subobject. At this point, the client process is blocked (on the
repl::send() call inside the replication subobject) waiting for the result of
the method invocation.
Phase 2
Figure 2.14 shows the control flow once the master replica has received the
invocation request from the proxy. There are four distinct steps:
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Figure 2.14: Phase 2 of DSO method invocation
6. When the network packet is received by the master replica host, the Globe
run-time creates a pop-up thread which passes the packet to the commu-
nication subobject for processing.
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7. The communication subobject extracts the request message from the net-
work packet, and forwards this message to the replication subobject by
calling commCB::msgArrived().
8. The replication subobject determines that the request can be served locally
(because the master replica implements the DSO’s semantics subobject),
so it extracts the marshalled request from the request message and passes
it to the control subobject by calling replCB::handleRequest().
9. The control subobject un-marshalls the request and invokes the appropri-
ate method (m in this case) on the semantics subobject by calling app-
Specific::m().
Phase 3
In the third phase of the method invocation process, the master needs to prop-
agate state changes to slave replicas. Figure 2.15 shows the control flow. There
are eight distinct steps:
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Figure 2.15: Phase 3 of DSO method invocation
10. Once the request has been executed on the master (that is, when the call
replCB::handleRequest() in step 8 has returned successfully), the replica-
tion subobject determines that the method invocation has changed the
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local state. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the replication subobject has a
mapping specifying which methods (method IDs) change the DSO state.
As a result, the replication subobject requests the (updated) state by call-
ing replCB::getState() on the control subobject.
11. The control subobject requests the (marshalled) local state from the se-
mantics subobject, by calling semState::getState(), and returns it to the
replication subobject.
12. The replication subobject incorporates the marshalled state into a repli-
cation protocol-specific message and passes it to the communication sub-
object by calling comm::msgSend().
13. The communication subobject encapsulates the replication message into a
network packet and sends it to the peer communication subobject of the
slave replica.
14. When the network packet is received by the slave replica host, the Globe
run-time creates a pop-up thread which passes the packet to the commu-
nication subobject for processing.
15. The communication subobject extracts the replication message from the
network packet, and passes it to the replication subobject by calling
commCB::msgArrived().
16. The replication subobject determines that the message is a state update
request, so it extracts the marshalled state, and passes it to the control
subobject by calling replCB::setState().
17. The control subobject updates the state of the semantics subobject by
calling semState::setState().
Phase 4
Finally, the master replica needs to return the result of the method invocation
to the proxy. Figure 2.16 shows the control flow. There are seven distinct steps:
18. The replication subobject on the master receives the (marshalled) result
from the control subobject as return value from the
replCB::handleRequest() call in step 8.
19. The replication subobject incorporates the marshalled result into a repli-
cation protocol-specific message and passes it to the communication sub-
object as a result of the commCB::msgArrived() call in step 7.
20. The communication subobject encapsulates the replication message into a
network packet and sends it to the peer communication subobject on the
proxy. The network pop-up thread on the master replica host terminates.
21. The communication subobject on the proxy receives the network packet
sent by the peer subobject on the master.
22. The communication subobject extracts the replication message from the
network packet, and passes it to the replication subobject by calling
commCB::msgArrived().
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Figure 2.16: Phase 4 of DSO method invocation
23. The replication subobject determines that the message is the result of a
(previous) method invocation, it extracts the marshalled result, and re-
turns it as a parameter of the repl::send() call from step 3. This un-blocks
the client process. The return value for repl::send() is set to RETURN.
This indicates the control subobject that it should return the result to the
client process.
24. The control subobject un-marshalls the result, and returns it to the client
process as a result of the appSpecific::m() call from step 1.
It is important to note that the security subobject is not involved in any
of these steps, because no security mechanisms are part of the original Globe
design. In the next chapter we will show how to secure the method invocation
process.
2.4 The Globe Operational Model—
Developer’s Perspective
In the previous section we have discussed the Globe operational model from
a user’s point of view. However, before a DSO can be used, it needs to be
implemented (coded), created and deployed. In this section we address these
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issues, looking at the Globe middleware from an application developer’s point
of view.
2.4.1 The Globe programming model
The first phase in the lifetime of a Globe distributed application is the de-
sign. This includes the functional design (this concerns what the application
should actually do), but also the design of the extra-functional aspects of the
application, such as the required replication strategy, communication protocols
and security model. Essentially, this design process closely follows the internal
structure of a Globe local object described in Section 2.2; once the design is
complete, the application developer has a clear idea of the types of subobjects
required for the implementation.
Depending on the types of subobjects required, the developer can either
re-use class objects already implemented (possibly from public class reposito-
ries), or he may have to code the classes for some of these objects himself. The
developer will most likely have to code the semantics subobject (or at least a
significant portion of it). On the other hand, since there are only a limited
number of communication protocols commonly used, it is likely that the com-
munication subobject can be instantiated by re-using a library class. The same
applies, although to a lesser extent, for the replication and security subobjects.
The control subobject is automatically generated from the application interface
by a stub compiler.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, each Globe subobject exports a number of
programming interfaces for interacting with other subobjects. Most of these
interfaces are standardized, but some of them are application-specific, so the
developer has to actually define them. The Globe middleware provides an In-
terface Definition/Description Language (IDL) [182] for specifying object inter-
faces. The Globe IDL is a high-level, platform-independent language mainly
supporting constant, type, and function declarations. Given an IDL interface,
an IDL compiler will map the interface to a target programming language,
creating skeleton implementations (stubs) of the interface’s methods. The de-
veloper then needs to extend these stubs to implement the required (sub)-object
functionality. Once this is done, the resulting source code is compiled (using
a compiler for the target language), in order to produce object code (classes).
Once the application developer has classes for all required subobjects, he can
create the new DSO, by selecting the hosts where the DSO’s replicas need to
be placed, and then instantiating replicas on these hosts.
2.4.2 The Globe object server
Globe local objects (user proxies and replicas) are static. In the case of user
proxies, these are instantiated by the Globe run-time as a result of a user process
(thread) binding to a DSO. However, object replicas may not always have an
execution process/thread associated with. Typically, a DSO replica waits until
it receives a remote method invocation from a proxy, executes the method,
propagates potential state changes to other replicas, and returns the result to
the proxy. All this replica activity is initiated by network pop-up threads (see
Section 2.3.3) controlled by a special middleware service called the Globe Object
Server (GOS).
2.4. THE GLOBE OPERATIONAL MODEL—DEVELOPER’S PERSPECTIVE29
The GOS provides an execution environment for remote method invocations
on DSO replicas. For each hosted replica, the GOS is responsible for managing
the network contact points where other DSO local representatives (either user
proxies or other replicas) bind to that replica. The GOS maintains a pool of
active threads; whenever a network packet is received on one of the managed
contact points, the GOS dispatches one of these threads to handle the request.
The dispatched thread controls the execution flow for processing the request, as
described in Section 2.3.3.
Besides managing contact points, the GOS provides a number of other ser-
vices which can be accessed through standard interfaces. The server manager
allows for replica creation, management and destruction, and accepts RPCs
from remote processes that want to place replicas on the GOS. The persistence
manager provides an operating-system independent interface to persistent stor-
age. Replicas can use this service to store their state on the host machine. This
allows for example replicas to survive graceful shutdown and restart of the GOS
hosting them.
2.4.3 Object creation
Once an application has been implemented as a Globe distributed object, the
party in charge of its deployment (the DSO administrator) needs to actually
create the DSO. This involves the following steps:
• generating a unique OID for the new DSO.
• possibly registering the DSO name and OID with the GNS.
• selecting a GOS for placing the first DSO replica.
• creating a contact address for that replica and registering it with the GLS.
• instantiating the new replica on the selected GOS.
The initial Globe design does not specify how a unique OIDs are to be gen-
erated; this may either involve contacting a global object registration authority,
or partitioning the OID space among different DSO administration authorities.
As we will show in the next chapter, it is actually possible to generate (statis-
tically) unique OIDs in a completely de-centralized manner, by using certain
properties of RSA public keys and of secure hash functions.
Once the new DSO has a unique OID, the administrator may register it
with the GNS, or may use alternative naming infrastructures, as discussed in
Section 2.3.1.
At this point, the administrator selects a GOS for hosting the first replica of
the new DSO. The administrator contacts the GOS on the management interface
and requests permission to instantiate a new replica. The GOS allocates a
network contact point for the new replica; the administrator uses this contact
point to generate a contact address for the replica, which is then registered with
the GLS. The administrator then passes the contact address and the location
of the implementation repository to the GOS. Using the protocol identifier in
the contact address (which fully describes the replica in terms of component
subobjects) the GOS retrieves all the necessary classes from the repository and
uses them to instantiate the new replica.
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2.4.4 Object deployment
A DSO is created by instantiating its first replica. In the DSO deployment
phase, other replicas of that object are instantiated according to the object’s
needs. As discussed in Section 2.1, a DSO may be replicated for scalability
and/or fault-tolerance reasons.
Each DSO is allowed to select its own policy for instantiating new replicas.
On one end, this process can be entirely manual—the DSO administrator decides
on the number of replicas required, selects the object servers where these replicas
need to be placed, and contacts each of the servers to instantiate the replicas. On
the other hand, the full power of the Globe DSO model can harnessed by using
a dynamic replication protocol (implemented by the replication subobject). In
this case, the DSO is responsible for automatically instantiating new replicas in
order to handle increased load (e.g flash crowds), or the (temporary) failure of
existing replicas (e.g. due to host or network problems). It is also possible to
have a hybrid replication model, with a subset (the core group) of the DSO’s
replicas manually created by the administrator, and the rest being dynamically
instantiated by members of the core group.
Regardless of the replication model employed, the DSO administrator (in the
case of manual replication) or the replicas (in the case of dynamic replication)
need a way to find Globe object servers that can host new replicas. To facilitate
the server discovery process, Globe provides another middleware service—the
Globe Infrastructure Discovery Service (GIDS).
2.4.5 The Globe infrastructure discovery service
The GIDS (described in detail in [123]) keeps track of all the object servers
available worldwide. Its implementation uses the Light-weight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) and standard LDAP servers [131]. Similar to the GLS, the
GIDS is a distributed service. Essentially the world is divided into a set of base
regions (generally subdivisions of the leaf domains identified for the GLS); in
each base region there is a GIDS server that keeps track of all available object
servers in that region.
The GIDS allows discovery of suitable object servers based on a specification
of desired properties, related to technical capabilities (amount of memory, avail-
able bandwidth, operating system and hardware platform), security attributes
(which person or organization operates this object server), and the location of
the object server.
When a DSO entity (administrator, replica) needs to instantiate a new
replica, it queries the GIDS with a set of desired properties. Some of these
properties may be derived from the DSO implementation and functionality (e.g.
the operating systems/hardware paltforms supported by the object code, the
memory/CPU requirements), others may depend on the specific replication sce-
nario (e.g. network placement of a new replica, so that overall request latency is
minimized), while others may depend on the DSO’s security policy (e.g. which
administrative domains are trusted to host the DSO’s replicas). Once a match-
ing server is found, the entity creating a new replica and the selected GOS enter
a negotiation phase to determine whether or not they want and can cooperate,
and negotiate the exact details of that cooperation.
Chapter 3
Security Requirements
In this chapter we present the set of requirements that have guided the design
and implementation of the Globe security architecture. The first step in identi-
fying these requirements is determining the specific threats the Globe security
architecture needs to counter. However, defining a threat model for a system
like Globe is difficult for the following reasons:
• Lack of a central trust authority. Globe has been designed to support
millions of users and billions of objects, and it is simply un-realistic to
assume a central trust authority in such an environment. A central trust
authority for Globe would not work for the same reasons it cannot work
for the Internet as a whole. First, such a central authority would not
scale. Second, it is practically impossible to find an organization that
is perceived as impartial by millions of people of different nationalities
and religions, spread across five continents, many having contradictory
political and economic agendas.
• Broad applications space. Globe is a middleware platform, and is intended
to support a large variety of distributed applications. It is impossible
to come up with a generic security architecture supporting all require-
ments for every potential Globe application. A more realistic approach
is to identify a set of pervasive security requirements (common to large
number of possible Globe applications); mechanisms to address these re-
quirements can then be provided as core middleware security services;
individual Globe applications can then extend this core by adding more
specialized security features.
• Applications spanning multiple administrative domains. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the purpose of the Globe middleware is to allow seamless de-
velopment and deployment of distributed applications, with emphasis on
application replication (for scalability, or fault tolerance reasons) and code
re-use. Globe object replicas may be placed on servers belonging to differ-
ent administrative domains, and may be instantiated by combining object
code from different developer communities. This makes it particularly
difficult to define a trusted computing base (TCB).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1 we look at what
“security” actually means, and we define it in terms of three system properties:
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confidentiality, integrity and availability. In Section 3.2 we define a number of
basic security terms, to be used throughout the rest of the thesis. In Section 3.3
we start exploring the requirements space for the Globe security architecture
by identifying four classes of security principals with distinct security agendas,
which are involved in the operation of the Globe middleware: Globe users, DSO
administrators, GOS administrators, and Globe developers. In Section 3.4 we
look at security requirements from the users’ point of view. In Section 3.5 we
look at security requirements from the DSO administrators’ point of view. In
Section 3.6 we look at security requirements from the GOS administrators’ point
of view. In Section 3.7 we look at security requirements from the Globe devel-
opers’ point of view. Finally, in Section 3.8 we put pieces together by grouping
security requirements into five categories: trust management, authentication and
secure channel establishment, access control, Byzantine fault tolerance, and plat-
form security. In subsequent chapters of this thesis we focus on specific security
mechanisms for addressing each of these requirements.
3.1 What is Security?
Before examining any security requirements for Globe, it may be useful to de-
fine the concept of “security”. To date, the subject of computer security has
generated substantial amount of research interest. However, it is surprisingly
hard to find a generally-accepted definition of computer security; possible inter-
pretations (in the chronological order of their appearance) include:
“... a general term for all the mechanisms that control the access of a pro-
gram to other things in the system” (1971—Butler Lampson [125]).
“Security is the practice by which individuals and organizations protect their
physical and intellectual property from all forms of attack and pillage.” (1997—
Java security whitepaper [93]).
“Computer security deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorized
actions by users of a computer system.” (1999—Dieter Gollman [101]).
“Computer security is the effort to create a secure computing platform, de-
signed so that agents (users or programs) can only perform actions that have
been allowed.” (2006—Wikipedia).
Most of the definitions we found in the literature (including the ones above-
mentioned) are either too abstract, or too informal to provide a useful starting
point for exploring security requirements for a system like Globe. Because of
this, we will focus on a more functional statement about computer security,
although technically, it does not qualify as a definition:
“Computer security consists of maintaining three characteristics: confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability.” (excerpt from [165]; also appears in more
or less same form in [54]).
• Confidentiality means that resources of a computing system are acces-
sible only by authorized parties.
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• Integritymeans that resources can be modified only by authorized parties
in authorized ways.
• Availability means that resources are accessible to authorized parties.
The above definition provides us with high-level goals for the Globe security
architecture; essentially, we want this architecture to protect the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of middleware resources. However, before examining
each of these goals in detail, we need to introduce a number of basic security
concepts.
3.2 Basic Concepts
In this section we define a number of security concepts, to be used throughout
the rest of this thesis.
3.2.1 Principals, authentication, and access control
A principal is an real-world entity (human/organization) whose actions have
some security implications on the functioning of the Globe middleware.
A software representative is a software component of the Globe mid-
dleware that acts on behalf of a principal or on behalf of another software
representative.
A name is a symbolic represenation of an entity that can be used for the
purposes of authentication and access control. Identification is the process
of associating a name to a Globe entity. A global name is an name that
has the same meaning (identitfies the same Globe entity) for all entities part
of the Globe middleware. The OIDs introduced in the previous chapter are
examples of global names—an OID uniquely identifies a DSO for all the other
entities involved with the Globe middleware. In contrast, local names only
have meaning to individual Globe entities. For example, a DSO may assign
an identifier to each of its users; these user identifiers act as local names for
users—they are only meaningful in the context of that DSO.
Resources include both data and software/hardware system components.
Each resource has an owner—a principal that has administrative control over
that resource. As discussed in the previous section, owners’ high-level security
goals are ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resources
they own. We need to stress that these properties may have different meanings,
depending the type of resources being protected:
• Data resources:
– Confidentiality means the data is disclosed only to authorized parties.
– Integrity means data can be modified only by authorized parties in
authorized ways.
– Availability means that data is protected from destruction (erasure).
• Software/hardware resources:
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– Confidentiality means that only authorized parties can use the pro-
tected resource.
– Integrity means that that resources will perform the tasks they are
expected to perform, in the expected way.
– Availability means that authorized parties will not encounter un-
justifiable delays when using resources (denial of service—DoS).
A right with respect to a resource is the ability to perform certain operations
on that resource. Possible rights that can be associated with a resource depend
on the resource type. For example, in the case of data, rights may include
reading, modifying, and deleting it; in the case of objects, rights may include
invoking methods, creating/deleting replicas, and so on.
The owner of a resource has by definition all the rights that can be associated
with that resource. The resource owner can grant some of these rights to other
entities (principals or software representatives), including the right to further
grant granted rights to other entities (delegation).
Access control is the process of enforcing rights on protected resources; the
idea is that an entity is allowed to perform an action on a protected resource
only in the following circumstances:
• the entity is the owner of the resource.
• the entity has been granted the right to perform the action (either directly
by the owner, or from some other entity, through delegation).
A reference monitor is a software component that enforces access control
on a protected resource.
Entity
action
1. Action Request
2. Access Control
    Check
Reference 
Monitor
Protected
Resource3. Perform
   ActionSecure Comm. Channel
Client System Server System
requesting
Figure 3.1: The reference monitor
A reference monitor operates as shown in Figure 3.1. Essentially, it is only
the reference monitor that can directly perform actions on a protected resource;
messages encoding action requests from various Globe entities are passed to
the monitor over some secure communication channel; the monitor performs
(executes) these actions only if the requesting entity has the rights to perform
them.
It is important that the reference monitor is capable of identifying entities, so
that only those that have been granted the appropriate rights can invoke specific
actions. Authentication is the process of securely associating an action request
to the identity of the entity that has issued the request.
A secure communication channel between two entities A and B is a com-
munication channel where both communication endpoints are authenticated. A
secure communication channel must at least ensure the integrity, and optionally
the confidentiality and availability of the data in transit:
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• Channel integrity—a message received by A on the secure channel could
only have been sent by B. A message sent by B that is modified while in
transit, will not be accepted by A.
• Channel confidentiality—a message sent by A on the secure channel can
only be received by B.
• Channel availability—a message sent by A is guaranteed to be received by
B; furthermore, transmission delay (latency) is finite and predictable.
Typically, authentication and secure communication channels are imple-
mented by means of cryptography. However, it is also possible to have phys-
ically secure communication channels; for example, a local area network with
controlled entry points would qualify for this.
Once rights have been granted, and authentication mechanisms are in place,
access control is relatively easy to implement; the hard part is to get to this
point. Trust management is the decision process of assigning rights to prin-
cipals and determining which mechanisms are secure and trustworthy enough
to authenticate them. Probably the best way to explain trust management is
to present possible application scenarios; we have identified three types of such
scenarios:
• Trust management based on direct (implicit) trust relationships—this is
the case when authentication mechanisms and rights are assigned based
on external (real-world) trust relationships. For example, in a company,
the employees rights with respect to usage of various resources are dic-
tated by the organizational and administrative policies in place for that
company. Similarly, authentication mechanisms can be arranged off-line
(for example a secure internal LAN would provide implicit authentication
of communication end-points; alternatively, or a company-wide public key
infrastructure could accomplish the same goal).
• Trust management based on trusted third parties. In this case, entities
that are interacting share some common trusted third party that can dis-
tribute cryptographic keys for authentication, and provide certification of
entity properties. Rights can then be granted based on those certified
properties. Global PKIs and certification authorities such as Verisign fall
into this category.
• Trust management based on entity interaction. In this case, an entity
gains the trust of another entity as a result of its actions. An example of
this is subscription based services: initially, a user is completely untrusted,
but once it pays a subscription fee it is granted the appropriate rights.
3.2.2 Faults and protection
The concepts introduced in the previous section deal with “good” security prop-
erties: ensuring that sources of requests are properly identified, and that re-
quests are served only for authorized parties. However, there is also a “dark”
side of security—it needs to deal with malicious entities and code, and the
threats they pose to the correct functioning of a system. In order to have a
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comprehensive security architecture for Globe, we need to look at these issues
as well. In this section we introduce the basic concepts of “black hat” security.
Malware is a piece of software that subverts the correct functioning of a
computing system. Examples of malware include spyware, viruses, worms, Tro-
jans, and so on. Threats posed by malware include loss of confidentiality (Tro-
jans that provide back-doors for unauthorized users), loss of integrity (viruses
that subvert application functionality), and loss of availability (spyware that
wastes computing resources).
A piece of code is trusted (trusted code) if it is guaranteed not to include
any malware. Alternatively, untrusted code may or may not include malware.
In the context of Globe, there are many circumstances where untrusted code
may be executed—when object servers run third-party object replicas, when
users instantiate untrusted DSO proxies, and so on. It is therefore important
that the Globe security architecture provides protection mechanisms against
malware.
Platform protection is a generic term for protection mechanisms against
malware. Platform protection mechanisms can be classified into three broad
categories: sandboxing, code authentication and proof carrying code.
Sandboxing is a protection technique where untrusted code is executed in
an isolated runtime environment (sandbox). Potential malware incorporated
into untrusted code may be able to compromise resources inside the sandbox,
but it cannot reach any resources outside it.
Code authentication deals with mechanisms that allow to establish a
secure association between a piece of code and a principal (either the party that
has produced the code, or the party that vouches for its correctness). Code that
can be authenticated to trusted parties is then implicitly trusted. Of course,
there is the issue of establishing trust among principals (those that produce code
and those that run it), but this is dealt through trust management techniques.
The idea behind proof carrying code [153] is to have a logical proof of
correctness associated with each piece of code. Before a piece of (untrusted) code
is run, the associated proof is then (automatically) checked by a (trusted) prover
application, and only programs that pass the check are allowed to execute.
A fault is the incorrect functioning of a computing system. Faults may be
unintentional (due to software bugs, or external factors, such as power loss) or
intentional (due to malware, malicious users, and so on..). An intentional fault
(due to malicious intent) is also known as a Byzantine fault.
Byzantine fault tolerance deals with protection techniques employed in
the context of complex distributed application. Such applications (Globe DSOs
are prime examples) typically consist of large number of components that work
together to implement some high-level functionality. A distributed application
is Byzantine fault-tolerant if it can provide correct functionality despite some
of its components exhibiting Byzantine fault behavior.
3.3 Examining Security Requirements
So far, we have defined security in terms of three high-level goals: ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of protected resources. However, it is
difficult to design a security architecture following directly from these goals,
given that (as shown in the previous section) existing protection mechanisms
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target more concrete (and lower-level) security requirements. The next step is
to examine how the high level goals of confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity translate into concrete security requirements for individual Globe resource
owners, and which mechanisms are appropriate for dealing with these individual
requirements.
The security requirements of individual Globe resource owners may derive
either from self-interest (a bank customer wants to ensure the integrity of his
banking transactions), or they may be the result of legal/organizatorial policies
of the administrative domain the principal belongs to (a bank may require two
employees to sign high value transactions). As explained in the previous chapter,
Globe applications typically span multiple administrative domains. As such,
different classes of security principals (each with their own, often contradicting,
security requirements) need to interact even just for the operation of individual
Globe DSOs.
Consider the following example: The Veterinary Science Department at Uni-
versiteit van Utrecht (UU) is experiencing increased workload on their Web site.
The department decides that improved scalability can be achieved by modeling
the site as a Globe DSO. The web-master in charge of the site identifies an
appropriate DSO class package—globeDoc [181]—developed at the Computer
Science Department at Vrije Universiteit (VU). Once the Globe DSO modeling
the web site is created, the web master decides to place one master replica at
UvA and a second (slave) replica on a Globe object server operated by the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Clients accessing the web site from
North America will be automatically redirected to the MIT replica.
In this (simple) example, we can already identify four classes of security
principals: (1) the web master at UU, (2) the Globe developers at VU, (3) the
Globe object server administrator at MIT, and (4) the clients that access the
site. Generalizing, we define four classes of security principals that are involved
with the Globe middleware:
• DSO administrators. For each Globe DSO, the administrator is responsi-
ble for creating and deploying the object. The administrator is in charge
of setting the DSO’s security policy.
• Globe developers. These are parties that implement (code) class packages
used to instantiate Globe DSOs. In theory, each DSO administrator can
implement all the classes needed for instantiating the object. However,
given the modular structure of Globe objects, and the emphasis put on
code re-use, it is likely that the vast majority of DSOs will be instantiated
using (at least partially) code written by third parties.
• GOS administrators. These are principals in charge of operating Globe
object servers for hosting DSO replicas. Again, it is possible to have all
replicas of a given DSO hosted by GOSes operated by the DSO adminis-
trator. However, the power of the Globe distributed object model is fully
harnessed when DSOs are capable of (dynamically) creating new replicas
at various network locations, according to the object’s replication needs
(scalability and/or fault tolerance). As a result, it is likely that for a given
DSO, at least a subset of its replicas will be hosted on GOSes operated
by third parties.
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• DSO users. These are parties that interact with a given Globe DSO, by
invoking its methods through user proxies running in their address space
(see Chapter 2).
Having identified these four classes of security principals allows us to conduct
a more systematic requirements analysis. Essentially, we take each individual
class and examine their specific security requirements.
3.4 Threats and Security Requirements—
Users’ Perspective
The resources owned by Globe users are the computing platforms from which
they access Globe DSOs and the sensitive information they may disclose/acquire
while interacting with those DSOs.
With respect to the computing platform, potential threats are coming from
the code used to instantiate the user proxy. As discussed in the previous chapter,
users proxies are instantiated using object code retrieved from an implementa-
tion repository. We assume that object code retrieved from a local repository
(residing on the same host as the user) is trusted. A local repository would
include proxy code part of the Globe standard distribution package—essentially
proxies for common Globe applications such as GlobeDoc [181], or the Globe
Distribution Network [42]. However, when interacting with Globe DSOs that
are not part of the standard distribution, users may need to download proxy
code from remote repositories. This is untrusted code (as defined in Section 3.2).
Thus, one of the security requirements for users is platform protection, that is,
ensuring that untrusted proxy code retrieved from remote repositories cannot
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the user’s platform.
Users are also interested in protecting their private information while inter-
acting with Globe DSOs. Both data confidentiality and integrity needs to be
taken into account:
• Confidentiality—Globe DSOs may be used to implement e-banking and
e-commerce applications, and may handle sensitive information such as
customer data, passwords, or credit card numbers. Such information needs
to be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Unauthorized disclosure
can occur either as a result of interacting with an un-authorized object
(for example a malicious DSO pretending to represent a legitimate bank),
or as a result of data being intercepted by malicious parties while in transit
to a legitimate destination.
• Integrity—Globe DSOs may be used to implement information dissemina-
tion services, such as electronic newspapers, or stock quotes services. In
this context, it is important to ensure the information integrity—that is
guaranteeing that information comes from legitimate sources, and has not
been tampered while in transit.
In order to ensure data confidentiality and integrity, the first requirement
is for trust management mechanisms. Essentially, human users do not implic-
itly trust abstract software entities such as Globe objects, but rather real-world
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entities such as banks, governments, or other users. Trust management mecha-
nisms should allow DSO users to establish secure associations between a DSOs,
viewed as abstract services, and the real world entities that offer these services.
Trust management prevents users from disclosing confidential information,
and accepting information used for sensitive decisions from un-authorized DSOs.
However, the confidentiality and integrity of data can also be compromised
while data is transfered over the network (between trusted parties). In order to
prevent this, the Globe security architecture should provide mechanisms for the
authentication of communication end-points (the user proxy and the DSO replica
handling its requests) and for establishing secure communication channels for
data transfer.
3.5 Threats and Security Requirements—
DSO Administrators’ Perspective
Essentially, administrators are responsible for offering services (modeled as a
Globe DSOs) to their users; their security goals are protecting the confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of these services.
The confidentiality goal dictates that only authorized users should be able
to access a DSO. This introduces three types of security requirements. Trust
management mechanisms are needed in order to assign rights to users; these
are method invocation rights, given that users can only interact with DSOs by
invoking their methods. Once rights are assigned to users, access control mech-
anisms are needed in order to enforce these rights; because Globe objects are
replicated, access control needs to be enforced on each replica through some
form of reference monitor. As explained in Section 3.2, a reference monitor re-
ceives operation requests over an authenticated, secure communication channel,
and executes them if the originating entity has the appropriate rights. Hence,
Globe DSOs need to provide mechanisms for user authentication and secure
channel establishment.
The integrity goal dictates that only authorized parties should be allowed to
modify a given DSO, and that a DSO should correctly implement its function-
ality.
In order to prevent the un-authorized modification of a DSO, only valid
replicas should be allowed to issue state updates; furthermore, only authorized
parties should be allowed to add/delete replicas. Thus, a DSO needs to imple-
ment mechanisms for authenticating replicas and establishing secure communi-
cation channels between them. Furthermore, trust management mechanisms are
needed in order to assign replica creation/destruction rights to relevant Globe
principals.
Ensuring that a Globe DSO correctly implements its functionality is diffi-
cult for two reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, a Globe DSO may be
(partially) created using untrusted object code written by third parties; in this
context, there is the threat of malware incorporated in this untrusted code that
may maliciously (and covertly) alter the DSO application semantics. This intro-
duces the need for trust management mechanisms for foreign code. Mechanisms
for accomplishing this include code authentication (securely associating foreign
code to a trusted entity), or proof carrying code.
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Replication is the second factor that makes it difficult to enforce DSO in-
tegrity. As described in Chapter 2 at least some of a DSO’s replicas may run
on untrusted, third-party controlled GOSes. In this context, there is the threat
of malicious GOS administrators “hijacking” replicas running on their domains;
“hijacked” replicas may exhibit all sorts of Byzantine-faulty behavior, ranging
from denial of service (slow response, or even lack of response to user requests)
to active attacks, such as returning erroneous results, or corrupting the DSO
state. In this context, it may be necessary to restrict DSO replicas rights (with
respect to what methods a replica is allowed to execute), based on the trust-
worthiness of the GOS hosting it. Again, trust management mechanisms are
needed for assigning replicas rights. Once rights have been assigned, reverse ac-
cess control mechanisms are needed to enforce them—essentially ensuring that
users only sent their method invocation requests to replicas trustworthy enough
to handle them.
Finally, the availability goal dictates that a DSO should be capable of pro-
viding correct and timely service despite some of its replicas exhibiting faulty
(possibly Byzantine-faulty) behavior. As such, the Globe security architecture
also needs to provide Byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms.
3.6 Threats and Security Requirements—
GOS Administrators’ Perspective
As discussed in Chapter 2, Globe object servers can potentially host replicas of
DSOs operated by third parties (not necessary trusted by the GOS administra-
tors). As such, GOS administrators essentially provide a “computing resources
on demand” service. It is outside the scope of this thesis to elaborate on the
economic models motivating such a service. We assume that once the Globe
application model becomes widespread, a large number of public (and free of
charge) GOS servers will become available for hosting replicas, as part of com-
munity projects (similar to SETI@Home [186] for example).
Regardless of their motivation, the security goals for GOS administrators
are ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the servers they
administer.
The confidentiality goal dictates that only authorized parties should be able
to use the GOS resources, more specifically to instantiate new DSO replicas. As
such, trust management mechanisms are needed in order to assign replica cre-
ation rights to untrusted DSO administrators. Once rights have been assigned,
authentication and secure channel establishment mechanisms are needed in or-
der to securely associate replica creation requests to the principals that have
been authorized to issue them.
The integrity goal dictates that a GOS should correctly implement its func-
tionality of hosting DSO replicas. Essentially, the service offered by the GOS
should be “fair” (fair sharing of GOS resources, and non-interference among
replicas). This is far from trivial to accomplish, since running replicas (essen-
tially foreign code) created by (un-trusted) third-parties exposes the GOS to all
sorts of attacks. For example malware part of a malicious replica code may at-
tempt to subvert the GOS, or may attempt to interfere with the correct function-
ing of other replicas. To address such threats, the Globe security architecture
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needs to provide GOS administrators with platform protection mechanisms.
Finally, there is the threat of malware part of a hosted replica code that may
try to compromise the availability of the hosting GOS. Attacks on availability
include wasting the GOS resources, or even launching DoS attacks against ar-
bitrary hosts on the Internet. Again, platform protection mechanisms, an in
particular sandboxing (restricting the GOS resources that can be accessed by a
given replica) are necessary to counter such threats.
3.7 Threats and Security Requirements—
Developers’ Perspective
Given the modular structure of Globe local objects (see Chapter 2), it is likely
that for a large fraction of all deployed DSOs, at least some of the component
sub-objects (the replication and communication sub-objects in particular) will
be instantiated using “de-facto” standard library classes. Essentially, there are
only a limited number of commonly used communication and replication pro-
tocols. Once efficient implementations for the corresponding replication and
communication sub-objects are developed, DSO administrators can simply re-
use them as part of newly created objects. This “economy of scale” in developing
new applications is one of the fundamental strengths of the Globe model.
The term “Globe developers” collectively includes the individuals and orga-
nizations that contribute with re-usable object code to the Globe project. This
object code is the only resource controlled by Globe developers.
Depending on the economic incentives that motivate this contribution, de-
velopers may have a variety of security requirements. For example commercial
organizations that develop re-usable Globe object code for economical profit
would be interested in protecting their copyrights, and preventing illegal copy-
ing and deployment of their products.
However, the focus of this thesis is on the Globe middleware evolving as a
support infrastructure for community software projects. Based on the success
of existing open-source software projects, we assume that once the Globe model
becomes widespread, a large number of developers will contribute with open-
source, royalty-free code. The standard we set for Globe software is the BSD
public license. As such, security mechanisms for protecting object code confi-
dentiality (enforcing commercial copyrights and preventing software piracy) are
outside the scope of this thesis.
Protecting re-usable code integrity is however important. Essentially we
need to prevent situations where a party A can make unauthorized changes to
object code developed by another party B. For example, A may incorporate
malware into B’s object code; when this code is used by third parties, they will
blame B for the subsequent damage. As such, code authentication mechanisms
are needed in order to securely associate a piece of code with the party that is
responsible for it.
3.8 Putting the Pieces Together
In the previous four sections we have looked at security requirements and threats
from the point of view of the various classes of principals involved in the op-
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eration of the Globe middleware. It is important to understand that the list
of security issues identified is by no means exhaustive. The aim of this thesis
is to design and implement a security architecture for Globe as a middleware
platform, rather than for individual Globe applications. As such, we focus on
security requirements and threats that are common to all (or to a large frac-
tion of all) possible Globe applications. Some of the more specialized security
requirements (such as software piracy protection for example) are deliberately
left out from the middleware security architecture, and are to be handled by
individual Globe applications.
Examining the security requirements/threats identified in sections 3.4-3.7,
we can see the recurrence of certain security issues. For example, platform
protection is a common requirement for users, DSO and GOS administrators;
authentication is another ubiquitous requirement. We can simplify our analysis
by grouping the identified security requirements into five distinct categories, as
follows:
• Trust management requirements
• Authentication and secure channel establishment requirements.
• Access control requirements.
• Byzantine fault tolerance requirements.
• Platform security requirements.
In the next chapter, we present a detailed description of the Globe security
architecture, and of the various mechanisms introduced in order to handle these
five classes of security requirements.
Chapter 4
The Globe Security
Architecture
In this chapter we describe the Globe security architecture. We have designed
this architecture with the aim of addressing the security requirements identified
in the previous chapter. As such, our approach is to look at each of the five
requirements areas and explain how our architecture addresses them. Essen-
tially, this chapter can be viewed as a detailed architectural specification that
can be used by developers to design and build the various components of the
secure Globe middleware, as well as secure Globe DSOs. In this context, our
focus is more on the generic techniques/algorithms that can be used, rather
than on implementation-specific mechanisms. As much as possible, we attempt
to employ well-known security techniques and protocols, which we believe pro-
vide better assurance (compared to ad-hoc designed mechanisms), and should
offer economies of scale when translated into actual implementation, given their
availability as off-shelf software packages. In several cases, the specifics of the
Globe middleware (in particular its emphasis on application replication) intro-
duced the need for specialized solutions. In this chapter we only provide an
overview of the specialized security techniques we have designed for Globe; each
of these techniques is then described in detail in a separate chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.1 we introduce
some of general principles used in the design of the Globe security architecture,
as well as the “historical motivation” for adopting these principles, based on
earlier work on secure distributed systems. In sections 4.2 to 4.6 we describe the
techniques used to address the five requirements areas identified in Chapter 3:
trust management (Section 4.2), authentication (Section 4.3), access control
(Section 4.4), Byzantine fault tolerance (Section 4.5), and platform security
(Section 4.6). Finally, in Section 4.7, we “put the pieces together”, and look at
the operational model of the secure Globe middleware both from an application
developer/administrator, and a user point of view.
4.1 General Design Principles
In this section we will introduce some general principles that have guided the
design of the Globe security architecture. Our aim has been to come up with a
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modular and extensible design that covers the five requirements areas identified
in Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Historical background
As a starting point, we examined the way some of the security requirements
identified in the previous chapter were addressed in earlier work on secure dis-
tributed systems. This “historical background check” provided the justification
for a number of design decisions we have made, most importantly the decision
to concentrate DSO security functionality in a separate security subobject, and
the decision to use public key cryptography as the basic cryptographic building
block for the Globe security architecture.
The reference monitor model
The first attempt to formalize the architecture of secure computer systems was
made in the early 70’s with the introduction of the reference monitor model [31].
Essentially the idea is to associate a piece of software (the reference monitor)
with each protected resource. Principals that want to access the resource, can
only do it by passing action requests to the monitor. The monitor keeps an access
control list (ACL), which associates permitted actions (under the security policy
for that resource) to principal names. If an action requested by a principal is
listed as allowed in the ACL, the monitor performs the action on behalf of it;
otherwise, the action request is rejected.
We apply this model to our design by concentrating all DSO security func-
tionality in a separate security subobject. In particular, access control is han-
dled by a separate module in the security subobject (the access control module).
Whenever another DSO subobject needs to perform a security-sensitive decision,
it has to request permission from this module. However, because Globe DSOs
are replicated, it is not possible to apply the reference monitor directly, since
there is no central enforcement point. Instead, we have a reference monitor
(an access control module) for each DSO local representative, responsible for
enforcing the DSO security policy on that local object.
“Authentication in Distributed Systems—Theory and Practice”
The first attempt to come up with a comprehensive security model for dis-
tributed systems is due to Abadi, Lampson, Burrows, andWobber. In their 1992
paper—“Authentication in distributed systems—theory and practice” [126]—
they stress the importance of authentication as the foundation for security in
distributed systems. Their paper introduces a logical framework for reasoning
about authentication, delegation, establishing secure channels, and mobile code
execution. Although this logic is independent of the basic cryptographic con-
structs used, the paper argues that public key cryptography is better suited
for wide-area distributed systems, because the synchronous communication as-
sumption inherent in symmetric-key protocols (because of their reliance on an
on-line TTP) does not apply to a wide-area environment.
Based on the arguments presented in [126], we have decided to use public key
cryptography as the basic cryptographic building block for the Globe security
architecture.
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“Decentralized Trust Management”
In their 1996 “Decentralized Trust Management” paper [58], Blaze, Feigen-
baum, and Lacy are the first to identify the trust management problem as a
distinct and important component of security in distributed systems. Prior
work assumed that all entities involved in the operation of a distributed appli-
cation were in the same security/administrative domain, which made assigning
privileges a relatively easy task. However, with the advent of e-commerce and
groupware (remote collaborative work environments) Internet applications, en-
tities in different administrative domains (“strangers” from a security point of
view) interacting part of the same distributed application are becoming the
norm rather than the exception. The authors of [58] argue that assigning rights
among “strangers” (from a security point of view) by ad-hoc mechanisms is
rapidly becoming the bottleneck limiting the scalability of distributed applica-
tions; to alleviate this, they propose a generic trust management framework,
where entities privileges can be derived from identity and attribute digital cer-
tificates those entities may acquire from a variety of trust authorities. Rights
derivation rules can be expressed as (concise) computer programs (the authors
introduce a logic programming language—KeyNote [56] for this purpose), which
allows the automation of the trust management process.
Based on the arguments presented in [58], we have decided to provide sup-
port for trust management at the lowest possible level—namely for each indi-
vidual DSO. This comes in the form of a trust management module, part of
the security subobject. The authors of [58] also argue that trust management
can be an expensive process, involving the negotiation of acceptable digital cre-
dentials, their retrieval and processing; although software trust management
engines and languages attempt to automate this process, in many cases human
intervention may be required. Based on this observation, our design aims to
minimize the frequency of such trust management operations during the life-
time of secure Globe DSOs. Our idea is to have each DSO create its own trust
domain. Trust management occurs only when entities are accepted part of this
domain, either as new DSO users, or as new DSO replicas. As such, the trust
management module of a Globe DSO is responsible for registering new users
and replicas; during this registration process users and replicas are assigned a
local identity as part of the DSO’s trust domain, and are given cryptographic
credentials allowing them to authenticate this local identity. Upon registration,
users and replicas are also granted operational rights with respect to the DSO
(for example—which methods a given user is allowed to invoke), according to
the object trust management policy; these rights are associated with their local
identities. During normal operation trust management is not necessary: users
and replicas simply authenticate their local identities, and rights are enforced
by means of access control mechanisms.
4.1.2 The Globe security architecture—
basic principles
Before describing the basic principles behind the Globe security architecture, we
review the types of entities involved in the operation of the Globe middleware,
as introduced in Chapter 2.
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• Each DSO is controlled by an object administrator. The object adminis-
trator is responsible for setting the DSO security policy.
• Depending on the DSO replication policy, replicas may be instantiated/destroyed
either manually, by the object administrator, or automatically, by special
replicas with administrative privileges (administrative replicas).
• Each Globe object server is controlled by a GOS administrator. The GOS
administrator is responsible for setting the GOS security policy.
• Each Globe user is in control of the hosts it uses to access Globe DSOs,
i.e. the hosts on which it instantiates Globe object proxies.
The basic principle we followed when designing the Globe security architec-
ture is de-centralization: essentially, we want each DSO to be able to manage it
own security policy, each user to be able to independently decide which DSOs
are trustworthy to use, and each GOS decide which replicas to host. A con-
sequence of this principle is that the global trusted computing base is kept as
small as possible.
Middleware services, such as the Location Service and the Globe Infrastruc-
ture Directory Service are not trusted. Their compromise will cause denial of
service, in the sense that user proxies may not be able to find DSO replicas
for sending requests, and administrative replicas may not be able to find object
servers for placing replicas, but in no way can their malicious behavior cause
the compromise of the security policy of a Globe DSO, user, or object server.
4.1.3 The case for an off-line TTP
Authentication is one of the basic components in any security architecture; other
security functions, such as access control and Byzantine fault tolerance are built
on top of it. As such, As such, the design of the authentication infrastructure
has significant impact on the overall security of a distributed system.
There are two types of pairwise authentication protocols: based on symmet-
ric keys, and based on public/private keys. With symmetric key protocols, two
entities authenticate over an unsecure network connection by using a shared
secret (key). With public key protocols, each entity has a public/private key
pair, and knows the public key of the other entity. A variety of symmetric and
public/private key pairwise authentication protocols have been designed [144].
As the number of entities in the system grows, basic pairwise authentication
protocols become inefficient, since each entity needs to store a number of keys
equal to the number of entities in the system. This problem is addressed by
having a trusted third party (TTP) that can authenticate each entity in the
system. In the case of symmetric keys, the TTP shares such a key with each
entity; in the case of public/private keys, each entity knows the TTP’s public
key, which in turn knows everybody else’s public key. Again, a variety of TTP-
based authentication protocols have been proposed [144], both using symmetric
keys, as well as public/private keys. Depending on how the TTP is used during
authentication, these protocols can be classified as follows:
• Online TTP—the TTP interacts with each of the two entities during the
pairwise authentication process.
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• Oﬄine TTP—each entity only interacts with the TTP during an initial-
ization phase. Afterwards, entities can pairwise authenticate without the
assistance of the TTP.
When used in a WAN environment, an online TTP has two disadvantages:
• The TTP introduces additional latency for the authentication protocol,
since, besides communicating with each other, each of the authenticating
parties also needs to contact the TTP.
• The TTP becomes a highly sensitive target, continuously exposed to
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Since Globe is designed for a WAN environment, we have decided to use
oﬄine TTP protocols for its authentication infrastructure. Following the ideas
in [126], we make public key cryptography the basic cryptographic block for the
Globe security architecture. Essentially, each security relevant Globe entity is
assigned a public/private key pair as follows:
• Each Globe DSO is assigned a public/private key pair—the object key.
Knowledge of the object private key gives ultimate control over the DSO
security policy; only the DSO administrator has this key.
• Each DSO replica is assigned a public/private key pair—the replica key.
The replica key is certified by the object key through a digital certificate,
and used for authenticating the replica when interacting with clients and
other replicas.
• Each DSO user is assigned a public/private key pair for each DSO she
uses— the user key. The user key is certified by the object key through a
chain of digital certificates, and is used for authenticating the user proxy
when interacting with DSO replicas.
• Each Globe object server is assigned a public/private key pair—the GOS
key. The GOS key is used for authenticating the server when interacting
with other Globe entities (users, administrative replicas) for managing the
DSO replicas hosted by the server.
By assigning each DSO a public/private key pair, we can apply an elegant
solution to a problem described in Chapter 2—namely how to assign unique
object IDs in a decentralized manner. Essentially, we have defined the OID
of a given DSO as the secure hash (SHA-1) of the object public key. Using
this technique, we obtain self-certifying object IDs, similar to the self-certifying
file names introduced in [140]. Given the security properties of the SHA-1
function, a self-certifying OID is securely associated with the object’s public
key—it is computationally infeasible to create two distinct keys that hash into
the same OID. Furthermore, if a cryptographically strong algorithm is used to
generate object keys, the probability of generating two distinct keys that hash
in the same OID is statistically insignificant, so this is a practical method of
generating unique OIDs in a completely decentralized manner.
In Section 4.3 of this chapter we will show how all these public/private key
pairs associated with DSO entities can be used to build a DSO-centric au-
thentication infrastructure. However, authentication in Globe is not limited to
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public/private key protocols. In Chapter 6 we introduce a novel symmetric key
authentication protocol using an oﬄine TTP, and show how it can be incorpo-
rated into the Globe security architecture.
4.1.4 The security subobject
Following the reference monitor model, we extend the internal structure of a
Globe local object, by introducing a security subobject, where all security sen-
sitive processing (for that local object) takes place. In particular, the security
subobject acts as a reference monitor (validating action requests received by
the local object), performs all the authentication, secure channel establishment,
and link encryption (at the request of the communication subobject, just be-
fore data is sent over the network), deals with credentials revocation, and trust
management. These operations are exported (to be used by other component
subobjects) through a number of standard interfaces:
• The secRepl interface (shown in Figure 4.1) allows the interaction between
the replication and security subobject. The sendRequest() method han-
dles secure remote method execution; essentially, the replication subobject
calls this method to pass a RPC request to the security subobject, which
then deals with all the security aspects of this RPC—whether the request
is permitted under the DSO’s security policy, finding a replica allowed to
handle the request (under the Globe access control model, not all replicas
may have the same method execution privileges—see Section 4.4), authen-
ticating such a replica, and so on. The registerUser() and createReplica()
methods deal with trust management, performing the trust negotiation
when new users and replicas are accepted as part of the DSO trust do-
main. Finally, the revokeUser() and revokeReplica() deal with revoking
users and replicas respectively, essentially removing them from the DSO
trust domain.
• The secComm interface (shown in Figure 4.2) allows the interaction be-
tween the communication and security subobjects. It consists of one
method—msgArrived which passes a message received by the communica-
tion object to the security subobject for further processing.
Method Description
isAllowed() Access control check on incoming request
findReplica() Finds replica allowed to execute a given method
registerUser() Accept new user into the DSO trust domain
registerReplica() Accept new replica into the DSO trust domain
revokeUser() Exclude user from DSO trust domain
revokeReplica() Exclude replica from DSO trust domain
Figure 4.1: The secRepl standard interface of the security subobject.
Method Description
encryptMsg() Encrypt message to be sent over a secure channel
decryptMsg() Decrypt message received on a secure channel
Figure 4.2: The secComm standard interface of the security subobject.
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Consistent with the Globe programming model, the security subobject is
structured in a number of modules accessible through standard interfaces. Each
module implements one particular aspect of the subobject’s functionality: trust
management, authentication, access control, and revocation. This allows for
economies of scale when developing new Globe applications, through the re-use
of standardized modules (for example, standard authentication protocols, such
as SSL). The internal structure of the security subobject is shown in Figure 4.3:
secRepl
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Figure 4.3: Internal structure of the security subobject. Arrows indicate possible interactions
among modules
• The trust management module deals with trust management operations.
Its secTM standard interface exports the registerUser() and createReplica()
methods, which are further exported by the security subobject as part of
the secRepl interface.
• The authentication module deals with authentication and secure chan-
nel establishment. Its secAuth standard interface exports three methods:
sendMsg() is called by the access control module to send a message encod-
ing an RPC request to a replica that can handle it over a secure channel.
msgArrived() is further exported to the secComm interface, and is called
by the communication subobject to pass a message received from the net-
work for further processing. Finally, establishSecChannel is called by the
access control module in order to authenticate a given replica, and estab-
lish a secure communication channel with it.
• The access control module deals with access control. Its secAC standard
interface exports three methods: sendRequest() is further exported as part
of the secRepl interface, and is called by the replication subobject in order
to pass a RPC to the security subobject. recvRequest() is called by the
authentication module in order to pass a RPC request received from the
network (via the communication subobject). Finally, registerRights() is
called by the authentication module once a secure channel is established
in order to report the rights associated with the entity at the other end of
the channel.
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• The revocation module deals with revoking users and replicas. Its secRev
standard interface exports four methods: revokeUser(), revokeReplica()
(which are further exported part of the secRepl interface), checkRevoked(),
which is called by the authentication module to check credentials revoca-
tion status during the authentication protocol, and updateCRL() which is
called by the authentication module when new revocation information is
received.
In the following sections we explain how the Globe security architecture deals
with the five requirements areas identified in Chapter 3. This should make it
easier to understand the functionality that needs to be implemented by each of
the modules part of the security subobject.
4.2 Trust Management
As explained in the previous chapter, trust management is a negotiation process
through which two partiesR and S decide on the rights they assign each other. A
distinguishing characteristic of trust management is that R and S are “strangers”
from a security point of view, meaning there is no explicit security policy to
govern their interaction. Generating (negotiating) such a policy is exactly the
goal of trust management. Once such a policy is in place, it can be enforced by
means of access control mechanisms.
The typical scenario is that one of the parties (R—the requester) wants to use
certain services provided by the other party (S—the server). R needs to employ
trust management mechanisms in order to assess which of these services (if
any) S is trustworthy enough to perform. S needs to employ trust management
mechanisms in order to assess which of these services (if any) R is trustworthy
enough to be served.
Probably the best way to understand the role of trust management in Globe
is to provide a list of common usage scenarios:
• A Globe object administrator uses third-party object code to instantiate
DSOs under his administrative control. The administrator needs to em-
ploy trust management mechanisms in order to assess whether the devel-
oper can be trusted to have written high quality and malware-free object
code. On the other side, the trust management decision is trivial, since
(as explained in the previous chapter), in this thesis we are only concerned
with royalty-free, BSD-licensed, re-usable object code. As such, anybody
is trustworthy enough to use it.
• A Globe user wants to utilize a previously unknown Globe DSO. The
user needs to employ trust management mechanisms to assess the object’s
trustworthiness (namely, whether the object will act in “good faith” and
attempt to correctly provide the services expected by the user). The
DSO needs to employ trust management mechanisms to determine the
rights that should be assigned to that user (for example, in terms of which
methods the user should be allowed to invoke).
• a Globe DSO needs to place a new replica on a previously unknown Globe
GOS. The DSO needs to employ trust management mechanisms in order
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to determine how much trust can be placed in the GOS. A GOS has
complete control over the replicas it hosts, so a malicious one may subvert
their functionality, and attempt to launch all sorts of attacks against the
DSO. Depending on the result of the trust management decision, the DSO
may decide to place the replica somewhere else (the GOS does not meet
basic trust requirements), or restrict its rights (for example in terms of
which methods the replica is allowed to handle) in order to protect against
potential damage caused by replicas hosted by marginally trusted GOSes.
The GOS also needs to employ trust management mechanisms in order
to determine the rights that should be assigned to the DSO. This means,
whether the DSO replica should be hosted in the first place, and if so,
how much of the GOS’ resources should be allowed to use (in terms of
disk space, memory, CPU share, network bandwidth share, etc.).
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are multiple mechanisms for
negotiating trust; we group those into two categories:
• Payment-based schemes: in this case, an entity is given certain rights upon
making certain (electronic) payment. The identity of the entity making
the request is irrelevant in this case. Subscription-based services fall into
this category.
• Identity-based schemes: in this case an entity is given certain rights based
on some identity (name) the entity claims (and can authenticate). Pre-
existent (real-world) administrative policies, third-party issued creden-
tials, recommender models (a la PGP) fall into this category. In Globe,
an identity claimed by an entity in the context of such trust management
mechanisms is defined as the entity’s external identity, in order to distin-
guish it from a possible local identity that entity may have as part of a
DSO (we will elaborate more on local DSO identities later in this section).
Identity-based schemes are in a sense more “powerful” than payment-based
schemes as they can be employed both by requesters and servers. For example, a
DSO implementing a digital library may serve a user that can be identified as an
ACM student member; a Globe user may be willing to place e-shopping orders
on a DSO modeling an e-commerce application if that DSO can be identified as
belonging to a company certified by the Better Business Bureau. On the other
hand, payment-based schemes only work on the server side: a DSO modeling
an e-newspaper may serve any user that pays the subscription fee. It is hard
to imagine a realistic scenario where a user utilizes a service because the service
pays him!.
In the context of identity-based trust management schemes, we introduce the
general term of trust management credentials to include all the cryptographic
credentials possessed by a Globe entity (user, developer, administrator, DSO,
GOS, etc.) which allow it to authenticate a claimed external identity. Examples
of such credentials are digital identity certificates, PGP-like certificate chains,
and so on.
In the next chapter, we will explain in detail how various trust management
mechanisms can be applied to the specific trust management scenarios listed
above. Instead of describing specific mechanisms, for the rest of this section we
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will focus on some general trust management principles we have applied to the
Globe security architecture.
A Globe entity is represented in a trust management negotiation progress
by a trust management engine. Trust management engines are incorporated
in various parts in the Globe software stack. For example, the trust manage-
ment engine used by DSO administrative replicas to negotiate with users and
GOS servers is represented by the trust management module in the security
subobject. The Globe user runtime (which needs to be installed on any host
prior to accessing Globe DSOs) also provides a trust management engine al-
lowing Globe users to mediate trust relationships with unknown Globe DSOs.
Similarly, the GOS software implementation also includes a trust management
engine for negotiating replica hosting rights with DSO administrative replicas.
In the next chapter we will describe in detail the functionality that needs to
be implemented by the various trust management engines.
The generic trust management decision process in Globe is shown in Fig-
ure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Generic trust management decision process in Globe
The idea is that before their first interaction, two previously unknown Globe
entities R and S (represented by their trust management engines) will exchange
trust management credentials (at least one party—the server—has such cre-
dentials, since payment-based trust management schemes cannot be used on
the requester side). Since an entity may have many such credentials, a pre-
negotiation phase is required to establish which types of credentials each party
requires. If the pre-negotiation is successful (each party has the credentials re-
quired by the other), credentials are exchanged, and the two parties establish a
secure communication channel using cryptographic material in the credentials
(e.g. public keys). If the server employs a payment-based trust management
scheme, an electronic payment protocol then takes place over the secure chan-
nel. At this point, each trust management engine determines all the rights that
can be assigned to the other party. The actual interaction (a method invocation
request, a replica creation request, and so on) also takes place over the secure
channel. Finally, the two parties may create “shortcuts”—that is, update their
internal security policy in order to remember the trust management decision for
subsequent interactions. This involves the following steps:
• create a local identity (local name) for the other party.
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• generate cryptographic credentials allowing the other party to authenti-
cate the newly created local identity.
• associate the rights derived through the trust management process to the
newly created local identity.
Once such “shortcuts” are created, subsequent interactions between R and
S will only require the two parties to authenticate local identities. Based on
these local identities, rights can be immediately inferred. Essentially, the trust
management process is reduced to an access control check.
This process of creating “shortcuts” is particularly important when Globe
entities are expected to repeatedly interact after their initial contact. Trust man-
agement is an expensive process. Pre-negotiating the right credentials, passing
them through trust management engines, electronic payment protocols, are all
likely to require multiple network round-trips, as well as running complex cryp-
tographic algorithms. Going through all this hassle for trivial Globe interactions
(DSO method invocations for instance) would be a performance overkill. For
this reason, the “shortcuts” strategy is extensively used in the case of Globe
interactions that are expected to happen frequently, such as the interactions
among a DSO’s local objects.
The idea is to create a local DSO identity whenever a new local object is
instantiated. Local objects can be either user proxies or replicas. In the next
two sections we examine the generic trust management procedure in each of
these cases:
4.2.1 Trust management—DSO users
In the case of user proxies, the generic trust management procedure works as
follows:
1. A Globe user decides to utilize the services offered by a Globe DSO; the
user’s trust management engine connects to an administrative replica of
that DSO (located using the GLS), and invokes the special registerUser()
administrative method implemented by the replica’s trust management
module.
2. The registerUser() method implements all the trust management negoti-
ation steps described earlier. A secure channel is established between the
administrative replica and the user’s host computer using the replica key,
and possibly cryptographic keys incorporated in the user’s trust manage-
ment credentials.
3. Upon successful trust negotiation, the administrative replica generates a
new, unique for that DSO, user Id; the rights assigned to the user as
a result of the trust management decision are also associated with the
newly generated user Id. The way these rights are encoded and stored is
dependent on the access control mechanisms implemented by that DSO,
to be discussed in Section 4.4.
4. The trust management engine on the user’s side generates a new pub-
lic/private key pair to act as a user key for that DSO. It then passes the
public key to the administrative replica over the secure channel (in order
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to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks). In order to keep track of registered
users, the administrative replica may also store a list of these users and
their associated keys (more details about this are provided in Chapter 5).
5. The administrative replica creates a user certificate, including the user
key, user Id, and possibly access control information encoding the rights
assigned to that user as a result of the trust management decision. The
certificate is signed with the administrative replica key, which in turn
may be certified by other administrative certificates, in a certificate chain
leading up to the DSO key (this will be described in detail in the next
section). The user certificate plus the administrative certificate chain that
links it to the object key form the local user credentials for that DSO.
6. When the Globe runtime on the user side instantiates the user proxy, the
user key and local user credentials are passed as initialization parameters.
Whenever the user proxy connects to one of the DSO’s replicas, it only
passes the local user credentials for authentication. Based on the user
Id, and possibly the access control information incorporated in the user
certificate, each replica can quickly determine the rights associated with
the user, without having to go through the expensive trust management
procedure.
4.2.2 Trust management—DSO replicas
In the case of DSO replicas, the trust management procedure is similar, except
that the negotiating parties are the trust management engine of the administra-
tive entity responsible for creating a new DSO replica, and the trust management
engine of the GOS where the new replica needs to be instantiated. An adminis-
trative entity responsible for creating new replicas can be either a (human) DSO
administrator, or an administrative DSO replica (in the case the DSO supports
dynamic replication). In the first case, the trust management engine is imple-
mented as part of the Globe runtime on the administrator’s computer; in the
second case, the engine is implemented as part of the trust management module
part of the administrative replica’s security subobject. We use the second case
(administrative replica) to illustrate the steps involved in the trust negotiation;
however, the procedure when a human administrator is involved is similar.
1. a DSO administrative replica decides to create a new (regular) DSO replica
on a given GOS. The replication subobject (responsible for dynamic repli-
cation) decides the location of the new replica (the region ID corresponding
to a Globe Infrastructure Directory Service region—see [123]), and then
invokes the createReplica() method (implemented by the replica’s trust
management module), passing it this region ID.
2. the createReplica() method first queries the GIDS server in the selected
region for a list of potential object servers that can host the new replica.
The selection criteria include technical properties (operating system sup-
ported, for instance) as well as security criteria (for example the identity
of the organization that operates the server). We will elaborate on this
selection process in Chapter 5.
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3. the trust management module selects one Globe object server from the
list returned by the GIDS, and contacts it. At this point, the trust man-
agement module on the replica and the one on the GOS perform all the
trust management negotiation steps described earlier. A secure channel
is established between the administrative replica and the GOS using the
replica and GOS keys.
4. upon successful trust negotiation, the administrative replica generates a
new, unique for that DSO replica Id; the rights assigned to the new replica
as a result of the trust management decision are also associated with
the newly generated Id. The way these rights are encoded and stored is
dependent on the access control mechanisms implemented by that DSO,
to be discussed in Section 4.4.
5. the trust management engine on the server side generates a new pub-
lic/private key pair to act as the replica key. It then passes the public key
to the administrative replica over the secure channel (in order to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks).
6. the administrative replica creates a replica certificate, including the replica
key, replica Id, and possibly access control information encoding the rights
assigned to that replica as a result of the trust management decision. The
certificate is signed with the administrative replica key, which in turn
may be certified by other administrative certificates, in a certificate chain
leading up to the DSO key. The replica certificate plus the administra-
tive certificate chain that links it to the object key form the local replica
credentials.
7. when the GOS instantiates the new replica, the replica key and local
replica credentials are passed as initialization parameters. Whenever the
replica interacts with other local objects of the same DSO (user proxies or
other replicas), it will only pass the local replica credentials for authentica-
tion. Based on the replica Id, and possibly the access control information
incorporated in the replica certificate, a local object can quickly determine
the rights associated with the replica, without having to go through the
expensive trust management procedure.
Essentially, by applying this “shortcuts” strategy, each DSO creates its own
trust domain, comprising all its local objects (replicas and user proxies). Each
new local object is accepted into the DSO’s trust domain after a trust man-
agement decision. Once part of the DSO trust domain, a local object has a
local identity, as well as credentials allowing it to authenticate under that iden-
tity; the DSO’s access control policy is also updated to contain all the rights
assigned to that local object. Thus, from a security point of view, interaction
among two DSO local objects is reduced to an authentication phase (each local
object authenticates its local identity using the credentials obtained during the
registration phase) followed by an access control check.
4.3 Authentication
As described in the previous chapter, authentication is the process of securely
associating an action request to the identity of the entity that has issued the
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request.
Authentication is therefore necessary whenever a Globe entity makes an
action request to another Globe entity. We distinguish three distinct cases,
based on the possible types of action requests:
• interaction between two DSO local objects.
• a Globe user registers with a DSO.
• a Globe DSO places a new replica on a GOS.
4.3.1 Authentication during the interaction between DSO
local objects
As explained in Section 4.2, local objects are part of the DSO trust domain;
they have local DSO identities (the user Id for a user proxy, the replica Id
for a replica), as well as credentials allowing them to authenticate their local
identities. The DSO access control policy contains all the rights assigned to
local objects part of the DSO. Thus, an interaction between a local object M
which requests an action a to another local object N follows the pattern bellow:
1. M and N exchange their local credentials.
2. M and N authenticate each other using the cryptographic keys part of
their local credentials. At the end of the authentication protocol, there is
a secure communication channel between M and N.
3. M checks the DSO access control policy to ensure N is allowed to perform
a (we will elaborate on this when discussing access control in Section 4.4).
If the check passes, M sends the action request over the secure channel to
N.
4. N checks the DSO access control policy to ensureM is allowed to request a
(we will elaborate on this when discussing access control in Section 4.4). If
the check passes, N performs the requested action, and returns the results
(if any) to M over the secure channel.
There are two types of interactions possible among local objects: method
invocation requests (between a user proxy and a replica), and internal DSO
operations, such as state updates (between two replicas). We will elaborate
more on the way action requests are encoded, and the way the DSO access
control policy is represented in the next section. In this section we will focus
on the local credentials that allow the two local objects to authenticate and
establish a secure communication channel.
As explained in Section 4.2, whenever a new user or replica are registered
with the DSO, there is a trust management phase. During this phase, the
new entity is assigned a local identity, generates a public/private key pair, and
is issued a digital certificate for the new key. This certificate is signed by the
administrative entity that performs the registration. The generic local certificate
format is shown in Figure 4.5.
A DSO local entity certificate contains the DSO’s object Id, the entity Id
(user Id or replica Id), the entity’s public key, the issue and expiration time, and
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OID
Entity ID
Entity public key
Issue time
Expiration time
Access control information
Signature
Local Certificate
Figure 4.5: Generic local certificate format
some additional information to be used in conjunction with the DSO’s access
control mechanisms. We will elaborate more on the access control information
in Section 4.4; for now, the only requirement is that this information allows
distinguishing among administrative DSO entities (entities that are allowed to
issue certificates to other local objects), and regular DSO entities (normal users
and replicas). To make the discourse simpler, for the rest of this section we will
assume this access control information is reduced to just one “administrative”
bit distinguishing regular DSO entities from administrative entities.
There are two types of administrative entities, humans and replicas. The
human administrative entity is in most cases the object administrator. In special
cases (for large objects) it may be necessary to delegate administrative privileges
to lower-level human administrators. We will explain how this can be done
in Chapter 7, but for now we will assume there is only one (human) object
administrator.
Administrative replicas on the other hand are useful when the DSO follows
a dynamic replication policy. When certain events occur (for example a flash
crowd), administrative replicas can quickly react and create additional replicas
to handle the increased workload.
The first administrative entity registered during the DSO’s lifetime is the
object administrator. This is the human entity that creates the DSO in the
first place, and has access to the object’s private key. Since there is no other
administrative entity for that DSO yet, the object administrator has to register
himself:
• The object administrator generates his own user Id.
• The object administrator generates a new public/private key pair to act
as his administrative key for the object.
• The object administrator creates an administrative certificate including
his user Id, and public key. The administrative bit in the certificate is set.
The administrator signs this certificate with the object’s private key.
Once the object administrator is registered, it will create one or more ad-
ministrative replicas for the DSO. These administrative replicas are in charge
of registering new users, and, if the object employs a dynamic replication algo-
rithm, they are also in charge of creating new replicas. The object administrator
may also (manually) create regular (non-administrative) DSO replicas. For all
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replicas directly created by the object administrator, their local certificates will
be signed with the administrator’s private key. Their local credentials consist
of their local certificates plus the object administrator’s local certificate.
Finally, administrative replicas are responsible for registering users, and cre-
ating additional replicas (some of them possibly having administrative privileges
as well) according to the DSO’s replication policy. For each of these entities,
their local certificate is signed by the administrative replica that has registered
or created it. Their local credentials consist of the entity certificate, plus all
the administrative certificates that link it to the object key. Figure 4.6 shows
an example: here, a user U has registered with an administrative replica A2,
which has been created by another administrative replica A0, which has been
created directly by the object administrator Admin. U’s local user certificate is
signed with A′2s private key. U’s local credentials consist of a certificate chain
including U’s, A′2s, A
′
0s, and Admin’s local certificates.
Administrative: 0
Administrative: 0Administrative: 1
Administrative: 1
Administrative: 1
public key
DSO public key
Administrative: 0
W3A ’s public key ’s public key
Signature
Local certificate
Signature
Local certificate
V ’s public key
Signature
Local certificate
1’s public keyA
Signature
Local certificate
’s public key
Signature
Local certificate
U ’s public key
Signature
Local certificate
Administrative: 1
2A
’s public key0A
Signature
Local certificate
Signature
Admin’s
Local certificate
Administrative: 1
Figure 4.6: The PKI associated with a Globe DSO. Admin denotes the object administrator.
A0, A1, A2, and A3 are DSO replicas. A0, A1, and A2 have administrative privileges, while
A3 does not. U, V , and W are represent DSO users.
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From Figure 4.6 we can see that all the keys and certificates associated with
the various DSO entities form a per-DSO public key infrastructure (PKI). In this
PKI, each DSO entity has some local credentials—a certificate chain that links
its local certificate to the DSO key, which is the root of the PKI. A certificate
chain is valid if it has the following properties:
• each certificate in the chain, except possibly the last one is an adminis-
trative certificate.
• the validity interval (tissue; texpire) of each certificate is strictly included
in the validity interval of its predecessor certificate in the chain.
• none of the certificates in the chain has been revoked.
It is easy to understand now how two DSO entities authenticate prior to their
interaction. The two entities first exchange their local credentials. These cre-
dentials are passed to the authentication module part of the security subobject,
which, together with the revocation module, checks their validity. If credentials
are valid, the two authentication modules engage in a public key authentication
protocol; the outcome of this protocol is that a secure communication channel
is established between the two entities. Action requests and results are then
exchanged over this channel.
The actual authentication protocol is implemented in the authentication
module. For now, our Globe prototype supports the TLS protocol [79] suite
which provides mutual authentication and secure channel establishment (in-
tegrity and secrecy). We use the PureTLS Java implementation [14]; integrating
this library with the rest of the Globe architecture was relatively easy because
essentially the entire functionality of PureTLS is hidden behind the standard
interfaces of the authentication module. Globe developers can opt for different
protocols for their objects, by rewriting the authentication module.
Revocation
Given that each DSO essentially creates its own PKI, authentication protocols
are only half of the story. Another essential (and often neglected) aspect is
certificate revocation. When exceptional circumstances occur—a private key is
compromised or an entity is found to have abused its privileges, so it needs to be
excluded from the DSO—certificates need to be revoked before their expiration
time.
There are a number of revocation mechanisms that can be used; the sim-
plest is to have no revocation at all, simply use arbitrary short-lived certificates.
In this way, the vulnerability time during which a revoked certificate may be
used can be reduced to whatever the issuing authority deems acceptable. How-
ever, in the case of Globe objects, very short-lived certificates would require
frequent wide-area interactions between local representatives and administra-
tive entities (in order to obtain new certificates), which introduce high latency.
A more practical (and widely used) approach is based on certificate revocation
lists (CRLs) [108]. The idea is that the certificate issuer (or another authority
delegated by the issuer) periodically publishes a list of certificates that have
been revoked but have not yet expired. Before accepting a certificate, an entity
must obtain a recent CRL and make sure the certificate is not listed there. A
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number of extensions have been proposed to this basic CRL scheme, includ-
ing CRL distribution points [108, 73], windowed certificate revocation [142],
as well as mechanisms for reducing the size of the revocation data structure
[146, 118, 150].
For Globe, the simplest case is when the object administrator is directly in
charge of certificate revocation, by periodically publishing a CRL and signing
it with the object key. However, in order to guarantee fresh revocation infor-
mation, CRLs need to be generated frequently, so it may be useful to automate
this process. This is accomplished by allowing each DSO to specify a number
of revocation authorities (RAs)—these are special administrative replicas that
are assigned revocation privileges. Each RA uses its replica key to sign the
revocation information it publishes.
For each DSO there are two such CRLs: one listing revoked user certifi-
cates (user CRL) and the other one listing revoked replica certificates (replica
CRL). The reason we provide separate CRL distribution mechanisms for revok-
ing replica and user certificates, is because of their rather different properties.
In the case of user certificates, it is only replicas that are concerned with
checking their revocation status, since direct user to user interactions are not
part of the Globe model. Therefore, the user CRL is only distributed to the
DSO’s replicas. When a new object replica is created, it registers with one of the
DSO’s RAs, which from then on is responsible for providing it with revocation
information by periodically sending it a fresh user CRL, which is passed to
the revocation module by calling the updateCRL() method. Replicas that are
temporary down are responsible for retrieving the latest user CRL when they
come back online.
In the case of replica certificates, the replica CRL needs to be distributed
to both users and replicas, since both user-replica (for method invocation) and
replica-replica (for state update) interactions are possible. Replica certificates
are quite different from the user certificates: they are short lived (in some cases
replicas may last only few hours in order to handle flash-crowd events) and, in
numbers, they are expected to be a few orders of magnitude fewer than user
certificates (one replica should be capable of handling hundreds, even thousands
of users, otherwise there would be no point in replication). Hence, replica CRLs
are much smaller than user CRLs. For this reason, replica CRLs are distributed
using a “pull” mechanism: each replica is responsible for storing the latest copy
of the replica CRL (which it periodically fetches from the RA it is registered
with), which it provides to users proxies if requested during the authentication
protocol. When the authentication module in the proxy receives such a replica
CRL, it passes it to the revocation module by calling the updateCRL() method
of the secRev interface.
4.3.2 Authentication during user registration
Another scenario when two Globe entities need to authenticate is when a Globe
user registers with a DSO. As described in Section 4.2, this registration requires
a trust management process, in order to determine the rights the user should
be assigned, and the amount of trust the user can place on the DSO. Upon
successful registration, a local identity is created for the user (the user Id), the
user receives some local authentication credentials for that identity, and the
DSO’s access control policy is updated to contain the rights assigned to the new
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user (the “shortcuts” strategy, as described in Section 4.2).
At least one of the two entities involved in this process has a public key—
namely the administrative replica that does the registration. This key is certified
by the replica’s local credentials which link it to the DSO key; the DSO key is
in turn certified by the DSO’s trust management credentials. Depending on
the trust management mechanisms employed, those can be identity certificates
signed by external certification authorities, PGP-like trust chains (for exam-
ple a number of other Globe users may collectively “vouch” on a given DSO
trustworthiness), and so on.
From an authentication point of view, we distinguish two cases, depending
on whether the trust management mechanism employed by the DSO is identity-
based or payment-based.
Identity-based mechanisms
In the case of identity-based schemes, the user has an external identity, an (ex-
ternal) public/private key pair, and trust management credentials that link his
external identity to his public key. The user and the administrative replica
mutually authenticate and establish a secure channel by running a public key
authentication protocol using the external user key and the (local) replica key.
The user then sends his local public key (which he generates during the trust
management negotiation) over this secure channel, so that the replica can incor-
porate it into the local user certificate (this is the “shortcuts” strategy described
in Section 4.2). This accomplishes the following:
• The user’s trust management credentials securely link the external user
identity (on which the DSO’s trust management decision is based) to the
external public key used in the authentication protocol.
• The DSO’s trust management credentials allow the user to assess how
much trust can be placed in the DSO, and securely link the DSO (seen as
an abstract service) to its public key.
• The administrative replica’s local credentials securely link the replica’s
public key to the DSO’s public key.
• Because the local user public key is received from a secure channel, the
administrative replica is assured that only the party authenticated as the
user’s external identity (on which the trust management decision is based)
could have send it. As such, it can safely create a local user certificate for
that key, and send it back to the user over the same secure channel.
Payment-based mechanisms
On the other hand, in the case of payment-based trust management, the user’s
identity is irrelevant. In this case, it is only the user that authenticates the
replica, and then establishes a secure channel, using the (local) replica key. The
payment protocol takes place over this secure channel. The user then sends his
local public key (which he generates during the trust management negotiation)
over the same secure channel, so that the replica can incorporate it into the
local user certificate (this is the “shortcuts” strategy described in Section 4.2).
This accomplishes the following:
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• The DSO’s trust management credentials allow the user to assess how
much trust can be placed in the DSO, and securely link the DSO (seen
as an abstract service) to its public key. The payment protocol proceeds
only if the DSO is deemed trustworthy enough to perform the service the
user wants to subscribe to.
• The administrative replica’s local credentials securely link the replica’s
public key to the DSO’s public key. Thus, the user knows it will make the
payment to a legitimate representative of a trusted DSO.
• Because the local user public key is received on the same secure channel
on which the payment protocol takes place, the administrative replica is
assured that only the party that has made the payment (on which the
trust management decision is based) could have sent the public key. The
replica can then safely create a local user certificate for that key, and send
it back to the user over the same secure channel.
4.3.3 Authentication during replica creation
Finally, authentication is required during the interaction between a GOS and a
DSO administrative entity (human or replica) that wants to create a new DSO
replica on that GOS.
Both parties involved in this interaction have public/private key pairs: the
replica key and the GOS key. The replica key is linked through the replica’s
local credentials to the DSO’s key, which in turn is linked to the DSO’s exter-
nal identity through the DSO’s trust management credentials. The GOS trust
management credentials link the GOS key to the GOS’ external identity.
As explained in Section 4.2, during the trust management phase, the ad-
ministrative replica and the GOS mutually authenticate and establish a secure
channel by running a public key authentication protocol. The administrative
replica key and the GOS key are used in this protocol. The administrative
replica then sends the replica creation request, possibly followed by the object
code needed to instantiate the new replica over this secure channel. The GOS
generates a new public/private key pair for the new replica, and sends the public
key back to the administrative replica, over the same secure channel. The ad-
ministrative replica incorporates this key in a new replica certificate, and sends
it back to the GOS. This accomplishes the following:
• The DSO’s trust management credentials allow the GOS to assess whether
it should host one of the DSO’s replicas. They also securely link the DSO
external identity to its public key.
• The administrative replica’s local credentials securely link the replica’s
public key to the DSO’s public key. Thus, the GOS knows the replica
creation request comes from a legitimate representative of a trusted DSO.
• The GOS’ trust management credentials allow the administrative replica
to assess whether the GOS is trustworthy enough to host one of the DSO’s
replicas. They also securely link the GOS external identity to its public
key.
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• Because the replica creation request is received on a secure channel, the
GOS knows that only the party authenticated as the DSO’s administrative
replica could have sent it. Since that replica has been deemed trustworthy
enough to instantiate a new replica on the GOS, the action can proceed.
• Because the administrative replica receives the public key for the newly
created replica over a secure channel, it knows that only the party au-
thenticated as the GOS’ external identity (which has been deemed as
trustworthy enough to host a new DSO replica) could have sent it. The
administrative replica can then safely create a local replica certificate for
that key, and send it back to the GOS over the same secure channel.
4.4 Access Control
As explained earlier in this chapter, access control logically follows a trust man-
agement decision: essentially, trust management deals with negotiating usage
rights over protected resources between two entities in different administrative
domains. Once rights have been negotiated, they can be enforced by means of
access control mechanisms.
Conceptually, there are two types of protected resources in Globe: resources
associated with GOS servers, and resources associated with Globe DSOs. In
the case of GOS servers, protected resources include memory, CPU time, disk
space, network bandwidth, and so on. Rights to use these resources are granted
to DSO replicas during the trust management part of the replica creation process
(which we briefly discussed in Section 4.2). These rights are then enforced by
the GOS during the replica lifetime. The enforcement mechanisms that can
be used for GOS protection are based on low-level resource usage monitoring
and sandboxing, and do not fit properly with the reference monitor model that
defines access control. For this reason, we will discuss them in Section 4.6 when
we talk about platform protection.
In this section we will focus on the second class of protected resources in
Globe—namely those associated with DSOs. DSO protected resources fall into
three categories:
• The services provided by the DSO to its users; these can be accessed only
through the DSO’s public methods.
• The DSO state. As explained in Chapter 2, this can be modified only by
the DSO’s replicas through private DSO methods, such as state update().
Here we view a state change as the propagation of DSO internal data from
one replica to the others, as opposed to the change of a replica’s internal
data as a result of a user method invocation.
• The DSO internal structure. This includes the replicas part of the DSO
and its user population. The DSO internal structure is modified through
the special administrative methods: registerUser(), createReplica(), re-
vokeUser(), and revokeReplica().
Since all DSO protected resources can be accessed only through the DSO’s
methods, it seems that access control in Globe would reduce to ensuring that
parties invoking these methods have been assigned the appropriate rights, as
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in the classical reference monitor model. However, replication makes it more
difficult to apply this model to Globe DSOs for the following reasons:
• There is no single point of enforcement. A DSO is not a monolithic entity,
but rather the set of all its local representatives.
• Not all DSO replicas may be equally trustworthy, since, as explained in
Chapter 2, the Globe DSO replication model allows replicas to be placed
on GOSes controlled by third parties, which may be only marginally
trusted.
We address the first issue by having a reference monitor for each DSO local
representative in the form of the access control module of its security subob-
ject. Before the local representative performs any action that may affect DSO
protected resources, this module performs the access control check; the action
is performed only if the check succeeds. We will elaborate more on this once we
explain the types of rights that can be associated with Globe DSOs.
In the reference monitor model, the only types of rights are rights to request
actions on protected resources. However, action request rights alone fail to cap-
ture the fact that not all DSO replicas have the same degree of trustworthiness.
In order to address this issue, we introducing a new class of rights that can be
associated with Globe DSOs—method execution rights. As the name suggests,
a method execution right represents a permission (given to a DSO replica) to
execute one of the DSOs methods (in order to serve a method invocation re-
quest from a user or from another replica). We define reverse access control as
the enforcement method execution rights. In this way, it is possible to capture
the fact that not all DSO replicas are equally trustworthy by assigning them
different method execution rights.
In addition to method invocation and method execution rights, a third class
of rights associated with Globe DSOs are administrative rights. These are rights
to grant method invocation rights (to users and replicas), grant method execu-
tion rights (to replicas), and further delegate administrative rights to other DSO
administrative entities (users and replicas). In the Globe access control model,
an administrative entity implicitly has all the rights that it is allowed to grant
(the delegation rule). It is easy to see that without this delegation rule, an
administrative entity could escalate its rights, by granting itself the rights that
does not have but has the permission to grant.
To summarize, there are three types of rights that can be used to protect
DSO resources:
• Method invocation rights—these are rights to invoke the DSO’s methods.
A DSO entity E granted an invocation right for method M has the right
to invoke M on any replica (part of that DSO) that is allowed to exe-
cute M . This type of rights are typically granted to the DSO’s users,
but may be also granted to replicas. For example, an active replication
algorithm may be implemented by having each replica propagate all the
write method invocation requests it receives to all the other replicas. In
this case, the replica should be granted method invocation rights for all
the write methods it is allowed to handle.
• Method execution rights—these are rights to execute the DSO’s methods,
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and can only be granted to the DSO’s replicas. We define the process of
enforcing method execution rights as reverse access control.
• Administrative rights—these are rights to grant and revoke rights to DSO
entities. Administrative rights may be granted both to DSO users and to
DSO replicas.
Rights are granted to users when they register with the DSO by invoking
the registerUser() method on an administrative DSO replica. Similarly, rights
are granted to replicas when they are instantiated by administrative DSO enti-
ties upon the invocation of the createReplica() method. Given this, the Globe
administrative rights are method execution rights for registerUser() and cre-
ateReplica(). There are no method invocation rights associated with these meth-
ods, since the parties that invoke them (users and object servers) are authorized
as result of trust management decisions, as explained in Section 4.2.
At this point we can further explain the way the access control modules in
each DSO local object do rights enforcement. The Globe access control model
is shown in Figure 4.7:
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5. PerformRequester 1. Action
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Requester System
Figure 4.7: The Globe access control model
Essentially, there are two entities that participate in each Globe access con-
trol decision: the requester (R)—the party that requests an action M (a method
invocation) to be performed on a protected resource, and the server (S)—the
party that performs the requested action. Before interacting, the two entities
establish a secure, authenticated communication channel; the method invoca-
tion request and the results are exchanged over this channel. Based on the types
of entities participating, and the type of action requested, we distinguish the
following cases:
• A user invokes a method on a DSO replica. In this case R is a user, S is a
replica, and M is one of the DSO’s public methods. In this case, R (more
exactly, the access control module part of R’s user proxy) is responsible
for the reverse access control check—ensuring that S has been granted a
method execution right for M. On the other hand S (more exactly, the
access control module part of S) is responsible for the (forward) access
control check—ensuring that R has been granted a method invocation
right for M.
• A replica invokes a state update on another replica. In this case R and
S are both replicas, and M is one of the DSO’s private methods. R is
responsible for the reverse access control check—ensuring that S has been
granted a method execution right for M. S is responsible for the (forward)
access control check—ensuring that R has been granted a method invoca-
tion right for M.
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• A user registers with the DSO. In this case R is a user, S is an adminis-
trative replica, and M is the registerUser() administrative method. In this
case, R is responsible for the reverse access control check—ensuring that
S has been granted a method execution right for registerUser(). However,
in this case there is no (forward) access control check, decision whether
to accept R as a user, as well as the specific rights that it should be
granted are the result of the trust management negotiation, as explained
in Section 4.2.
• A new DSO replica is instantiated on a GOS. In this case R is the admin-
istrative replica that creates the new replica, and S is the GOS that will
host the new replica. In this case, S is responsible for the reverse access
control check—ensuring that S has been granted a method execution right
for createReplica(). However, in this case there is no (forward) access con-
trol check, decision whether to accept S as a hosting server, as well as the
specific rights that should be granted to the replica it hosts are the result
of the trust management negotiation, as explained in Section 4.2.
We can see that the Globe access control model is discretionary with respect
to method invocation and method execution rights. An entity that has been
granted a method invocation right for M is supposed to enforce the correct
execution ofM, by ensuring it sends invocation requests only to entities that have
been granted execution rights for M. The same applies for method execution
rights: an entity that has been granted such rights for M is supposed to enforce
the correct invocation of M, by only executing requests from entities that have
been granted the appropriate invocation rights. Before showing how the actual
checks can be done, we need to explain how rights are expressed.
4.4.1 Expressing and storing rights
Since all rights that can be associated with Globe DSOs deal with invocation
and execution of methods, a simple way to express all the rights granted to
a DSO entity is to have two lists—one containing all the methods the entity
is allowed to invoke, and the other one containing all the methods the entity
is allowed to execute. In this case, the access control granularity is set to
method level: an entity is either allowed to invoke/execute a method or it is
not. However, certain applications may require a more refined access control
granularity; for example, an e-banking application may require different security
properties when requesting the same action—a money transfer—depending on
the amount being transfered. In Chapter 7 we will describe a more complex
access control framework that can express such fine-grained policies (based on
method parameter values, as well as on other constraints). However, for the sake
of simplicity, in this chapter we only consider access control on a method-level
granularity.
In order to have a more compact way to encode rights, we associate a
method ID (a small integer) with each of the DSO methods (public and pri-
vate). The method name—method ID mapping is kept by each DSO in a special
method mapping data structure. The two administrative methods registerUser()
and createReplica() are always assigned method IDs 0 and 1. This convention
is enforced for all Globe DSO; the reason for this is that these methods are
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called by the Globe runtime on behalf of users and object servers before a user
proxy or replica are instantiated, and thus before the method mapping data
structure is in place; as a result, without having standardized method IDs it
would be impossible for users and GOSes to perform the access control checks
on registerUser() and createReplica().
Given this method name—method ID mapping, the rights associated with a
Globe entity can be encoded as two bitmaps—the forward access control bitmap
and the reverse access control bitmap. In each of these bitmaps, a bit at position
n encodes the rights with respect to invocation/execution of the method with
method ID equal to n: a 1 value grants the right, while a 0 value denies it.
Figure 4.8 shows a simple example.
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Figure 4.8: Method mapping and sample access control bitmaps for a DSO modeling a dis-
tributed file system using master-slave replication
The only problem left is the way these bitmaps are stored. Here we need to
consider two aspects:
• Availability—a DSO entity should be able to quickly locate the bitmaps
associated with other DSO entities with which it interacts, in order to
perform the access control and reverse access control checks.
• Integrity—only authorized administrative entities should be able to cre-
ate/modify these bitmaps, since only these are allowed to grant rights.
A naive solution would be to have each DSO local representative store all the
bitmaps associated with all other representatives part of the DSO. Essentially,
this would correspond to the classic access control list (ACL) mechanism from
the reference monitor model. A local representative would have to obtain this
list at the time it is initialized, before it interacts with any other DSO entities
(otherwise it would not be able to perform the access control checks for inter-
actions prior to obtaining the list). To preserve integrity, this access control list
could be signed with the DSO key, which is the root of trust for the object.
However, this naive approach makes it hard to ensure availability of access
control information. Essentially, each time a new user registers, or a new replica
is created, their corresponding bitmaps would have to be propagated to all the
DSO local representatives. For massively replicated DSOs, maintaining ACL
consistency among all local representatives could be a daunting task.
Fortunately, we have a better solution, which takes advantage of the local
authentication credentials associated with each DSO entity (described in Sec-
tion 4.3). The idea is that for each DSO entity, we incorporate the access control
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bitmaps into the entity’s certificate. Figure 4.9 shows the sample DSO-centric
PKI that was introduced in Section 4.3, augmented with access control bitmaps
for each certificate.
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Figure 4.9: The sample DSO-centric PKI that was introduced in Section 4.3, augmented with
access control bitmaps for each certificate. The method mapping is showed in the upper-right
corner.
This solution provides excellent availability properties: essentially, two DSO
entities that interact obtain all the necessary access control information during
the authentication phase. Furthermore, each local representative only has to
store its own access control information, instead of a global ACL, which is an
advantage for large DSOs. The only drawback of this solution is that granting
new rights/withdrawing existing ones requires issuing a new set of credentials,
and possibly revoking existing ones. However, this can be handled through the
same revocation mechanisms used during the authentication process.
In order to handle the integrity constraint, we need to ensure that rights
can only be assigned by administrative entities in a correct manner, namely, an
administrative entity cannot grant more rights than it itself has been delegated.
This introduces some additional constraints on the local credentials format:
• Each certificate chain must start with the object administrator’s certifi-
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cate, which by definition holds all possible rights. Thus, the bitmaps in
the administrator’s certificate should be all 1’s.
• Each certificate in the chain, except possibly the last one, must be an
administrative certificate. Based on the way rights are encoded, this means
an administrative certificate needs to have at least one of the first two
bits in the reverse access control bitmap set—corresponding to rights to
execute registerUser() or createReplica().
• Each certificate in the chain must conform to the delegation rule, which
states that an administrative entity cannot grant more rights than it ac-
tually has. This means that the bitmaps in each certificate are subsets of
the bitmaps in its predecessor certificate in the chain.
When two DSO entities authenticate, each party performs these checks on
the other party’s local credentials. If all these checks pass, each party passes
the other party’s bitmaps to the access control module, by calling the reg-
isterRights() function on the secAC interface. The access control module is
responsible for rights enforcement.
The last problem we need to look at is the way local objects acting as action
requesters find replicas allowed to execute their requests. We solve this problem
by incorporating reverse access control bitmaps in the replica contact record at
the Globe Location Service. The GLS supports queries on individual bits part
of these bitmaps. It is important to understand that the GLS does not have to
be trusted, the contact records it returns to such queries are treated as mere
“hints”. A replica is “trusted” to have execution rights for a given method only
upon authentication, and only if the bitmap in its local certificate has the bit
corresponding to that method ID set. Given this, the only harm a malicious
GLS server can cause is reduced to denial of service—namely pointing clients to
replicas that cannot serve their requests because they do not have the necessary
execution rights.
4.4.2 Discussion
For the sake of simplicity, in this chapter we only consider a relatively coarse-
grained access control model, where the unit of protection is the DSO method.
While this may be sufficient for many application scenarios, there may be cases
that require finer access control granularity, to the level of method parameter
values. For example, in the case of a medical database modeled as a Globe
DSO it may be necessary not only to restrict which users may access the read
methods, but also restricts which records each user is allowed to read (e.g. a
doctor is only allowed to inspect her patients’ the health records, and not any
record in the database).
A possible solution to the fin-grained rights management problem is role-
based access control (RBAC) [173]. This is a new framework for expressing
and enforcing access control in the context of large organizations where rights
associated with entities can be complex, may frequently change, and there is no
single point of enforcement. Under the RBAC framework, entities are granted
membership into roles based on their competencies and responsibilities in the
organization. The operations that an entity is permitted to perform are based
on that entity’s role. In the RBAC context, there is a substantial amount of
70 CHAPTER 4. THE GLOBE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
research [174, 172, 113] showing how fine-grained access control policies can
be expressed and enforced ( [113]in particular discusses RBAC in a wide-area,
decentralized application scenario, not very different from the one envisioned
for Globe applications).
Given these considerations, it makes sense to incorporate RBAC with the
Globe security architecture. In Chapter 7 we describe how this can be done,
and present a RBAC policy language which can support fine-grained rights
management. It is important to understand that the RBAC constructs covered
in Chapter 7 do not super-seed the basic access control model presented in this
chapter, but rather they provide an extension which can be used when a DSO
application requires fine-grained rights management. In fact, the basic Globe
access control model discussed so far has an “RBAC-flavor” in the sense that
the FACB/RACB combinations associated with DSO entities can be viewed as
role identifiers.
4.5 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key strengths of Globe is that DSO
local representatives are decoupled from the resources/physical infrastructure
on which they run, since DSO administrators have the option of creating replicas
on Globe object servers outside of their administrative control. It is important
to stress that Globe provides this feature as additional flexibility given to DSO
administrators for choosing the replication strategy that best fits their needs,
as opposed to a design constraint. Each DSO is free to choose any policy with
respect to which servers are allowed to host its replicas. While for highly secure
applications such as e-banking, running on untrusted infrastructure may be
unacceptable, there are many less security-critical scenarios where replication
on marginally trusted platforms can be extremely beneficial, as demonstrated
by the advent of content delivery networks and grid applications.
Deciding on how much trustworthiness to demand from the hosting infras-
tructure is ultimately a cost/benefits analysis problem for DSO administrators.
Nevertheless, perfect security is practically impossible, so for any DSO we need
to consider the possibility that at least some of its replicas may be corrupted,
either due to malicious GOS administrators, or to vulnerabilities in the hosting
platform itself (in the operating system, or in the GOS code). In this context,
it becomes essential to provide mechanisms for Byzantine fault tolerance.
Looking at the list of possible Byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms that can
be applied to Globe DSOs, we can divide them into two categories, depending
on the way they handle potential damage caused by faulty (malicious) DSO
replicas:
• Damage control: this class of mechanisms focus on limiting the amount
of damage malicious replicas can cause, as well as detecting this damage
after it has occurred and attempting to take corrective action.
• Damage prevention: this class of mechanisms focus on preventing mali-
cious replicas from causing any damage, except possibly denial-of-service.
Clearly, preventing damage is better than limiting it, but as we will show,
damage prevention mechanisms are considerably more expensive to implement
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(in terms of resource usage). For this reason, we aim to provide both types of
mechanisms; individual Globe DSO administrators can then decide which ones
are more appropriate for their objects through a costs/benefits analysis.
4.5.1 Byzantine fault tolerance—damage control
In this section we present two techniques for achieving damage control: by
means of reverse access control, and by means of auditing.
Damage control through reverse access control
One way to do damage control is through the reverse access control mechanisms
described in Section 4.4. Recall that replicas are granted method execution
rights that specify which of the DSO’s methods they are allowed to handle.
In this way, execution of security-sensitive actions can be restricted to replicas
running on trusted hosts. For example, the object owner can select a trusted
group of core replicas, and set a security policy where all methods that change
the DSO’s state are executed only on these core replicas. The core replicas
can propagate state updates to a much larger set of less-trusted cache replicas,
which only serve read requests. Although malicious cache replicas can choose to
ignore state updates, or even return bogus data as answers to read requests, the
harm they can do is limited for two reasons. First, such bogus data is sent only
to that fraction of users that are connected to the malicious cache. Second, the
reverse access control mechanism prohibits a malicious cache from propagating
bogus state updates to other caches. There are applications for which a great
deal of harm can be done sending bogus data even to a small percentage of the
users (stock quotes for example). In such a case, damage prevention Byzantine
fault tolerance mechanisms need to be considered.
Damage control through auditing
Another way to do damage control is through auditing results produced by
untrusted replicas. This technique ensures that a malicious replica returning
bogus results to clients is eventually detected and excluded from the DSO. In
order to achieve this, it is necessary to have the ability to link a given method
invocation result to the particular replica that has computed it. This goal can
be achieved by having each replica sign the results it produces using its replica
key. Auditing involves the following steps:
• The user proxy and the replica authenticate and establish a secure com-
munication channel.
• The proxy sends the method invocation request to the replica over the
secure channel.
• The replica executes the request, and creates a “pledge” packet containing,
among other things, a hash (SHA-1 of the result, and a hash of the original
request. The “pledge” packet is signed using the replica key.
• The proxy accepts the result if the hashes in the pledge match the original
request and the result value, and if the signature is correct.
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• The proxy forwards the original request and the signed pledge to a trusted
DSO replica designated as an auditor.
• The auditor collects requests and pledges and verifies them by re-executing
the requests and ensuring the result matches the hash in the pledge.
• If a given result does not match a pledge, the auditor has irrefutable
evidence the replica that has signed the pledge is malicious. At this point,
it can take corrective action by excluding the malicious replica from the
DSO (essentially revoking its replica certificate).
Auditing is well suited for methods that do not modify the DSO state
(“reads”). For “write” methods, auditing is less useful; essentially, a malicious
replica can return the correct result for a write request to the client, but still fail
to correctly update the DSO state (for example, by not propagating the write
to other replicas). In this case, the auditing mechanism will fail to detect the
replica misbehavior. For this reason, the auditing method is most effective when
used in conjunction with a reverse access control policy that restricts execution
of “write” methods only by trusted replicas. In this way, “write” methods are
guaranteed to be correctly executed, while potential misbehavior from untrusted
replicas executing “read” requests will eventually be detected through auditing.
We want to stress that in this chapter we only provide an overview of this
auditing technique. There are many details that need to be explained: for
example, when checking pledges, the auditor needs to be aware of state changes
during the time the result was computed by a replica, and the time the pledge
is checked. There is also the question whether the auditor is able to keep up
with its workload, since it likely has to check pledges from a large number of
untrusted replicas. We will explore all these issues in detail in Chapter 8.
4.5.2 Byzantine fault tolerance—damage prevention
In this section we present two techniques for achieving damage prevention: by
means of state signing, and by means of state machine replication.
Damage prevention through state signing
One technique that can be used for damage prevention is state signing. The idea
is to have the results of “read” operations signed by a trusted party; a client
can then receive these results from untrusted replicas; if the signature can be
verified, the result is guaranteed to be correct. In this case, the only damage
a malicious replica can do is denial-of-service, by returning bogus results to
read operations. However, bogus results will not have the right signature, so
the clients can simply ignore them, and request the read again from another
replica. The DSO key is the prime candidate for the signing key, since it is the
root of trust for the object.
A scenario where this technique is particularly useful is a Globe-powered
static Web site (GlobeDoc, as described in [181]). Such a site can have all its
individual documents time-stamped and signed with the object’s key, so that
for each GET request, the client’s proxy can check that the untrusted cache
has returned a valid document. However, state signing is an application-specific
solution, which can only be applied in certain circumstances:
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• There is a finite set of possible results for read operations. This is nec-
essary, since all these potential results need to be signed beforehand with
the object key.
• The DSO state, and implicitly the values for all the possible read opera-
tions do not change frequently. Otherwise, the trusted replica that does
the signing would have to frequently re-sign results modified as a result of
state updates, and this is an expensive operation.
• The application can tolerate stale results being sent to its users. Since
a stale result is still correctly signed, an untrusted replica can return it
to clients even after a state update. In order to limit the time period a
stale result can be accepted by clients, a timestamp can be signed together
with the result; clients should reject results older than some application
specific freshness period. However, if this freshness period is too short,
the replica that does the signing would have to frequently re-sign results
with updated timestamps (in order to keep them valid), and this is an
expensive operation.
Damage prevention through state machine replication
Finally, another technique that can be used for damage prevention is state ma-
chine replication [176, 65]. The idea is for the client to invoke the same method
on a number of replicas (quorum in the terminology introduced in [65]), and
accept the result only when the same value is returned by the group majority.
Although this ensures very good protection against malicious replicas (in this
case a number of malicious replicas need to collude in order to pass an erroneous
result to the client), this technique is expensive:
• The amount of computing resources needed to handle one request is mul-
tiplied by the size of the quorum.
• The client-perceived latency for the request is dictated by the highest
latency of all replicas in the quorum.
Clearly, here we have a tradeoff between security and efficiency: a larger
quorum size increases security (since more malicious replicas need to collude in
order to pass an erroneous result), but also increases the amount of resources
needed (more replicas), and possibly the client-perceived latency. Given this, it
may be useful to have different quorum sizes for different operations, depending
on how sensitive these operations are with respect to the DSO functioning. It
may also be useful to be able to specify the makeup of the quorum set, in
terms of the trustworthiness of the member replicas. For example, a smaller
quorum composed of reasonably trustworthy replicas may offer better security
guarantees than a larger one made up of untrusted replicas. We tackle both
these issues by introducing a new policy language for expressing access control
and reverse access control. This language is described in detail in Chapter 7.
4.6 Platform Security
As explained in Chapter 2, the Globe middleware allows DSO replicas to be
instantiated on object servers controlled by third parties (outside the control
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of the DSO administrator). In the previous section we discussed techniques for
protecting DSOs against malicious GOS administrators that may corrupt their
replicas. In this section we look at remote replica hosting from the opposite
point of view, and focus on mechanisms for protecting object servers against
attacks from the replicas they host.
In this context, the types of security issues we need to consider fall into two
categories:
• Mechanisms allowing isolated execution of replica code, in order to pre-
vent attacks that malicious replicas may attempt to launch against other
replicas hosted on the same GOS, or against the GOS itself.
• Mechanisms for preventing denial of service attacks.
4.6.1 Isolated execution of hosted replicas
As explained in Chapter 3, sandboxing is a protection technique where untrusted
code is executed in an isolated runtime environment (sandbox). Potential mal-
ware incorporated into untrusted code may be able to compromise resources
inside the sandbox, but it cannot reach any resources outside it. The basic idea
for preventing potentially malicious replicas hosted on a GOS from compromis-
ing other hosted replicas or even the GOS itself, is to have the GOS run each
replica in a dedicated sandbox. We want to stress that the focus of this thesis
is not on designing new sandboxing mechanisms, but rather on using existing
ones. Since our GOS prototype is primarily implemented in Java, we decided
to use the Java sandboxing mechanisms and implemented custom sandboxing
of untrusted local representatives, which still allows replicas (controlled) access
to persistent storage. Essentially, our GOS prototype implementation defines
a separate Java protection domain [103] for each local representative; the per-
missions associated with each protection domain are based on the identity of
DSO whose replica runs in that domain; these permissions are negotiated during
the trust management phase of the replica creation. Because the Java security
model assigns permissions based on class code authentication, we require that
DSOs sign all the classes that are used for instantiating their replicas using the
DSO key.
4.6.2 Denial of service attacks
One last set of issues we need to address in order to have a complete plat-
form protection architecture regards mechanisms for preventing denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. Depending on the source, we can group DoS attacks into two
broad categories:
• Host-based: the attack comes from the same host where the GOS is lo-
cated, i.e. from one of the DSO replicas run by the GOS.
• Network-based: the attack comes from the network.
Host-based DoS
Host-based DoS attacks are caused by the malware part of a malicious replica
code. In the presence of good sandboxing mechanisms, each replica runs in
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isolation in its own sandbox, so for a malicious replica it should be impossible
to compromise either the GOS or any of the other hosted replicas. However,
most sandboxing tools (and the Java protection domain model in particular)
can only guarantee isolated execution, in the sense that isolated processes are
assigned their own private memory space, possibly some private storage space
on the host file system. Isolated malicious replicas can still cause harm by
excessively consuming shared resources, such as CPU time, memory space, or
network bandwidth. The general technique for preventing this is resource usage
monitoring. Depending on the runtime used for the GOS, resource monitoring
tools may be implemented either as extensions of the virtual machine environ-
ment (for example the JRes [75] or JSeal [183] toolkits for Java), or as OS kernel
plug-ins (for example the Janus [100] toolkit for UNIX-based systems). As with
sandboxing, the focus of this thesis is on re-using existing resource monitoring
tools, rather than designing new ones. Given that our GOS prototype is im-
plemented in Java, it should be straightforward to extend it to use Java-based
resource management toolkits, such as JRes. In order to support such tools, the
GOS trust management engine (which will be described in Chapter 5) allows
for negotiation of CPU, memory, and network bandwidth usage limits during
the replica creation process.
Network-based DoS
There are two types of network-based denial of service attacks—low level and
high level, depending on the network stack layer targeted. Low level attacks
target the TCP layer. Probably the most common example is the TCP SYN
flooding attack—where a malicious entity sends a large number of TCP SYN
packets to the target, but does not continue with the correct TCP handshake.
The target host is left with a large number of “half-open” connections which
fill the TCP connections table; in the end, the target may refuse legitimate
connections because of this TCP resource exhaustion. The standard solution
against such an attack is “SYN cookies” [51].
SYN cookies are particular choices of initial TCP sequence numbers by TCP
servers. The difference between the server’s initial sequence number and the
client’s initial sequence number is:
• top 5 bits: tmod32, where t is a 32-bit time counter that increases every
64 seconds;
• next 3 bits: an encoding of an MSS selected by the server in response to
the client’s MSS;
• bottom 24 bits: a server-selected secret function of the client IP address
and port number, server IP address and port number, and t.
This choice of sequence number complies with the basic TCP requirement
that sequence numbers increase slowly; the server’s initial sequence number
increases slightly faster than the client’s initial sequence number.
A server that uses SYN cookies does not have to drop connections when its
SYN queue fills up. Instead it sends back a SYN+ACK, exactly as if the SYN
queue had been larger. (Exceptions: the server must reject TCP options such as
large windows, and it must use one of the eight MSS values that it can encode.)
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When the server receives an ACK, it checks that the secret function works for
a recent value of t, and then rebuilds the SYN queue entry from the encoded
MSS.
By incorporating this protection mechanism into the communication subob-
ject of Globe DSO, we can achieve good protection against TCP SYN flooding
attacks.
The other class of network DoS attacks target the protocol stack above the
TCP layer. For example, the SSL/TLS layer can be targeted by sending connec-
tion requests that are rejected because of authentication failure. Alternatively,
it is possible to target the application layer, by sending method invocation re-
quests that cannot be executed because the requester does not have the neces-
sary method invocation rights. In both cases, the target host needs to to certain
amount of processing on these invalid requests before rejecting them, and this
wastes CPU cycles.
The general technique we use to prevent such attacks is to have the commu-
nication subobject keep a special data structure—the “black list”, which keeps
track of the IP addresses of hosts that have sent invalid requests. Each new
connection request is checked against the black list, and if the initiator IP ad-
dress is found there, the connection is dropped without further processing. This
greatly reduces the amount of CPU time that can be wasted for invalid requests.
Entries are kept in the “black list” only a limited time (typically one day). This
ensures that a host that has been compromised (and used as a platform for
launching network-based DoS attacks), but has recovered, is not banned forever
from contacting DSO replicas.
4.7 The Life cycle of a Secure Globe DSO
At this point we have examined all the requirements areas identified in Chap-
ter 3, and explain the various techniques that can be employed to handle these
requirements. This section presents an example taking the reader through all
the life stages of a secure Globe object, which include:
• creating the object.
• creating and managing its replicas.
• registering users with the object.
• the secure method invocation process.
This should make it easier to understand how the Globe security architecture
actually works.
4.7.1 Creating a DSO
In this section we elaborate on the process of creating a secure Globe DSO. This
process involves a number of (logical) steps: selecting the DSO code, creating
the object’s “blueprints”, obtaining the DSO’s trust management credentials,
generating the administrative key and its corresponding certificate, and regis-
tering the DSO with the GNS.
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Selecting the DSO code
When creating a new Globe DSO, the first step the administrator needs to take
is to select the classes required to instantiate the object’s local representatives.
As explained in Chapter 2, the administrator may code some of these classes
herself; however the full power of the Globe programming model can harnessed
by re-using class packages implementing frequently used subobjects (such as the
replication and communication subobjects).
When using foreign code, there is the threat of malware incorporated into
this code that may subvert the DSO functionality. Essentially, the DSO admin-
istrator needs to decide how much trust can be placed in the foreign code he
wants to use for his object. In order to facilitate this trust management decision,
we require reusable Globe class code to be signed with the private key of the
developer that produced it. The developer key is in turn certified by whatever
external identity certificates the developer may have. To support the Globe
experiment, we run one certification authority called Fuego. In order to issue a
certificate, Fuego requires developers to physically authenticate by means of a
national Id or passport. Other certification authorities (such as VeriSign) can
be used as well.
The idea is that before using third-party code, the DSO administrator ex-
amines the identity certificates for the developer that wrote the code. The
decision on whether to use this third-party code can then based on the devel-
oper’s identity. For example most Linux users are comfortable with code written
(or endorsed) by Linus Torvalds; the GNU crowd may be comfortable with code
written (or endorsed) by Richard Stallman, and so on.
Creating the object blueprints
Once the object administrator has selected all the necessary classes, she gener-
ates a new public/private key pair to serve as the DSO key. The secure hash
(SHA-1) of the public key becomes the object Id for the new DSO. The ad-
ministrator then creates a number of object blueprints—these are archives that
contain all the classes required to instantiate the various types of local repre-
sentatives for the new object. For example, there may be one blueprint for
user proxies, and one blueprint for regular replicas (regular replicas require the
classes for instantiating the semantics subobject, while user proxies do not im-
plement it). Blueprints may contain actual code, or references to code, in the
case of well-known classes part of the Globe standard distribution. Blueprints
are signed with the object key; in this way it is possible for the parties that
instantiate local representatives (the DSO’s users and the GOSes that host its
replicas) to transfer the trust they place in the object (which in turn is derived
during the trust management negotiation) to the code they need to run in order
to interact with the DSO.
Obtaining the DSO’s trust management credentials
The object administrator may then want to obtain a number of trust man-
agement credentials for the new object. Essentially, this involves linking the
object’s public key to some external PKI. For example, the administrator may
have an external identity, certified through identity certificates in an external
PKI (e.g. VeriSign). In this case, the administrator may want to link the new
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DSO to his identity, by using his identity private key (the private key corre-
sponding to the public key in his identity certificate) to sign a digital certificate
for the object key (essentially claiming responsibility for the services provided
by the DSO). Alternatively, the administrator may link the DSO to the orga-
nization to which it belongs, by requesting the organization to sign an identity
certificate for the object key. Trust management credentials allow trust to be
extended from the external identity that claims responsibility for the services
provided by the DSO, to the DSO itself.
Generating the administrative key and certificate
The object administrator then generates a new public/private key pair to serve
as his administrative key for the object. The administrator registers himself
with the object by creating an administrative certificate for this key, and signs
it with the object key. Given that the administrator has all the possible rights
that can associated with the object, the forward and reverse access control
bitmaps in the administrative certificate have all the bits set, except the ones
for invocation of registerUser and execution of createReplica (see Section 4.4).
Registering the DSO with the GNS
Finally, the object administrator needs to register the newly created object
with the GNS. The security policies enforced by GNS for registering names are
described in [45], and are outside the scope of this thesis. In general, they closely
follow the policies used for registering DNS names.
Once the object name is registered with the GNS, the administrator can
start deploying the DSO by creating replicas.
4.7.2 Creating and managing DSO replicas
Once the DSO administrator has created the object blueprint, has registered the
object name with the GDN and has obtained all the necessary trust management
credentials, it can start deploying the DSO by placing replicas on GOSes on the
Internet.
The decision on how many replicas are necessary, and where they should be
placed, is partly dependent on the object’s replication and fault tolerance needs.
One common scenario is for the object administrator to create one administra-
tive replica, which is then responsible for registering users and possibly creating
other replicas (when the DSO employs a dynamic replication algorithm). Al-
ternatively, the administrator may manually created all the replicas needed by
the object.
Creating a new DSO replica by the object administrator involves the follow-
ing steps (in the case of dynamic replication, administrative replicas follow a
similar procedure):
1. The administrator decides that a new DSO replica is needed. The ad-
ministrator selects the location for the new replica, which is specified as
a GIDS region ID. The administrator also selects the technical and secu-
rity requirements for the hosting server (e.g. operating system, minimum
amount of computing resources that should be provided by the GOS, or-
ganization that controls the server, etc.). The administrator passes all
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this information to the trust management module of its Globe runtime,
by calling the createReplica() method.
2. The trust management module queries the GIDS server in the specified
region, providing the selection criteria received from the administrator.
3. The GIDS returns a list of Globe object servers in its area that meet the
query parameters.
4. The trust management module selects one of these servers and contacts
it.
5. The module on the administrator’s side and the GOS perform the trust
management negotiation described in Section 4.2:
6. The administrator’s module and the GOS authenticate each other and
establish a secure communication channel, by running a public key au-
thentication protocol (SSL in our prototype implementation), taking as
inputs the administrator’s key (certified by the administrator’s local cre-
dentials in conjunction with the DSO’s trust management credentials) and
the GOS’ key (certified by the GOS’ trust management credentials).
7. The administrator’s module examines the server’s trust management cre-
dentials in order to decide whether the GOS is trustworthy enough to host
the new replica. The administrator’s decision may be influenced by factors
such as the identity of the individual/organization running the GOS, the
operating system on top of which the GOS is running, and so on.
8. The module sends the specific hosting terms required for the new replica to
the GOS. Examples of such requirements include the amount of memory,
network bandwidth, CPU cycles/second, and so on.
9. The GOS examines the administrator’s local certificate, and ensures it
includes a method invocation right for createReplica.
10. The GOS examines the DSO’s trust management credentials in order to
decide whether it should host one of its replicas under the requested terms.
Depending on the economic model employed, the GOS may also require
the payment of a replica hosting fee (the payment protocol takes place
over the secure channel).
11. If all these checks have passed, the server generates a public/private key
pair for the new replica, and sends the public key to the administrator
(over the secure channel).
12. The administrator’s module generates the replica certificate, including the
replica public key, and the bitmaps encoding the rights granted to the
replica, signs it with his administrator private key, and sends it back to
the server, together with the blueprint for the new replica.
13. The server verifies that the blueprint is signed with the object’s key, and
that the replica certificate is correct (the rights granted to the replica are
a subset of the administrator’s rights).
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14. If these checks pass, the GOS creates a new isolated execution environ-
ment (sandbox) and instantiates the new replica using the classes in the
blueprint. The resource limits for the new sandbox are set according to
the values negotiated with the administrator.
15. The replica key, the replica certificate, the administrator’s local creden-
tials, and the DSO trust management credentials are passed to the new
replica’s security subobject as initialization parameters. The local creden-
tials for the new replicas consist of the administrator’s local credentials
plus the replica certificate.
16. The newly created replica registers with the GLS. The registration proce-
dure requires the replica to authenticate to the GLS using its local DSO
credentials. This ensures that only legitimate replicas can register with
the GLS, and that the access control bitmaps they register are indeed
those assigned to them in their replica certificate. In the contact record
for the new replica the GLS stores the replica’s access control bitmaps,
as well as a secure hash (SHA-1) of the replica’s public key (this will be
used to authenticate contact point removal requests, as it will be explained
shortly).
When a DSO’s replication needs change, some of its replicas may become re-
dundant and have to be terminated in order to prevent wasting GOS resources.
An internal DSO method terminateReplica() serves this purpose. Upon receiv-
ing such a termination command, a replica is supposed to stop accepting user
requests, commit its state (according to the object’s replication protocol), to
de-register from the GLS, and (gracefully) shut down. The GLS policy for
removing replica contact records specifies the following:
• Each replica is allowed to remove its own contact record. Since in each
record the GLS stores the secure hash of the replica public key, the GLS
can authenticate contact point removal requests coming from the replica
that has registered the contact point.
• Entities that have been granted method invocation rights for terminateReplica()
are allowed to remove contact records for any of the replicas part of the
same DSO. This ensures the contact records for replicas that have fatally
crashed before they had the chance to de-register are not kept in the GLS
forever.
4.7.3 Registering new users
Before they can access the services provided by a Globe DSO, users need to
register with the object. User registration is handled by administrative entities
that have execution rights for the registerUser() method.
When registering with a new DSO, a user is represented by a trust man-
agement module part of the Globe runtime installed on his computer. This
module has access to the user’s trust management credentials and to the cryp-
tographic keys associated with it. Our design puts no constraints on the types
of trust management credentials a user may acquire; however, these credentials
are useful only when a large fraction of the other Globe entities are capable of
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processing them. As such, standard certificate formats (such as X.509 [108], or
PGP [190]) and standard public key algorithms (RSA [165] or DSS [165]) are
strongly recommended. The Fuego certification authority we run part of the
Globe experiment supports X.509 identity certificates.
In theory, the object administrator can manually register users, by issuing
them the appropriate certificates signed with his administrative key. However,
this approach requires off-line (person-to-person) interaction between users and
the administrator, and it is clearly not scalable, except possibly for DSOs serving
very small, closed, user communities.
We expect the most common scenario to involve user registration being han-
dled by administrative replicas. In this case, the registration procedure involves
the following steps:
1. A Globe user starts with the symbolic (human-readable) name of a DSO
whose services she wants to employ. The way users find the names of ob-
jects of interest is outside the scope of this thesis, this may involve brows-
ing/searching the Globe Name Service (GNS), electronic yellow pages
services, and possibly out of band discovery mechanisms (e.g. word of
mouth). The user (the Globe runtime on the user’s computer more specif-
ically) queries the GNS to resolve the symbolic object name into an OID.
2. The user (his trust management module more specifically) searches for a
replica which can handle user registration. This involves querying the GLS
for a contact record associated with the DSO’s OID, contact record that
has the first bit in the reverse access control bitmap set (corresponding to
an execution right for the registerUser() method—see Section 4.4).
3. The user contacts the replica, and negotiates the types of trust manage-
ment credentials that are acceptable for registration. The purpose of this
negotiation is to establish which certification authorities, certificate for-
mats, and signature/encryption schemes are supported by the DSO. This
negotiation takes place over an insecure channel.
4. The user and the replica authenticate each other and establish a secure
communication channel, by running a public key authentication protocol
(SSL in our prototype implementation), taking as inputs the user’s iden-
tity public key (from the user’s trust management credentials that are
acceptable to the DSO) and the replica key (certified by the replica’s local
credentials in conjunction with the DSO’s trust management credentials).
5. The user examines the DSO’s trust management credentials in order to
decide whether the object is trustworthy enough to provide the services
needed by the user. The user’s decision may be influenced by such factors
as the identity of the individual/organization operating the DSO, possibly
what other users say about the object (in the case of PGP-based trust
management credentials).
6. The user examines the replica’s local certificate, and ensures it includes a
method invocation right for registerUser().
7. The replica informs the user about all the possible rights that can be
derived from his trust management credentials, and possibly about addi-
tional rights that can be granted upon payment (e.g. subscription services)
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8. The user decides which rights it want to acquire (either accept the stan-
dard rights derived from his trust management credentials, possibly pay
for extra rights in the case the object offers subscription services).
9. The user generates a new public/private key pair, and sends the public
part to the replica over the secure channel.
10. The replica generates the user certificate, including the user public key,
and the bitmaps encoding the rights granted to the user, signs it with
his replica private key, and sends it back to the user, together with the
blueprint for instantiating the user proxy.
11. The user verifies that the blueprint is signed with the object’s key.
12. The user creates a new isolated execution environment (sandbox) and
instantiates the DSO proxy using the classes in the blueprint.
13. The user key, the user certificate, and the replica’s local credentials, are
passed to proxy’s security subobject as initialization parameters. The
local DSO credentials for the user consist of the replica’s local credentials
plus the user certificate.
4.7.4 Secure method invocation
Once a user is registered with a Globe DSO, and has instantiated the user proxy,
he can start accessing the services provided by the object by invoking its meth-
ods. Secure method invocation closely follows the insecure method invocation
procedure outlined in Chapter 2, with some additional steps for performing the
security checks. Again, we assume the application-specific interface exported by
the DSO is called appSpecific, and the user invokes a method m part of it. In
the first phase of this process, the invocation request propagates from the client
process through the user proxy. Figure 4.10 shows the control flow:
1. The client process invokes appSpecific::m() on the control subobject in the
proxy.
2. At this point the control subobject is in the START state on the method
invocation state machine (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1). Accordingly, it in-
vokes repl::start(methodId(m)) on the replication subobject. Here metho-
dId(m) denotes the method Id assigned to method m of the appSpecific
interface in the method mapping data structure).
3. Because m cannot be execute locally (the proxy has no semantics sub-
object), the replication subobject returns SEND. The control subobject
moves to the SEND state, marshalls the method name and parameters,
and passes them to the replication subobject by calling repl::send().
4. The replication subobject passes the request to the access control module
of the security subobject by calling sendRequest() on the secRepl interface.
5. The reverse access control checks are performed as part of the sendRequest()
method. First the access control module examines all replicas the proxy is
connected to in order to determine whether any of these has the method
4.7. THE LIFE CYCLE OF A SECURE GLOBE DSO 83
module
Revocation
 6
 9
10
 7
Security subobject
module module
Trust managmnt
module
secRevsecAuth
secTM
Access control
User
proxy
Security
sub-object
Control 
sub-object
 
 
se
cC
om
m
   secRepl
GLS
 5
 6
10
11
12
 9
process
Client
Client Host
Network
 3
Authentication
   replCB
appSpecific
 7
 8
 4
 4
secAC
sub-object
 1
 2
   commCB
      repl
Replication
sub-object
    comm
Communication
 5
 
 
se
cC
om
m
   secRepl
 8
 8
Figure 4.10: Phase 1 of the secure method invocation process. On the right side, the secu-
rity subobject is enlarged, in order to better visualize the interactions among its component
modules
execution rights for handling the request. If no authorized replica is found,
the access control module queries the Globe Location Service (GLS) for
a replica that has the methodId(m) bit set in the reverse access control
bitmap.
6. Once an appropriate replica is found, the access control module requests
an authenticated secure connection to it, by calling secureChannel() on
the authentication module, passing it the contact point returned by the
GLS.
7. The authentication module first establishes an un-secure connection to the
replica, by calling connect() on the comm interface, passing the replica’s
contact point.
8. Once this connection is established, it is used to pass the various messages
for the authentication protocol. The authentication module passes mes-
sages by calling send() on the comm interface. Messages received by the
communication subobject from the replica are passed to the authentica-
tion module by calling msgArrived(). Messages are passed back and forth
in this way until the authentication protocol is completed, and a secure
channel is established. During this process, the authentication module
may also interact with the revocation module, in order to check creden-
tials’ revocation status, by calling checkRevoked() on the secRev interface.
9. Once the secure channel is established, the authentication module passes
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the channel Id and the access control bitmaps in the replica’s local certifi-
cate to the access control module, as return values to the secureChannel()
call.
10. The access control module verifies that themethodId(m) bit in the replica’s
reverse access control bitmap is set. If this is the case, it sends the RPC
request on the newly established secure channel by calling sendMsg() on
the secAuth interface.
11. secAuth::sendMsg() is implemented by the authentication module. Upon
receiving the message encoding the RPC request, this module encrypts
it using the channel key (agreed with the peer authentication module on
the replica during the authentication protocol), and passes the encrypted
message to the communication subobject by calling send() on the comm
interface.
12. The communication subobject encapsulates the encrypted request mes-
sage into a network packet and sends it to the peer communication subob-
ject of the replica. The comm::msgSend() call successfully returns in the
replication subobject. At this point, the client process is blocked (on the
repl::send() call inside the replication subobject) waiting for the result of
the method invocation.
Once the replica has received the encrypted request message, the execution
flow continues on the replica host, controlled by the network pop-up thread cre-
ated by the Globe run-time for handling incoming network packets. Figure 4.11
shows the control flow in this phase:
13. The pop-up thread passes the received network packet to the replica’s
communication subobject.
14. The communication subobject extracts the (encrypted) request message
from the network packet, and passes it to the authentication module in
the security subobject by calling msgArrived() on the secComm interface.
15. The authentication module uses the channel key to decrypt the message,
and passes it to the access control module by calling recvRequest() on the
secAC interface.
16. The access control module performs the access control check (verifying
that the methodId(m) bit is set in the forward access control bitmap as-
sociated with the secure channel to the proxy). If this is the case, it
passes the request to the replication module by calling msgArrived() on
the commCB interface.
17. The replication extracts the marshalled request from the request message
and determines it is an execution request for m, which can be handled
locally. The replication subobject passes the marshalled request to the
control subobject by calling handleRequest() on the replCB interface.
18. The control subobject un-marshalls the request and invokes the appropri-
ate method (m in this case) on the semantics subobject by calling app-
Specific::m().
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19. The semantics subobject executes the request, and passes the result back
to the control subobject as a return value to the appSpecific::m() call.
20. The replication subobject receives the (marshalled) result from the control
subobject as return value from the replCB::handleRequest() call in step 17.
21. The replication subobject incorporates the marshalled result into a repli-
cation protocol-specific message and passes it to the access control module
of the security subobject as a result of the commCB::msgArrived() call in
step 16.
22. The access control module passes the message to the authentication mod-
ule as a return value for the recvRequest() call at step 15.
23. The authentication module encrypts the message with the channel key,
and passes the encrypted message back to the communication subobject
as return value of the msgArrived() call at step 14.
24. The communication subobject encapsulates the encrypted message into a
network packet and sends it to the peer communication subobject on the
proxy. The network pop-up thread on the master replica host terminates.
Once the proxy has received the encrypted result packet, the execution flow
continues on the proxy host, controlled by the network pop-up thread created by
the Globe run-time for handling incoming network packets. Figure 4.12 shows
the control flow during this final phase:
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25. The pop-up thread passes the network packet to the proxy’s communica-
tion subobject.
26. The communication subobject extracts the (encrypted) result message
from the network packet, and passes it to the authentication module in
the security subobject by calling msgArrived() on the secComm interface.
27. The authentication module uses the channel key to decrypt the message,
and passes it to the access control module by calling recvRequest() on the
secAC interface.
28. The access control passes the message containing the result to the repli-
cation module by calling msgArrived() on the commCB interface.
29. The replication subobject determines that the message is the result of a
(previous) method invocation, it extracts the marshalled result, and re-
turns it as a parameter of the repl::send() call from step 3. This un-blocks
the client process. At this point, the network pop-up thread terminates.
The return value for repl::send() is set to RETURN. This indicates the
control subobject that it should return the result to the client process.
30. The control subobject unmarshalls the result, and returns it to the client
process as a result of the appSpecific::m() call from step 1.
Chapter 5
Trust Management
In Chapter 4, we described the basics of trust management for Globe DSOs.
Essentially, trust management is a process that needs to take place whenever
two entities that are “unknown” to each other from a security point of view
interact for the first time. As a result of the trust management process, the two
entities assign rights to each other and decide how to interact as part of the
Globe middleware.
With the advent of the Internet in the mid-90’s, trust management has
become an intrinsic requirement for a large variety of distributed applications,
ranging from e-commerce, to grid computing, and to peer-to-peer file sharing.
Unfortunately, although its importance is widely acknowledged [57], the problem
of negotiating/managing trust in the cyberspace is not yet that well understood.
Currently, trust management mechanisms are mostly ad-hoc, and often use
infrastructure designed for different purposes. For example, the Domain Name
System [161] (originally designed for managing human-readable names assigned
to Internet hosts) is typically used for making trust decisions with respect to
Web sites (e.g. “I trust this site to represent a university because it is in the .edu
domain”); certification authorities (originally designed for supporting public-
key authentication) are often used for making trust decisions in matters of e-
commerce (e.g. “I will give my credit card number to this site because they have
a VeriSign certificate”). In practice, such ad-hoc mechanisms work reasonably
well, but are far from perfect. New trust management mechanisms, based on
third-party recommender models, and history of past transactions have also
been proposed [71, 99, 139, 190], with some positive results (for example, on
the eBay [5] electronic auction site, most low-value transactions are conducted
based on seller’s reputation).
A world-wide trust management infrastructure would likely involve a com-
bination of technical (strong authentication, software and hardware assurance-
assessment tools) and legal mechanisms (for example, a cross-border legal frame-
work defining liability in the cyberspace). It is unlikely such an infrastructure
will come into place, at least in the near future. On the other hand, it is expected
that new, specialized, trust management solutions will emerge for various ap-
plication and administrative domains. In this context, our goal is to make trust
management a pluggable feature for the Globe middleware, so that a variety of
solutions can be supported.
As explained in Chapter 4, we achieve this by having each DSO create its own
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trust domain. In order to interact with a DSO, a Globe entity has to be accepted
as part of the object’s trust domain, and this involves a trust management
decision. The actual trust management is performed by trust management
modules; such modules are designed to be part of the Globe runtime, local
objects, and Globe object servers, in order to assist users, DSOs, and GOS
administrators in making their trust management decisions.
The generic trust management decision process in Globe, as introduced in
Chapter 4, is shown in Figure 5.1:
ServerRequester
management
Trust 
module
5. Assign 5. Assign
Trust
management
module3. Establish secure channel
2. Exchange credentials
1. Pre-negotiation phase
4. Payment
6. Interaction (action request)
7. Create "shortcuts"
rights rights
Figure 5.1: Generic trust management decision process in Globe
As explained in Chapter 4, there are seven (logical) steps involved:
1. During a prenegotiation phase, the two parties involved determine which
type of trust management mechanisms/credentials they require from each
other in order to establish trust.
2. If the prenegotiation is successful (each party has the type of credentials
required by the other party), the two parties exchange the negotiated trust
management credentials.
3. Using cryptographic material in the exchanged credentials, the two parties
authenticate (mutually, or server-only, dependent on the type of trust
management employed), and establish a secure channel.
4. Depending on the trust management mechanism employed, the requester
may carry out an electronic payment over the secure channel.
5. Each trust management module determines all the rights that can be
assigned to the other party, based on the received credentials, and possibly
on the payment amount.
6. The two parties carry out their (first) interaction.
7. The two parties may create “shortcuts”—namely update their internal
security policy in order to remember the trust management decision for
subsequent interactions.
This trust management procedure is performed whenever a new entity is
accepted as part of a DSO trust domain, namely during user and replica regis-
tration. The “shortcuts” the two parties may create in the last step of this trust
management procedure are essentially the local credentials described in Chap-
ter 4. During regular DSO operations (i.e. method invocations), entities part of
a DSO trust domain only have to use these local credentials for authentication
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and access control. In this way, trust management mechanisms are (logically)
separated from the rest of the Globe security design. Our observation is that
research on trust management is still in its infancy, and it is very hard to pre-
dict developments in this area (even for the near future). By having this logical
separation between trust management mechanisms and the rest of the Globe
security architecture, we are confident that our overall design will not require
drastic changes, even if conceptually different (from the current “state of the
art”) trust management solutions may emerge. As long as trust management
consists of accepting some sort of credentials and deriving some rights from
them, our Globe security model should be valid.
Trust management operations mostly occur during the registration phase,
when new Globe entities are accepted as part of a DSO trust domain. In Sec-
tion 5.1 we discuss trust management during user registration, and the function-
ality trust management modules part of the Globe runtime (acting on behalf of
users), and administrative replicas (acting on behalf of DSOs) need to implement
in order to support this process. In Section 5.2 we discuss trust management
during replica creation, and the functionality trust management modules part
of administrative replicas (acting on behalf of DSOs), and Globe Object Servers
(acting on behalf of GOS administrators) need to implement in order to support
this process.
5.1 Trust Management During User Registra-
tion
Before a user can employ the services provided by a Globe DSO, the user has
to register with the object and be accepted part of the DSO’s trust domain. At
the end of this registration process, the user obtains local user credentials for
the object, which allow him to authenticate to the DSO’s replicas, and contain
the rights he has been assigned (see Chapter 4).
During this registration process, both the user and the DSO need to make
trust decisions: in the case of the user, this decision is whether it should trust
the DSO to provide the requested service; in the case of the DSO, this decision
is whether the user should be allowed to access the object, and if so, under what
restrictions (i.e. what rights the user should be granted). We discuss each of
these trust management processes separately.
5.1.1 Trust decisions on the user side
Before making use of the services offered by a Globe DSO, a user needs to decide
whether the object is trustworthy enough to provide these services. Ultimately,
we believe that this trust decision—on whether to use a DSO or not—should
be human-mediated, but a user trust management module, part of the Globe
client runtime (which needs to be installed on any host before accessing Globe
DSOs) can assist the user to derive and manage trust associations with Globe
objects. Possible mechanisms that could be implemented as part of this trust
management module include:
• Direct trust. The user can specify a number of Globe DSOs which she
implicitly trusts. The object IDs of these implicitly trusted DSO are
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then kept in a special data structure, part of the user trust management
module. The module should provide an interface for adding or removing
entries in this “trusted DSOs” list. A user would obtain the OIDs of such
trusted DSOs by out of band means. For example, a bank could send its
customers the OID of its e-banking application (modeled as a Globe DSO),
together with the client proxy software implementation, by certified mail.
Although this approach to trust management is not very scalable, it can
be useful for certain applications serving closed user communities.
• Trust based on naming. The user may decide on the trustworthiness of
a given Globe DSO based on the (human-readable) name of that DSO,
as registered with the Globe Naming System (GNS). This is similar to
the trust management mechanism facilitated by the DNS for WWW sites
(as mentioned, sites in the .edu domain are generally trusted to represent
academic institutions). In this context it is important that user interac-
tion with the GNS is secure, in the sense that name queries/responses
are authenticated, in order to prevent masquerading attacks. Our GNS
prototype implementation (described in detail in [45]) supports these se-
curity features, which are modeled closely to DNSsec [80]. The user trust
management module should provide an interface allowing users to specify
the GNS-qualified names of the objects they want to access. Depending
on the user’s settings, DSO accessed by their GNS names could either be
automatically trusted, or they could be subject of further trust analysis,
for example by means of certification or recommendation (to be discussed
next).
• Trust based on certification. The user may decide on the trustworthi-
ness of a given Globe DSO based on what trusted third parties (TTPs)
claim about the object or the DSO administrator behind it. This is sim-
ilar to the trust management model used for e-commerce applications on
the Internet, where e-commerce sites are deemed trustworthy if they are
certified by well known certification authorities, such as VeriSign. We
use the generic term of DSO trust management credentials to represent
all digital certificates a DSO may acquire from various TTPs in order to
facilitate its users to make trust management decisions. The user trust
management module should provide the appropriate interfaces for manag-
ing these trust management credentials. This should include mechanisms
for adding/removing TTP public keys, for specifying the system’s behav-
ior with respect to credential chains (i.e. Are chains of arbitrary length
acceptable? How is the trust management decision affected by possible
intermediate authorities in the credentials chains?), and for displaying
credentials in a human-readable form.
• Trust based on recommendation. The user may decide on the trustworthi-
ness of a given DSO based on what other users—not necessary trustworthy—
say about the object (more specifically, their experience while using the
object). This type of recommender models have emerged for a number of
new Internet applications, such as electronic auctions [5], peer-to-peer file
sharing [4], on-line movie ratings [17], and even authenticated e-mail [190].
Research on recommender systems is still in an incipient phase, and a num-
ber of issues need to be resolved before they could be used for protecting
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high-valued assets; for example, an unforgeable electronic identity strongly
linked to a physical (human) identity is needed in order to prevent false
positive recommendations from bogus users.
Despite these limitations, recommender systems are increasingly employed,
so a full scale implementation of the Globe middleware should consider
them. The way such systems could be integrated with the user trust
management module is dependent on the user interface provided by the
recommender system. For example, the trust management module could
display to the user the trust metric computed by the recommender sys-
tem, so the user could make his own decision. Alternatively, the user could
configure a minimum trust value for using a DSO.
Prototype implementation
So far, we have described possible trust management mechanisms that could
be integrated with the Globe user trust management module. Our prototype
implementation does not support all these mechanisms; some of these (recom-
mender systems) are still in an incipient phase, and may require further research
effort, while others may require large scale technological and legal infrastructure
in order to be effective (the case of certification authorities).
For our prototype implementation we provide a simple user trust manage-
ment module, which supports direct trust, trust based on naming and trust
based on certification. A special text file user-DSO-TM-rules.txt is used to
store all trust management settings for a given user; it contains the following
types of information:
• Trusted DSOs. The OIDs of DSOs that are implicitly trusted are stored
in the user-DSO-TM-rules.txt file, as entries of the form:
trust OID;
The user can add/remove entries from this file; as explained, it is ex-
pected that the user obtains these trusted OIDs by out-of-band mecha-
nisms. When the user interacts for the first time with a DSO whose OID
is “trusted”, the registration process proceeds without any intervention
from the user.
• Information specifying trust behavior with respect to GNS-qualified names.
Essentially, this information consists of a set of statements of the form:
trustGNS {alwaysTrust‖alwaysCheck} GNSpath;
When the alwaysTrust value is set, the system behavior is to automati-
cally trust any DSOs that are accessed by the user using GNS names in
the specified path GNSpath (e.g. the user believes a DSO’s GNS name
correctly describes the object’s behavior). On the other hand, when the
value is set to alwaysCheck, just specifying a DSO by its GNS name is not
enough to make the object trustworthy; the system will perform additional
checks on the DSO’s trust management credentials, before registering the
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user with the object. For example, a statement of the form:
trustGNS alwaysTrust .edu;
specifies that the user trusts any DSO in the .edu GNS domain. On the
other hand, a statement of the form:
trustGNS alwaysCheck .utexas.edu;
specifies that additional checks need to be performed on DSOs part of
the GNS utexas.edu second-level domain. The default behavior is set to
alwaysCheck.
• Information specifying trust behavior with respect to trust management
credentials. For a DSO which is neither automatically trusted, nor trusted
based on its GNS name, additional checks are performed on its trust man-
agement credentials. The user-DSO-TM-rules.txt file may contain entries
of the form:
CA: pubKeyHash {trust‖ask};
Such a statement defines a certification authority (CA) trusted by the
user to issue trust management credentials for Globe DSOs. The CA is
described by the secure hash of its public key. The user may choose to
automatically trust DSOs that have trust management credentials issued
by the given CA (the trust option), or may request these credentials to be
displayed before making his decision (the ask option). At this moment (in
order to keep the implementation simple:), we do not support intermediate
CAs and credentials chains.
5.1.2 Trust decisions on the DSO side
A user can employ the services provided by a Globe DSO only after has regis-
tered with the object. During this registration process, the object (represented
by the trust management module part of one of its administrative replicas) has
to decide whether to accept the user as part of its trust domain, and also decide
on the rights that should be granted to the user. Once this decision is made,
the user is issued local credentials for that DSO, allowing him to authenticate
to replicas, and storing the rights it has been granted (see Chapter 4).
Possible trust management mechanisms
As discussed in Chapter 4, trust management mechanisms that can be used
by the DSO for this purpose fall into two broad categories: identity-based and
payment-based.
With identity-based schemes, the basis for the DSO’s trust management
decision is some (external) identity claimed by the Globe user. The user has
to prove (authenticate) this external identity by means of trust management
credentials. Possible mechanisms for doing this include:
5.1. TRUST MANAGEMENT DURING USER REGISTRATION 93
• Out of band authentication. This could be, for example, a user, physically
(in person) interacting with the DSO administrator and obtaining his local
credentials on some portable storage media (a USB stick, CD-ROM, etc.).
Such mechanisms are not very scalable, but may be useful for handling
DSOs with small, closed user communities.
• Password-based authentication. This could be used for integrating Globe
DSO with small to medium size, closed, authentication realms, such those
supported by universities or companies. During registration, the user is re-
quired to present his user name and password; administrative replicas have
their trust management modules configured to interact with the realm au-
thentication server (in the simplest case this could be accomplished by
giving the replica read-only access to the password file on UNIX systems).
The trust management decision is then based on the user’s identity in the
authentication realm.
• External certification infrastructures. These are wide-area certification
authorities, such as VeriSign. Such infrastructures are particularly useful
for DSOs supporting wide-area, open, user communities (e-commerce and
e-government applications are prime examples). During registration, the
user presents his trust management credentials (digital certificates) from
such external authorities, and authenticates (by means of a public-key
based authentication protocol). The DSO can then base its trust man-
agement decision on the user’s external identity, as well as on additional
attributes present in his external credentials.
With payment-based schemes, the user’s external identity is irrelevant (for
certain applications ignoring user’s identity may be part of the business plan,
in order to provide privacy-enhanced services). Essentially, the DSO provides
a subscription-based service, open to anyone who makes a certain payment.
The rights granted to the user solely depend on this payment, and possibly on
the amount being payed (e.g. different subscriber classes—regular member, gold
member, platinum member, etc.). Both the user trust management module, and
the one on the administrative replica handling the registration need to support
the same electronic payment mechanism. This could be (in the simplest case)
a secure form for sending a credit card number, or a more complex electronic
payment protocol (SET [130], PayPal [13], etc.).
Expressing trust management policies
So far, we have presented possible mechanisms for doing trust management
with respect to users on the DSO side. However, mechanisms only describe
how a trust decision is reached. In order to describe what the decision should
be, we need to talk about trust management policy. Essentially, on the DSO
side, the trust decision process needs to be fully automated; the generic “modus
operandi” is that a user presents his credentials/makes a payment, and then
receives his local DSO credentials (storing the rights it has been granted) without
any form of human assistance. To support such an automated process, each DSO
should have some sort of trust management policy data structure—DSO-user-
TM-rules, containing the specific rules for granting user rights based on the
credentials/payments received.
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This policy data structure needs to be reasonably simple to make it possi-
ble to for the average DSO administrator to write expressive trust management
policies. On the other hand, it should be generic enough to accommodate a vari-
ety of possible trust management mechanisms. We envision this data structure
as a two-dimensional table; rows in the table represent trust management rules
and they determine how rights are derived based on the credentials/payments
received. Each rule consists of seven parts, as shown in Figure 5.2:
Rule ID Backward Mechanism Mechanism Rights Target Validity
compatib. type name period
1.5 3 Password cs.vu.nl 011101 bpopescu 1 month
2.4 2 Certification 0x34FD2A 000111 name = 1 month
“John Doe”
3.3 0 Certification 0x4AD59F 000011 position = 1 month
“student”
4.5 5 Payment PayPal 111001 $100 1 year
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 5.2: The DSO-user-TM-rules data structure, with four sample rules. We discuss the
sample rules in Section 5.1.2
• Rule ID—uniquely identifies the given rule instance. It consists of two
numeric fields, the rule number, which differentiates between rules, and the
version number, which differentiates between different versions of the same
rule. The DSO administrator may change a given rule (for example by
adding/removing some of the rights the rule grants), and this change may
or may not affect user credentials already issued under previous versions
of the rule (depending on the value of the backward compatibility filed—see
next). Each time a rule is modified, its version number is incremented.
• Backward compatibility—specifies the last version number for the given
rule which is compatible with the current version of the rule. Rights
granted based on earlier versions of the rule (earlier than the backward
compatibility version number) are considered incompatible with the cur-
rent trust management policy for the DSO; all local credentials encoding
such incompatible rights need to be revoked (we describe how this can be
done later in this section, when discussing user registration lists)
• Mechanism type—the type of trust management mechanism used by the
given rule. Based on the discussion earlier in this section, possible values
for this field are OutOfBand, Password, Certification and Payment; these
values should be treated as keywords, and should be consistently used by
all implementations of trust management modules throughout the Globe
middleware. During the trust management prenegotiation phase (see Fig-
ure 5.1), the trust management modules on the user and DSO side ex-
change such keywords in order to determine a common mechanism for
conducting their trust negotiation.
• Mechanism name—the name of a particular instance of a trust mechanism
type used by the given rule. Depending on the mechanism type, there
are different ways to identify a given mechanism instance. For example,
password-based mechanisms can be identified by the name of the authen-
tication realm (e.g. the cs.vu.nl realm); certification-based mechanisms
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can be identified by the secure hash of the root public key; payment-
based mechanisms can be identified by the name of the payment proto-
col/infrastructure (e.g. SET, PayPal, etc.), and so on. Once the user and
the DSO have agreed on a trust management mechanism type they both
support, agreement on a particular mechanism instance essentially com-
pletes the pre-negotiation phase. For this reason, it is essential that unique
and un-ambiguous mechanism names are user throughout the Globe mid-
dleware.
The (mechanism type, mechanism name) combination uniquely identifies
a particular instance of a trust management mechanism. The DSO trust
management module can use this combination as an index in a function
table, pointing to the actual software implementation of the mechanism
instance. In this way, a module can support a number of trust engine
implementations; as a matter of fact, the DSO trust management module
can be seen as a meta trust management engine.
• Rights—the rights granted by the given rule. The way rights are encoded
is dependent on the access control mechanism used by the DSO; rights can
be represented either as a bitmap (as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4),
or as a user role (as we will explain in Chapter 7). Once a user satisfies
a given rule during the registration protocol, the rights specified by that
rule are incorporated into his local DSO credentials, issued at the end of
the registration process.
• Target—the actual conditions that have to be met in order to satisfy
the rule. The way these conditions are expressed is dependent on the
rule mechanism type. For example, for payment-based mechanisms, the
condition may specify the payment amount required by the rule; for
certification-based mechanisms, the condition may specify the user name,
as certified by the CA, or additional attribute-value pairs that need to be
present in the certificate. We will show a few examples in the next section.
• Validity period—how long the rights granted according to this rule are
valid. The expiration date in the local credentials issued to the user at
the end of the registration process (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4) is set
according to this validity period.
The user registration process
When a user registers with a DSO, during the pre-negotiation phase of the
trust management process (see the generic trust management procedure out-
lined at the beginning of this chapter), the administrative replica informs the
user trust management module about all the mechanisms supported (type and
name). If the user trust management module module supports any of these, it
selects one of them (possibly based on user preference, and on additional in-
formation provided by the DSO, explaining which rights each rule may grant).
The two parties then proceed with the actual negotiation, during which creden-
tials are exchanged, the two parties authenticate and establish a secure channel,
electronic payments are made, etc. If the negotiation is successful, the user is
assigned a new user ID for that particular DSO, and granted certain rights,
based on the rule that has been applied. Finally, the administrative replica
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generates a new public/private key pair for the user, issues the DSO user cre-
dentials (incorporating the user’s public key and the granted rights) and sends
everything to the user over the secure channel.
Keeping track of registered users
The administrative replica also needs to retain some information regarding
registered users. This information is stored in a special administrative data
structure—the user registration list. As shown in Figure 5.3, this structure
should contain at least the following types of information: the user ID, the
rights granted, the ID of the rule applied for granting these rights, the expira-
tion time for these rights, and some information allowing to authenticate the
user (“security question”), should the local credentials issued be lost (as a result
of a “catastrophic” storage failure event for example).
User ID Granted rights Granting rule ID Expires Security question
25 111001 4.5 02/02/2006 “Mother maiden name?” =
“Greenglass”
... ... ... ... ...
Figure 5.3: The user registration list data structure
The purpose of this user registration list is twofold: first it allows the DSO
to keep track of all the users it has registered and link them to the trust man-
agement rule that has allowed them in the DSO trust domain. When trust
management rules are deleted or updated, it may be necessary to remove some
users from the DSO trust domain. For example, a rule may be updated to a
new version, which makes it incompatible to certain earlier versions; in such a
situation, the administrative replica can consult the user registration list, and
promptly revoke all local user certificates that were issued based on incompatible
versions of the updated rule.
Second, keeping a user registration list may be useful as a precaution against
“catastrophic” events, such as users losing their local DSO credentials. In such a
situation, a user may request re-registration, authenticating to the administra-
tive replica by means of the information stored in the registration list. Depend-
ing on the trust management mechanism used for registration, this information
may be a copy of the user’s trust management credentials (for identity-based
schemes), or, in case of payment-based schemes, this could be some sort of “se-
curity question” provided by the user during the registration process. Once the
user is authenticated in this way, local credentials can be re-used without having
to go through the entire trust management process (and in case of payment-
based schemes, without the user having to pay again!).
From the description provided in this section, it is clear that trust manage-
ment during user registration can be quite a heavyweight process. It is expected
that the software implementation of a generic trust management module to be
used by administrative replicas will be rather large and complex. However, all
this overhead only needs to be handled by a limited number of DSO replicas—
those assigned user registration privileges. All the other replicas need to know
nothing about trust management, and are only required to implement the au-
thentication and access control mechanisms described in chapters 4, 6, and 7. It
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is also important to understand that if the DSO requires multiple administra-
tive replicas, the replication protocol should ensure that the DSO-user-TM-rules
data structure and the user registration list are kept in strict consistency among
all these administrative replicas.
Example of trust management policies
The policy constructs and data structures described in the previous sections are
quite complex. In this section we provide few examples which hopefully will
make things easier to understand.
Figure 5.4 shows the trust management policy data structure for a hypo-
thetical DSO:
Rule ID Backward Mechanism Mechanism Rights Target Validity
compatib. type name period
1.5 3 Password cs.vu.nl 011101 bpopescu 1 month
2.4 2 Certification 0x34FD2A 000111 name = 1 month
“John Doe”
3.3 0 Certification 0x4AD59F 000011 position: 1 month
“student”
4.5 5 Payment PayPal 111001 $100 1 year
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 5.4: The DSO-user-TM-rules data structure
The first rule has the ID equal to 1.5, which means it is rule number one, ver-
sion five. The backward compatibility is set to version three, which means that
rights granted based on earlier versions of this rule are incompatible with cur-
rent trust management policies and any local credentials encoding them should
be revoked (thus credentials issued based on rules 1.1 and 1.2 would be invalid,
while one based on rule 1.4 would be acceptable). The trust management mech-
anism type is password-based, and the mechanism name is cs.vu.nl (the name of
the password-authentication realm). The bitmap in the next field represents the
rights granted by this rule, encoded as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. The
target of the rule is a user in the cs.vu.nl realm with the login name bpopescu.
The validity interval for the credentials is set to one month (from the time of
registration).
The second rule has the ID equal to 2.4, which means it is rule number
two, version four. The backward compatibility is set to version two. The trust
management mechanism type is certification based, and the mechanism name is
given by the secure hash of the root CA public key (0x34FD2A in this example).
The bitmap in the next field represents the rights granted by this rule, encoded
as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. The target of the rule is a user identified
by the name “John Doe” that must appear in the certificate issued by the CA
(it is assumed these certificates include an attribute called name). The validity
interval is set again to one month.
The third rule has the ID equal to 3.3, which means it is rule number three,
version three. The backward compatibility is set to version zero, meaning that
this version is compatible with all the previous versions of the rule. The trust
management mechanism type is again certification-based, and the mechanism
name is given by secure hash of a root public key (0x4AD59F in this exam-
ple), presumably identifying a different CA from rule 2.4. The bitmap in the
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next field represents the rights granted by this rule, encoded as explained in
Chapter 4, Section 4.4. The target of the rule is a group of users that have an
attribute called position in their certificate set to the value student (this kind
of attribute:value pairs in digital certificates allow open groups to be defined
for the purpose of trust management). The validity interval is set again to one
month.
Finally, the fourth rule has the ID equal to 4.5, which means it is rule
number four, version five. The backward compatibility is set to version five,
meaning that this version invalidates all previous versions of the rule. The trust
management mechanism type is payment-based, and the mechanism name is
PayPal. The bitmap in the next field represents the rights granted by this rule,
encoded as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. The target of the rule is any
user that makes a hundred dollar subscription payment to the DSO. The validity
interval is set to one year (the subscription is valid for one year).
Prototype implementation
For our Globe prototype we have implemented a simplified version of the trust
management module described in the previous sections. At this moment we only
support certification-based mechanisms. Trust management rules are stored in a
DSO-user-TM-rules.txt text file, which needs to be provided to each administra-
tive DSO replica. Administrators are free to select any CAs for their user trust
management; however, our implementation only supports X.509 [108] identity
certificates. Rule targets may use any attribute:value pairs present in the cer-
tificate; although relatively simple, this is a powerful mechanism for defining
“open” user groups (as in the example in the previous section, defining the
group of all users identified as student by a given CA). We do not support trust
management credential chains and intermediate certification authorities.
5.2 Trust Management during Replica Creation
Before a DSO can place one of its replica on a Globe Object Server, there is
a trust negotiation between the DSO (represented by the trust management
module part of the administrative replica responsible for creating the new DSO
replica) and the GOS (represented by its own trust management module). Each
party has to make a trust decision: in the case of the DSO, this decision is
whether it should trust the GOS to host one of its replicas, and if so, what
rights should be granted to this replica; in the case of the GOS, this decision is
whether it should host the DSO’s replica (or more specifically, whether it should
give the DSO access to some of its resources), and if so, what resource limits it
should set for the DSO.
5.2.1 Trust decisions on the DSO side
The trust decisions on the DSO side regard the actual privileges the object
should grant to a newly created replica hosted by a given DSO. Ultimately,
a GOS has complete control over the hosted replicas; these replicas run in
the server’s address space, so the server can interfere with their operation in
arbitrary ways. A malicious GOS can even “hijack” a hosted replica by taking
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over its credentials (replica certificate and private key) which are also in the
server’s address space; in this way a malicious server may be able to masquerade
any hosted replica to users connecting to it. As such, it is clear that a malicious
GOS can cause substantial damage to the “unfortunate” DSOs whose replicas
it hosts. It is therefore important that DSOs have the ability to restrict the
rights of replicas placed on marginally trusted DSOs, in order to minimize the
potential damage.
When a new DSO replica is created, the trust management module of the
administrative replica responsible for this action has to decide which rights the
new replica should be granted. Possible trust management mechanisms that
can be supported by this module are:
• Direct trust—the DSO administrator can specify a number of implicitly
trusted GOSes (identified by their network address and public key). Al-
though this is not very scalable, it may be useful to have such a mecha-
nism for specifying a small number of “very trusted” core GOSes where
the DSO’s most powerful replicas may be placed.
• Trust based on certification—similar to the situations described in sec-
tion 5.1, the DSO may decide on the trustworthiness of a given GOS
based on what trusted third parties (TTPs) claim about the server or the
GOS administrator behind it. We use the generic term of GOS trust man-
agement credentials to represent all digital certificates a GOS may acquire
from various TTPs in order to facilitate the trust management decisions
for DSOs that may want to use it for hosting replicas. Before a new replica
is created, the GOS sends its trust management credentials to the admin-
istrative replica, which can then base its trust management decision on
the server’s external identity, as well as on additional attributes present
in those credentials.
• Trust based on recommendation/historical traces of past behavior. A DSO
may decide on the trustworthiness of a given GOS based on the way the
server is recommended by other DSOs that have placed replicas on it.
Alternatively, the DSO may progressively increase the trust placed on a
GOS based on the server’s behavior history. For example, a given GOS
may be initially only marginally trusted, hence only allowed to host less
powerful replicas (read-only caches, for instance). Based on the server’s
correct behavior in hosting the DSO’s replicas, (presumably observed over
some extended period of time), the DSO may increase the amount of trust
in that GOS, and allow it to host more powerful replicas. As already
mentioned, both recommender systems and trust management based on
historical traces of past behavior are relatively new research, and no au-
thoritative solutions have yet emerged. However, such mechanisms may
have a lot of potential, particularly in managing trust relationships in
federated systems—the set of all Globe object servers can be seen as an
(extremely heterogeneous) federated system.
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Expressing DSO trust management policies with respect to object
servers
As with trust management policies regarding DSO users, Globe administra-
tive replicas need a dedicated data structure—DSO-GOS-TM-rules—for storing
trust management policies regarding object servers. Such a data structure is
similar to the one described in Section 5.1.2—a two-dimensional table; rows in
the table represent trust management rules and they determine how rights are
derived based on the object servers’ credentials. Each rule consists of seven
parts, as shown in Figure 5.5:
Rule ID Backward Mechanism Mechanism Rights Target Validity
compatib. type name period
1.3 2 directTrust - 111100 0x9251B5 1 month
2.1 1 Certification 0x34F32D 000111 organization: 1 month
“Akamai”
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 5.5: The DSO-GOS-TM-rules data structure. The first rule deals with direct trust,
and grants certain rights (to host replicas with maximal method invocation rights of 111100—
encoded as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4) to a GOS with the secure hash of the public
key equal to 0x9251B5. The second rule deals with certification-based trust, and grants
certain rights (to host replicas with maximal method invocation rights of 000111—encoded
as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4) to all GOSes operated by Akamai, as certified by a
CA with a secure hash of the public key equal to 0x34F32D.
• Rule ID—has the same function as described in Section 5.1.2, and also
consists of two parts; the rule number identifies the rule, while the version
number is used to differentiate between different versions of the same rule.
• Backward compatibility—has the same function as described in Section 5.1.2—
specifies the last version number which is compatible with the current
version of the rule.
• Mechanism type—again the same function as described in Section 5.1.2; at
the moment the only possible values are directTrust andCertification, since
we are not aware of any widely accepted trust management mechanism
based on either recommendations or historical traces of past behavior.
• Mechanism name—again the same function as described in Section 5.1.2.
Depending on the mechanism type, there are different ways to identify the
mechanism instance. For example, certification-based mechanisms can be
identified by the secure hash of the root public key.
• Possible rights—the complete set of rights granted by the given rule. When
a given GOS matches the rule, the rights to be granted to a replica hosted
by the server must be a subset of the possible rights. The actual rights to
be granted to the new replica are decided based on the object’s replication
strategy. For example, a less powerful replica (a read-only cache) may be
instantiated on a highly trustworthy server (that could potentially host
administrative replicas) because at the moment the object’s replication
needs only require one additional read-only cache, and the (very trustwor-
thy) server is optimally located to host it.
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• Target—again, this field has the same function as described in Section 5.1.2,
and specifies the conditions that have to be met in order to satisfy the rule.
The way these conditions are expressed is dependent on the rule mecha-
nism type:
– In the case of directTrust rules, the target is specified as the public
key of the (implicitly) trusted GOS, and its network address.
– In the case of Certification rules, the target is described in terms of
attribute:value pairs that need to be present in the server’s certificate.
• Validity Period—how long the rights granted according to this rule are
valid.
Creating a new DSO replica—
the trust management process step-by-step
Figure 5.6 shows what happen when a new DSO replica is instantiated by a DSO
administrative replica, as a result of the object’s dynamic replication strategy.
There are 7 steps involved:
1. The replication subobject on the administrative replica detects that a new
replica is required. The way this happens is dependent on the DSO’s repli-
cation strategy, and is outside the scope of this thesis. As an example,
administrative replicas may monitor regular replicas’ workload, and create
new ones when this workload increases above a certain threshold. Based
on the DSO’s replication strategy, and on the object’s technical properties
(software implementations supported, memory/bandwidth/CPU require-
ments, etc.) the replication subobject selects the following:
(a) The type of replica to create—this depends on the types of replicas
supported by the object, and on the external factors that have made
the creation of a new replica necessary (e.g which types of replicas
are overloaded).
(b) The location of the new replica—this again depends on external fac-
tors, such as the region where most of the user requests come from.
(c) The technical capabilities required from the hosting server—this can
be the underlying operating system, CPU/memory/disk space/network
bandwidth limits, etc.
2. The replication subobject calls the createReplica() method on the trust
management module (see Chapter 4 for module/subobjects interfaces);
the parameters passed are the type of replica to be created, location (the
GIDS region ID, see Chapter 2), and the technical capabilities required
from the hosting server.
3. A replica-rights data structure part of the security subobject maps possi-
ble replica types to the rights associated with each type. Based on this
mapping, the trust management module determines the rights that need
to be granted to the new replica.
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Figure 5.6: The trust management process during replica creation. Dotted rectangles indicate
data structures.
4. The trust management module searches through the DSO-GOS-TM-rules
data structure to find all the rules that may grant the rights required by
the new replica. Given the types of trust management mechanisms that
can be supported, there are two cases:
(a) directTrust—if such rules are found to grant the required rights, the
addresses and public keys of the potential hosting servers are stored
in the Target field of those rules. Servers are selected only if their
address falls in the region where the new replica needs to be instan-
tiated.
(b) Certification—if such rules are found to grant the required rights,
the GIDS needs to be queried in order to find addresses of potential
hosting servers. The attribute:value pairs in the Target field of those
rules are used as selection parameters when querying the GIDS.
5. If no directTrust servers are found, the trust management module needs
to query the GIDS. The module connects to the GIDS server of the region
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where the new replica needs to be placed, and sends the query; the query
parameters include:
• The technical capabilities required from the hosting server, as re-
ceived from the replication subobject in Step 2.
• The attribute:value pairs identified at Step 4b.
The GIDS returns a list of Globe object servers in its region matching the
selection criteria.
6. Eventually, the trust management module selects one GOS, and contacts
it requesting to instantiate a new replica.
7. The trust management module on the administrative replica and the one
on the GOS engage in the trust negotiation process outlined at the begin-
ning of this chapter:
(a) During the pre-negotiation phase, each party has to determine the
trust management mechanisms required by the other party:
i. In the case of the administrative replica, if the GOS was selected
from a directTrust rule, the replica does not require any creden-
tials (the GOS is implicitly trusted). In the case of Certification
rules, the replica informs the GOS about the CAs it trusts for
certification. The replica also informs the GOS about the re-
quested hosting terms (selected by the replication subobject at
Step 1c).
ii. The trust management module on the GOS examines its inter-
nal data structures (these will be described in Section 5.2.2), and
selects all the rules that may grant hosting rights under the re-
quested terms. If no rules granting the requested hosting terms
are found by the GOS, the pre-negotiation fails.
The mechanisms specified by the selected rules are sent to the
administrative replica. If the replica supports the mechanisms
requested by the GOS, the pre-negotiation is successful; other-
wise the pre-negotiation fails.
(b) If the prenegotiation is successful, the two parties exchange the trust
management credentials corresponding to the selected mechanisms.
(c) The two parties authenticate and establish a secure channel, using
the administrative replica public key, and the GOS public key.
(d) If the GOS requires a payment-based trust management mechanism,
the administrative replica makes the necessary payment over the se-
cure channel.
(e) The administrative replica sends the blueprint for the new replica the
GOS, and requests it to instantiate the new replica.
(f) The two parties perform the rights assignment:
i. The GOS generates a new public/private key pair to serve as the
new replica’s key, and sends the public key to the administrative
replica.
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ii. The administrative replica incorporates this key into a replica
certificate, also containing the rights granted to the new replica,
and its replica ID.
iii. The administrative replica sends the newly created certificate,
together with its own DSO credentials to the GOS.
iv. The GOS creates an isolated execution environment, grants it
the resource usage limits negotiated with the DSO, and instanti-
ates the new replica, initializing it with the keys and credentials
received from the administrative replica.
(g) The administrative replica and the GOS update their internal data
structures to record this transaction. In the case of the administrative
replica, this means adding the newly created replica to the active
replicas list (to be described next). In the case of the GOS, this
means adding the newly created replica to the hosted replicas list (to
be described in Section 5.2.2).
Keeping track of active replicas
The administrative replica also needs to retain some information regarding ac-
tive replicas, which is stored in an active replicas list (an administrative data
structure). This structure should contain at least the following types of informa-
tion: the replica ID, the rights granted, the ID of the rule applied for granting
these rights, and the expiration time for these rights.
This list allows the DSO to keep track of all its active replicas, and link them
to the trust management rule that has allowed them in the DSO trust domain.
When trust management rules are deleted or updated, it may be necessary to
remove some replicas from the DSO trust domain. For example, a rule may
be updated to a new version, which makes it incompatible to certain earlier
versions. In such a situation, the administrative replica can consult the active
replicas list, and promptly revoke all local replica certificates that were issued
based on incompatible versions of the updated rule.
As explained in Section 5.1.2, if the DSO requires multiple administrative
replicas, it is important that the DSO-GOS-TM-rules data structure and the
active replicas list are kept in strict consistency among all these administrative
replicas.
Prototype implementation
For our Globe prototype we have implemented a simplified version of the trust
management module described in the previous sections. We only support direct
trust and certification-based mechanisms. Trust management rules are stored
in a DSO-GOS-TM-rules.txt text file, which needs to be provided to each ad-
ministrative DSO replica. Administrators are free to select any CAs for their
GOS trust management; however, our implementation only supports X.509 [108]
identity certificates. Rule targets may use any attribute:value pairs present in
the certificate. We do not support trust management credential chains and
intermediate certification authorities.
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5.2.2 Trust decisions on the GOS side
The other side of the trust management process during replica creation concerns
the GOS. Essentially, the GOS has to decide whether it wants to host a replica
of a given DSO, and if so, under what terms (e.g. how much disk space, memory,
CPU share, network bandwidth the replica should be allowed to use).
Each GOS software implementation should include a trust management
module allowing the server to automate this trust management decision. Possi-
ble mechanisms that can be employed are:
• Identity-based mechanisms—the GOS’ trust management decision is based
on the identity of the DSO requesting replica hosting:
– Direct trust—the GOS administrator can specify a number of im-
plicitly trusted DSOs (identified by their object IDs) whose replicas
should be always hosted. This mechanisms is useful for expressing
“ad-hoc” trust relationships—for example DSO administrators ne-
gotiating replica hosting with GOS administrators by out of band
means (e.g. speaking in person).
– Trust based on certification—similar to the situations described in
sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1, the GOS may decide on the trustwor-
thiness of a given DSO based on what trusted third parties (TTPs)
claim about the object or the DSO administrator behind it. The
same DSO trust management credentials presented to users during
the user—DSO trust negotiation (see Section 5.1.1) can also be used
by the GOS to make a trust decision.
• Payment-based mechanisms—in this case the DSO’s identity is irrelevant;
instead, the GOS offers the hosting service for payment (similar to Web
hosting commercial services). The hosting terms (the resource limits for
the hosted replica) may also depend on the payment amount.
Expressing GOS Trust Management Policies
As explained in sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1 (regarding the way trust management
policies are stored on DSO administrative replica), the GOS trust manage-
ment module also needs a specialized data structure to store its rules. This
data structure—GOS-DSO-TM-rules—is shown in Figure 5.7, and is similar to
the DSO-user-TM-rules and DSO-GOS-TM-rules structures (a two-dimensional
table with seven fields—“columns”—Rule ID, Backward Compatibility, Mecha-
nisms Type, Mechanism Name, Possible Rights, Target and Validity Period).
The way these fields are interpreted is similar to what we described in sec-
tions 5.1.2 and 5.2.1, with the exceptions of the Possible Rights field. The reason
for this is that the types of rights that can be granted by object servers are con-
ceptually different from those granted by Globe objects. While Globe DSOs
are mostly concerned with granting method invocation/execution rights, object
servers mainly deal with granting resource usage rights.
Resource usage rights can be expressed as name:value pairs, with name de-
scribing a protected resource (e.g. disk space, memory, CPU time, network
bandwidth, etc.) and value being the usage limit granted for that resource by a
given rule. For example, if a pair (disk Space:10Mb) appears in a rule, then any
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Rule Back. Mech. Mech. Rights Target Validity
ID comp. type name period
1.5 2 directTrust - diskUsage:10Mb 0x9251B5 1 month
memory:2Mb
cpuTime:20ms
bandwidth:30Kb/s
2.1 1 Certification 0xA6937C diskUsage:1Mb institution: 1 month
memory:512Kb MIT
cpuTime:5ms
bandwidth:10Kb/s
3.7 0 Payment PayPal diskUsage:50Mb $200 1 year
memory:5Mb
cpuTime:100ms
bandwidth:100Kb/s
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 5.7: The GOS-DSO-TM-rules data structure
replica that is granted hosting rights based on that rule is given a 10Mb disk
quota for the GOS.
It is important that resource names are used consistently throughout the
Globe middleware, to ensure interoperability between object servers and the
DSOs that make hosting requests. Figure 5.8 shows some of the resource names
that should be used throughout the Globe middleware.
Resource Name Description
diskUsage Disk quota to be assigned to a replica matching the rule.
memory Amount of memory a replica matching the rule is allowed to use.
cpuTime Fraction of CPU time a replica matching the rule is allowed to use
(expressed in milliseconds per second of CPU time).
bandwidth Amount of network bandwidth a replica matching the rule is
allowed to use.
Figure 5.8: Resource names used in GOS trust management rules
Keeping track of hosted replicas
The object server also needs to retain some information regarding the replicas
it hosts. This information is stored in an hosted replicas list (an administrative
data structure). This structure should contain at least the following types of
information: the OID of the hosted replica, the replica ID, the rights granted,
the ID of the rule applied for granting these rights, and the expiration time for
these rights.
This list allows the GOS to keep track of all the replicas it hosts, and link
them to the trust management rule that has granted them hosting rights. When
trust management rules in the GOS-DSO-TM-rules structure are deleted or
updated, it may be necessary that some replicas are removed. For example, a
rule may be updated to a new version, which makes it incompatible to certain
earlier versions; in such a situation, the GOS can consult the hosted replicas
list, and promptly remove all replicas that were accepted for hosting based on
incompatible versions of the updated rule.
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Prototype implementation
At this moment, our GOS prototype does not support enforcement on resource
usage limits for individual hosted replicas. The GOS prototype is implemented
in Java, which does not provide direct support for fine-grained resource account-
ing. A number of Java extensions [75, 183] attempt to provide such functionality,
but integrating them with the Java runtime has turned out to be very difficult,
which may be due to the fact most of these extensions are proof-of-concept im-
plementations for academic projects. As such, our prototype only allows object
servers to make high-level trust management decisions, namely whether or not
to host replicas of given DSOs. If a replica is granted hosting rights, the GOS
ensures it is run in an isolated execution environment (a Java protection do-
main), which ensures the replica cannot corrupt other hosted replicas, or the
GOS itself. However, a malicious replica can still cause denial of service, by
excessive consumption of server resources. A full scale Globe implementation
should fix this problem.
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Chapter 6
Support for Symmetric Key
Authentication
As explained in Chapter 4, we use public key cryptography as the basic cryp-
tographic building block for the Globe security architecture. Public key au-
thentication protocols are extensively used during the trust management phase
(authenticating third-party object code, authenticating users and replicas dur-
ing registration, authenticating object servers during replica creation). Fur-
thermore, each Globe DSO also creates its own PKI, consisting of the local
keys and certificates associated with its users and replicas; as such, public key
authentication is extensively used during secure method invocation.
Public key authentication protocols offer many advantages, especially when
used in a WAN environment. In particular, such protocols do not require an
on-line trusted third party (TTP) to mediate authentication. In aWAN environ-
ment, an on-line TTP becomes a highly sensitive target, continuously exposed
to denial of service attacks. Furthermore, because of the additional network
roundtrips for contacting the TTP, this may introduce increased latency and
become a performance bottleneck.
Despite all these advantages, public key authentication protocols are com-
putationally expensive. While measuring the performance impact of the Globe
security architecture (see Chapter 9), it became obvious that for certain types
of workloads (lightweight transactions in particular), the use of public key au-
thentication during secure method invocation can be a performance killer. We
handle this situation by supplementing the public-key based Globe authentica-
tion framework with symmetric key authentication mechanisms.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.1 we review classic sym-
metric key authentication protocols, which at their time were mainly designed
for a LAN environment. In Section 6.2.1 we discuss a number of approaches
that were proposed for migrating symmetric key authentication protocols to a
WAN environment, and point out their limitations, more specifically their re-
liance on an online trusted third party (TTP). In Section 6.3 we present the
protocol we propose, and show how it can achieve mutual authentication only
using symmetric keys, and an oﬄine TTP. In Section 6.4 we discuss operational
aspects—mainly memory requirements imposed on Globe DSOs that employ
our new authentication scheme. Finally, in Section 6.5 we present a logical
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proof for our protocol, using the BAN-logic [63] framework.
6.1 Symmetric Key Authentication—An Overview
Symmetric key authentication protocols have been typically used for securing
small to medium-size authentication realms, mostly over local area networks.
Our goal is to integrate such protocols with Globe; however, before doing this,
it may be useful to examine how they would behave when migrating to larger
systems connected by wide-area networks.
Most challenge-response symmetric key authentication protocols derive from
the seminal work of Needham and Schroeder [154, 155]. As shown in Figure 6.1,
the Needham-Schroeder protocol consists of the following messages 1:
The goal of the protocol is to allow two principals, A and B, to authenticate
each other and establish a secure communication channel. A trusted authen-
tication server AS shares long term symmetric keys—KA,AS and KB,AS with
each principal and is capable of generating and sending “good” session keys on
the request of these principals. The protocol consists of seven steps:
Notation
A,B entities that want to authenticate.
AS the authentication server.
NU random nonce generated by entity U .
KU,V symmetric key shared between entities U and V .
f secure hash function.
[data]K data encrypted with the symmetric key K.
Protocol
(1) A −→ B: A
(2) B −→ A: [A,NB0 ]KB,AS
(3) A −→ AS: A,B,NA, [A,NB0 ]KB,AS
(4) AS −→ A: [A,B,NA,KA,B]KA,AS ,
[A,B,N
0
,KA,B]KB,AS
(5) A −→ B: [A,B,N
0
,KA,B]KB,AS
(6) B −→ A: [NB1 ]KA,B
(7) A −→ B: [f(NB1)]KA,B
Figure 6.1: The Needham-Schroeder protocol
1. A sends its identity to B over an unsecure network channel.
2. B uses the long term key KB,AS to encrypt a message M1 consisting of
A′s identity and a fresh nonce (a random number) NB0 that it generates
for that session; sinceM1 is encrypted using KB,AS, B is guaranteed that
1This is the version of the protocol that fixes the flaw described in [78]
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only AS can decrypt it and obtain the nonce; NB0 will be incorporated
in all the messages generated by the AS for that particular session, and
this protects against certain replay attacks using old, compromised session
keys [78].
3. A sends to the AS the identities of the authenticating parties—A and B,
a fresh nonce NA that it generates for that session, and the message M1
received from B at step 2.
4. Upon receiving the messages sent by A at step 3, the AS decrypts M1
using the key KB,AS it shares with B. the AS then generates a new
session key KA,B, and creates two tickets TA and TB, one for each of the
authenticating parties. TA includes the identities of A and B, A
′s nonce
NA, the session key KA,B, and is encrypted using KA,AS . TB includes
the identities of A and B, B′s nonce NB, the session key KA,B, and is
encrypted using KB,AS. The AS sends both TA and TB to A.
5. A can decrypt TA using its long-term key KA,AS. Since it has generated
the nonce NA in the ticket, A is guaranteed that the AS has participated
in this session by incorporating NA in the ticket TA; this assures A that
the session key KAB is fresh and has indeed been generated by the AS.
At this point, A forwards TB to B.
6. Upon receiving TB, B decrypts it using its long-term key KB,AS. Since
it has generated the nonce NB0 in the ticket, B is guaranteed that the
AS has participated in this session by decrypting the message M1 (sent
at step 2); thus, the session key KA,B is fresh and has been generated by
the AS. At this point, B generates another fresh nonce NB1 , and sends it
to A encrypted using the new session key KA,B.
7. A decrypts the message from B using the session key, obtains NB1 , and
creates a new message for B containing f(NB1), also encrypted using
KA,B. Here. f is a previously agreed-upon secure hash function. Upon
receiving this last message, B is assured that A is online and active (it
has received and decrypted the message sent at step 6); essentially, this
prevents replay attacks.
A large number of authentication schemes [119, 52, 111] have been designed
based on the original Needham-Schroeder protocol. Because the original version
of the protocol is based on nonces, it has one weakness that allows compromised
keys to be indefinitely used to impersonate their original owners; for this rea-
son, [78] suggests modifying it to include timestamps, in order to limit the
authentication ticket lifetime.
The Kerberos authentication protocol [119] also fixes this weakness by adding
a timestamp in the tickets generated by the authentication server. This ensures
that principals will always reject old tickets that may correspond to compro-
mised keys.
The same weakness is fixed in the Otway-Rees protocol [160] but only by
means of nonces. Essentially, in order to prevent the stale tickets attack, both
the initiator and the responder need to generate fresh nonces which are included
by the authentication server in the tickets it generates for both parties. The
disadvantage of this compared with the Kerberos solution (based on timestamps)
112 CHAPTER 6. SYMMETRIC KEY AUTHENTICATION
is that both parties need to remember their nonces for the brief period of time
during which a ticket may be reused for repeated authentications.
All these protocols require the AS to be on-line, since the two principals
need to contact it at least for the first secure session they want to establish.
This approach leads to a security infrastructure highly dependent on the AS.
As we will show in the next section, this dependence may cause problems in a
wide-area network environment.
6.2 Symmetric Key Authentication—
Migration Towards WANs
The symmetric key authentication protocols discussed in the previous section
rely heavily on the AS. While this dependency is acceptable in the case of
LAN-based systems, when moving to a wide-area network (as is the case of
Globe distributed applications), reliance on an on-line AS has the following
disadvantages:
• The AS is a single point of failure because when the AS is out of service
users cannot independently establish a new secure session. This makes it
a particularly attractive target for DoS attacks.
• The AS is a performance bottleneck, since all the users need to contact
the server for each new session they want to establish.
• The AS is an highly sensitive target since compromising it would re-
sult in a possible compromise of all the subsequent private communica-
tions among all users registered with that particular AS. Furthermore key
material is continuously exposed since the AS needs to be online.
6.2.1 Boyd’s authentication protocol
A possible solution to this problem (having the AS online) was first suggested
by Boyd in [59]. The idea in this protocol is to have the two authenticating
principals contact the AS server only once, to obtain a shared long term secret;
this long term secret is then repeatedly used by the two parties when interact-
ing during future sessions. In order to avoid re-using session keys, and prevent
replay attacks, the long term secret is never used for encrypting data. Instead,
each session key is created by combining the long term secret with a pair of
fresh nonces (one generated by each party), using a secure hash function. When
combining such a function with a secret key (the long term secret), the result
is a keyed hashed functions [50]. One fundamental property of such functions is
that even when having a (limited) number of (input,output) pairs, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to derive the function key. Based on this property, it follows
that this session key generation scheme is both forward and backward-secure:
the compromise of one session key does not compromise either the long term
secret, or any other session keys derived from it.
In detail, Boyd’s protocol is shown in Figure 6.2. It consists of five steps:
1. A sends to the AS the identities of the two parties involved in the authen-
tication protocol (A and B).
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Notation
A,B entities that want to authenticate.
AS the authentication server.
NU random nonce generated by entity U .
KU,V symmetric key shared between entities U and V .
KS long term secret.
[data]K data encrypted with the symmetric key K.
Protocol
(1) A −→ AS: A,B
(2) AS −→ A: [A,B,KS ]KA,AS , [A,B,KS ]KBAS
(3) A −→ B: A, [A,B,KS ]KB,AS , NA
(4) B −→ A: [NA]KA,B , NB
(5) A −→ B: [NB]KA,B
Figure 6.2: Initial authentication in Boyd’s protocol
2. The AS generates a long term secret KS and incorporates it into two tick-
ets TA and TB, one for each of the two parties. TA includes the identities
of A and B and the secret KS , and is encrypted using a long term key
KA,AS shared by A and the AS. TB includes the identities of A and B
and the secret KS, and is encrypted using a long term key KB,AS shared
by B and the AS. The AS sends both TA and TB to A.
3. A decrypts TA using KA,AS (which it shares with the AS) and obtains
KS . It then generates a fresh nonce NA and sends it to B, together with
its identity, and the ticket TB obtained from the AS. A caches the ticket
TA for future use.
4. B decrypts TB using KB,AS (which it shares with the AS) and obtains
KS . It then generates a fresh nonce NB, and combines it with NA and
KS using a previously agreed-upon secure hash function f , to obtain a
session key KA,B = f(NA, NB,KS). B then encrypts NA using KA,B and
sends it back to A, together with the nonce NB (in plaintext). B caches
the ticket TB for future use.
5. A receivesNB and can also compute the session keyKA,B = f(NA, NB,KS).
A uses this key to decrypt the message [NA]KA,B sent by B. Since NA
is a fresh nonce it has generated, A is assured that B is active and has
participated in the protocol. At this point A encrypts NB using KA,B
and sends it to B. B decrypts [NB]KA,B ; since NB is a fresh nonce it
has generated, B is assured that A is active and has participated in the
protocol. A and B are mutually authenticated.
Once two parties run the above protocol, they can subsequently re-authenticate
without contacting the server, by producing a new authenticated and fresh ses-
sion key by completing the protocol shown in Figure 6.3.
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Protocol
(1) A −→ B: A,N ′A
(2) B −→ A: [N ′A]K′A,B , N
′
B
(3) A −→ B: [N ′B]K′A,B
Figure 6.3: Subsequent authentications in Boyd’s protocol
The protocol consists of three steps:
1. A decrypts the (cached) ticket TA it has obtained from the AS, and gets
the long term secret KS. A then generates a fresh nonce N
′
A and sends it
to B, together with its identity.
2. B decrypts the (cached) ticket TA, and gets the long term secret KS . It
then generates a fresh nonce N ′B, and combines it with N
′
A and KS using
the previously agreed-upon secure hash function f , to obtain a session key
K ′A,B = f(N
′
A, N
′
B,KS). B then encrypts N
′
A using K
′
A,B and sends it
back to A, together with the nonce N ′B (in plaintext).
3. A receives N ′B and computes the new session key K
′
A,B = f(N
′
A, N
′
B,KS).
A uses this key to decrypt the message [N ′A]K′A,B sent by B. Since N
′
A
is a fresh nonce it has generated, A is assured that B is active and has
participated in the protocol. At this point A encrypts N ′B using K
′
A,B
and sends it to B. B decrypts [N ′B]K′A,B ; since N
′
B is a fresh nonce it
has generated, B is assured that A is active and has participated in the
protocol. A and B are mutually authenticated.
6.2.2 Boyd’s protocol with public key credentials
One drawback of Boyd’s protocol is that although less frequently accessed, the
AS still needs to be online, in order to generate the long-term secret needed
to authenticate two unknown principals. Our goal for Globe was to have a
symmetric key authentication protocol based on an oﬄine trusted third party,
that would work much in the same way as public-key based authentication
protocols.
One possible solution is to replace the initial AS-mediated authentication in
Boyd’s protocol with a public key protocol. The idea is to have a public/private
key pair assigned to each authenticating party, with the public key certified by
the oﬄine TTP through a digital certificate. The first authentication between
two unknown principals is then accomplished through a public key authen-
tication protocol; this could be for example the X.509 strong authentication
protocol [144] shown in Figure 6.4.
The X.509 strong authentication protocol consists of three steps:
1. A generates a fresh nonce NA. It then signs this nonce together with is
identity, using its private key xA, and sends the signed message to B,
together with A′s public key certificate obtained from the authentication
server AS. The message is signed in order to prevent oracle attacks.
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Notation
A,B entities that want to authenticate.
certU entity U
′s public key certificate.
YU/xU entity U
′s public/private key pair.
NU a random nonce generated by entity U .
KU,V symmetric key shared between entities U and V .
KS long term secret.
{data}K data encrypted with the symmetric/asymmetric
key K; public key signing is represented as
encryption with a private key.
Protocol
(1) A −→ B: certA, [NA, B]xA
(2) B −→ A: certB, [NB, NA, A, [KS ]YA ]xB
(3) A −→ B: [NB, B]xA
Figure 6.4: The X.509 strong authentication protocol
2. B verifies the AS signature on A′s certificate, and checks the certificate
is not revoked. B then verifies A′s signature on [NA, B]xA , using A
′s
public key YA from the certificate. Now B generates a fresh nonce NB
and a long term secret KS; it encrypts KS using A
′s public key, and signs
the encrypted data, together with the two nonces NA and NB and A
′s
identity, and sends the signed message to A, together with its public key
certificate certB .
3. A verifies the AS signature on B′s certificate, and checks the certificate is
not revoked. A then verifies B′s signature on the message received from
B, using B′s public key YB from the certificate. Since NA is a fresh nonce
it has generated, A is assured that B is active and has participated in the
protocol. A decrypts [KS ]YA using its own private key xA and obtains
the shared secret KS , which it stores for future use. A then signs the
nonce NB together with its own identity and sends the signed message to
B. Upon receiving this message, B verifies the signature using A′s public
key. Since NB is a fresh nonce it has generated, B is assured that A is
active and has participated in the protocol. At this point, A and B are
mutually authenticated.
At the end of this protocol the two parties A and B are mutually authenti-
cated, and share a common long term secret KS. Both parties cache this secret
and use it to establish future session keys by running the second step in Boyd’s
protocol (as shown in Figure 6.3).
The advantage of this hybrid construction is that the two parties have to run
the (heavyweight) public key authentication protocol only once. All subsequent
authentications only require a lightweight symmetric key protocol. This idea is
not new; the TLS protocol [79] for example, has provisions for session caching;
resuming it only involves symmetric key operations. A similar idea is described
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in [65] in the context of applications that use replication for improved Byzantine
fault tolerance.
The hybrid scheme we described is effective when there are frequent in-
teractions between two parties because the high cost of the initial public key
authentication can be amortized over a series of subsequent sessions. This is the
case with the system described in [65]. There, replication is used for improved
Byzantine fault tolerance; the number of replicas is relatively small, and they
run for extended periods; it is thus expected that a client will interact with the
same set of replicas for a long time interval. In contrast, in Globe we envision
that object replication will be mostly employed for achieving better scalability
and performance. In this context, the hybrid public/symmetric authentication
scheme we have described in this section is less effective for the following reasons:
1. One of the great advantages of dynamic application replication with Globe
is the ability to deal with “flash crowd” events. When such events occur,
Globe objects have the ability to quickly react, and instantiate new replicas
to handle the peak workload. However, when a new replica is created, it
has no cached shared secrets with any clients. Thus, the first time clients
connect to a new replica, they have to perform the heavyweight public key
authentication mechanism. In the context of a flash crowd, this means lack
of replica performance exactly when this performance is needed the most.
2. In Globe, replica selection for method invocation is done by the repli-
cation subobject of the client proxy, based on the replica contact points
returned by the Globe Location Service. In the simplest case, the client
proxy may always select the closest object replica. However, for certain
types of Globe applications, especially those involving extensive compu-
tational workload (service computing and Grid applications for example),
the replica selection algorithm needs to take into account additional fac-
tors besides network proximity, such as balancing workload among repli-
cas. Since replica workload is dynamic, as clients come and go, it is less
likely that any given client will interact with the same replica over a num-
ber of sessions. Furthermore, a client may have to switch replicas when
invoking different methods, based on the reverse access control settings
for the object (as described in Chapter 4). In all these scenarios, caching
public key authentication sessions will have a much reduced impact on the
overall performance.
6.3 Symmetric Key Authentication Using An
Oﬄine TTP
Given the drawbacks of the hybrid scheme described in the previous section,
we decided to investigate whether it is possible to have a 100% symmetric key
authentication protocol based on an oﬄine trusted third party. Our starting
point was again Boyd’s protocol, particularly the idea of exploiting the security
properties of keyed hash functions for deriving fresh session keys from long-term
shared secrets. In order to achieve our original goal (moving the TTP oﬄine),
in the end we had to design a completely new protocol. This protocol consists
of three phases: administrative replica initialization, user/replica registration,
and finally the actual authentication.
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For initialization, the administrative replica (AR) generates two sets of 128-
bit AES [1] keys: the replica master key list (RKL) and the user master key list
(UKL). The size of the RKL is the maximum number of replicas expected to be
instantiated for the DSO, while the size of the UKL is the maximum number of
users expected to register.
Secret Auth. Ticket
1
2
S
S
S authTicket
authTicket
authTicketR0,R1
R0,R2
R0,RM
R0,R1
R0,R2
M
Replica ID
M
Secret Auth. Ticket
SU0,R1
SU0,RM authTicket
authTicket U0,R1
U0,RM
UR-set
Replica R
RR-set
Replica ID
R0,RM
RM
S
S
authTicket
authTicket
R0,U0
R0,U1
N
R0,U0
R0,U1
RU-set
Administrative replica (AR) User U0
0
User ID
R1K
K
K
R0
0
1
Secret Auth. Ticket
S authTicketR0,UN R0,UN
K
KU1
UN
1
KU0 SU0,R0 authTicket U0,R0
User master key list
(UKL)
User ID
0
1
Master key
N
Replica master key list
(RKL)
0
1
Master keyReplica ID
M
0
Figure 6.5: New authentication protocol—data structures
In the registration phase, users and replicas register with the administrative
replica (AR). This registration would typically happen during the trust nego-
tiation phase (see Chapter 5), when new users or replicas are accepted part of
the DSO trust domain.
A user who registers is assigned an unused key from the UKL, and receives
an authentication credentials set (the UR-set) which consists of a number of
(long term secret, authentication ticket) pairs. Long term secrets part of the
UR-set are shared between users and replicas part of the DSO, with a user
sharing a long term secret with each of the running replicas as well as with
each potential replica that may be instantiated in the future (thus, the number
of long term secrets is equal to the size of the RKL). In this way, when new
replicas are instantiated, the users already registered need not be updated when
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switching replicas.
A similar process occurs when new replicas are registered, and this would
typically happen during the trust negotiation phase between the administrative
replica and the GOS hosting the new replica (see Chapter 5). In this case,
the new replica receives two sets of credentials, one set including shared long
term secrets for every potential user (including those expected to register in
the future)—the RU-set, and the other set including long term secrets for every
potential replica—the RR-set. The reason for having two credentials sets is
that both user-replica, and replica-replica interactions are possible, for method
invocation and state updates, respectively. As such, number of long term secrets
in the RU-set is equal to the size of the UKL, while the number of secrets in
the RR-set is equal to the size of the RKL. Figure 6.5 shows the data structures
introduced so far.
There is an authentication ticket associated with each long term secret. The
(long term secret, authentication ticket) pair allowing DSO entity A (user or
replica) to authenticate to entity B has the form
(SAB , [SA,B, OID, IDA, IDB, Tissue, Texpire]KB,AR)
where SA,B is the secret (an 128 bit random value), OID is the object ID, IDA
is the entity ID for A, IDB is another entity ID (possibly not yet assigned, but
expected to be assigned in the future), and KB,AR is another master key. The
ticket can be used by A to prove to B that it is indeed part of the DSO—since it
is encrypted with a key shared only between B and the administrative replica.
Once a DSO entity has registered, it can use its credentials to authenticate
other DSO entities following the protocol shown in Figure 6.6. The protocol has
some similarities to the original protocol proposed by Boyd, except that now
each party has its own long term secret, also included in the ticket which it send
to the other party. We provide a logical proof of the correctness of the protocol
in Section 6.5.
The new authentication protocol consists of four steps:
1. A generates a fresh nonce NA, and sends it to B together with its entity
ID, IDA, which it was assigned when registering with the DSO.
2. B searches its authentication credentials set for the long term secret SB,A
corresponding to IDA. B then generates a fresh nonce NB and sends
it to A together with its entity ID IDB, and the authentication ticket
authT icketB,A corresponding to IDA.
3. A decrypts authT icketB,A using the long term key KA,AR it shares with
the administrative replica, and obtains the long term secret SB,A. A now
combines SB,A with its own long term secret for IDB—SA,B, and the two
nonces NA and NB, using the SHA-1 secure hash function, and obtains a
new session key KA,B. A then uses KA,B to encrypt B
′s nonce NB, and
sends it to B together with the authentication ticket authT icketA,B.
4. B decrypts authT icketA,B using its long term keyKB,AR, and obtains the
long term secret SA,B. B now combines SA,B with its own long term secret
for IDA—SB,A, and the two nonces NA and NB, using the SHA-1 secure
hash function, also obtaining the new session key KA,B. B uses KA,B to
decrypt [NB]KA,B (sent by A). Since NB is a fresh nonce it has generated,
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Notation
AR DSO administrative replica.
A,B entities that want to authenticate.
NU random nonce generated by entity U .
SU,V long term secret shared by entities U and V .
KU,V symmetric key shared between entities U and V .
authT icketU,V ticket used by entity U to authenticate
with entity V ; it has the form:
[SAB , OID, IDA, IDB, Tissue, Texpire]KB,AR
[data]K data encrypted with the symmetric key K
Protocol
(1) A −→ B: IDA, NA
(2) B −→ A: IDB, NB, authT icketB,A
(3) A −→ B: [NB]KA,B , authT icketA,B
(4) B −→ A: [NA]KA,B
Figure 6.6: New symmetric key authentication protocol
B is assured that A is active and has participated in the protocol. B then
uses KA,B to encrypt A
′s nonce NA, and sends it to A. Upon receiving
this, A decrypts it; Since NA is a fresh nonce it has generated, A is assured
that B is active and has participated in the protocol. Both parties are
now mutually authenticated.
6.3.1 Key update and revocation
What makes this protocol different from classical symmetric key authentication
schemes is that credentials are long-lived, much in the same way as for public
key protocols. Because of this, we have to make provisions for two additional
mechanisms: credentials update and credentials revocation.
An update is needed because, in order to prevent possible cryptanalytic
attacks, credentials cannot be used forever; after certain time they need to be
discarded and replaced with fresh material. One property we want to have in this
case is locality: an update should only affect the DSO entity that performs it, and
none of the others. This is essential for ensuring the scalability of the protocol.
Assuming the maximum credential lifetime is T , and M , N are the maximum
number of replicas and clients that register during T , the locality property
can be achieved by ensuring the administrative replica always has at least M
unused keys in the RKL and at least N unused keys in the UKL. Whenever a
user registers, it then receives additional credentials for at least M unassigned
replica keys, which should cover all possible replicas that may register until the
credentials will expire; similarly, when a replica registers it receives additional
credentials for at least N unassigned user keys, which should cover all possible
users that may register until the replica will update the credentials. In this
case, each user receives a credential set of size 2 ∗ M and each replica two
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credential sets of size 2 ∗M (for authenticating to other replicas) and 2 ∗N (for
authenticating to users).
When exceptional circumstances occur, the administrative replica may needs
to revoke credentials before they expire. We use the same mechanisms outlined
in Chapter 4, namely a separate CRL for replicas and users, which include the
ID’s of the revoked entities. Validating these CRLs requires a public key signa-
ture verification, but this is not a problem from a performance point of view,
since CRL verification does not occur that often (a one hour freshness interval is
considered sufficient for most applications). Furthermore, our implementation
uses the RSA algorithm for public key operations, and here signature verification
is relatively inexpensive.
Maintaining the locality property with respect to credentials revocation re-
quires further increasing the size of the RKL and UKL. Assuming that an entity
that has its credentials revoked is assigned new credentials (not always the case,
but this keeps us on the safe side), means that the total number of credentials
to be issued becomes larger than the maximum number of entities expected to
register. If the probability for credentials revocation is P , the new formulas for
the maximum size of the RKL and UKL become M ∗ (2 + P ) and N ∗ (2 + P )
respectively.
6.4 Discussion
The great advantage of the symmetric key authentication protocol introduced
in the previous section is the fact that it operates very much in the same way
as public key protocols, in the sense that authentication does not require inter-
acting with an online trusted third party. A DSO entity only needs to contact
the administrative replica for registration, key update, possibly for obtaining
fresh revocation information (in the case of replicas). As a result, interactions
with the administrative replica are much less frequent, thus the administrative
replica becomes less of a performance bottleneck. It is also important to note
that even if the administrative replica is down or unreachable, users and repli-
cas already registered with the DSO can continue to operate normally; only
registering new users or replicas becomes impossible. Furthermore, it is now
possible to enhance the administrative replica with mechanisms for preventing
denial of service attacks (for example crypto puzzles [32, 184]); this would be
killer overhead should this replica have to act as an online TTP, as in traditional
symmetric key protocols. However, these advantages come at a certain price:
First there are increased storage requirements: essentially, each user proxy
needs to store a number of credentials proportional to the maximum number of
replicas, while each replica needs to store a number of credentials proportional
to the maximum number of users and replicas. However, with storage price
dramatically decreasing every year, we believe this is an acceptable tradeoff.
Based on our Java implementation, we have calculated (as shown in Ta-
ble 6.1) that the size of one (authentication key, authentication ticket) pair is
100 bytes. Considering the formulas derived in Section 6.3.1, Table 6.2 shows
the size of the UKL and RKL for different types of Globe objects:
Given the numbers in Table 6.2 we can see that even for reasonably large
DSOs (thousands of replicas, hundreds of thousand users), and for a very high
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Entry Format:
( KAB, {KAB, OID, IDA, IDB, Tissue, Texpire}KeyB )
Field Size
KAB 16 bytes
OID 20 bytes
IDA 4 bytes
IDB 4 bytes
Tissue 4 bytes
Texpire 4 bytes
SHA-1 over above fields 20 bytes
Total ticket size 68 bytes
Total after encryption 80 bytes (5 blocks)
(CBC mode)
Grand total (encrypted ticket 100 bytes
+ authentication key)
Table 6.1: Size of one (authentication key, authentication ticket) credential
Max. Max. Expected revo- RKL UKL
replicas users cation rate size size
20 1000 5% 3.9KB 192KB
20 1000 25% 4.3KB 216KB
100 10000 5% 19KB 1.9MB
100 10000 25% 21KB 2.1MB
1000 100000 5% 192KB 19MB
1000 100000 25% 216KB 21MB
Table 6.2: RKL and UKL size for different types of Globe DSOs
revocation probability (25%), the storage requirements would be in the order of
hundreds of kilobytes for user proxies and tens of megabytes for replicas (which
is not that much of a problem when considering the average disk size exceeds
50GB these days). For extremely large DSOs, scalability can be achieved by
partitioning authentication credential sets based on replica and user geograph-
ical clustering. For example, a user could be given authentication credentials
only for replicas and potential replicas) in her network vicinity (the whole point
of replication is to match clients with nearby replicas, so there is no point in
giving users in Europe credentials for replicas in Australia). It is also impor-
tant to stress that the application target for Globe is not massive replication,
but instead dynamic replication in order to achieve better performance and
fault tolerance. In this context, we expect most Globe applications to require
a moderate number of replicas (in the order of hundreds) which could be easily
handled with our authentication mechanism.
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Besides increased storage requirements, another drawback of our symmet-
ric key authentication scheme is the fact that the maximum size of the (user,
replica) population needs to be known in advance. However, for many classes of
applications, predicting an upper bound of the number of users is not that dif-
ficult. This is the case for applications serving closed communities, such as the
employees of a company or the students at a university campus. Furthermore,
for this upper bound one only needs a rough estimate (the order of magni-
tude as opposed to the exact number); “guessing up”, and allocating slightly
more master keys that necessary, at worst leads to some small fraction of the
users/replicas’ storage being wasted. In the case of applications serving world-
wide “open” communities, where predicting and upper bound for the number of
users may be difficult, it is always possible to make use of geographical clustering
of users and replicas in order keep the size of credential sets in check.
Finally, the new authentication protocol does not support nonrepudiability,
but this is an intrinsic limitation of symmetric key algorithms. Furthermore,
another intrinsic limitation of symmetric key protocols is their lack of support
for delegation of administrative privileges: essentially, all the trust needs to
be placed in the AS. For Globe applications where nonrepudiation is required,
as well as for situations that demand complex administrative hierarchies, DSO
administrators should only select the public key authentication module.
6.5 A Logical Proof of the New Protocol
In this section we examine the security of authentication protocol we introduced
in Section 6.3. For our analysis we use the BAN [63] logic that has been extended
as suggested by Wright and Stubblebine in [178] in order to formalize revocation
and dealing with keyed hash functions. Both concepts are not present in the
original BAN logic. We assume the reader is familiar with this logic.
We had to extend the original BAN logic with a new formula and two new
postulates. The formula expresses the statement saying that a principal A
checked the revocation list issued by S about key K and the key is not present
in the list (thus K is valid)
Revocation
¬(A |≡ ¬(S |≡ X))
Concerning the postulates, the first extends once said into belief if the state-
ment has not been revoked after it has been uttered. The second states that
assuming f a keyed hash function over any number of input, the key obtained
by applying such a function on these inputs is trusted as long as one of the
inputs is a trusted secret and one is a fresh nonce.
Revocation-check postulate
A|≡S|∼X,¬(A|≡¬(S|≡X))
A|≡S|≡X
We start our analysis from the idealized version of the protocol, as required
by the logic, recalling that the messages and parts of messages in cleartext are
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Key-derivation postulate
A|≡A
K
⇀↽B,A|≡#(N)
A|≡A
f(..,K,N,·)
←→ B
omitted, since they do not contribute to the logical properties of the protocol.
The idealized protocol is shown in Figure 6.7, where S stands for the admin-
istrative replica. OID, IDA, and IDB are omitted because their purpose is to
identify the sender and receiver of the message, and this indication is already
captured by the specification of the principals (A and B) in the other constructs
(i.e. A
KBA⇀↽ B).
(2) B −→ A: {A
KBA⇀↽ B}KAS
(3) A −→ B: {A
KAB⇀↽ B}KBS , {Nb, A
K
←→ B}K
(4) B −→ A: {Na, A
K
←→ B}K
Figure 6.7: Idealized authentication protocol
The analysis consists of starting from assumptions that represent the beliefs
of the parties when the run of the protocol starts and by applying the postulates
of the logic verifying if the goal of authentication is achieved. This goal can
be expressed in term of beliefs of the two parties. Thus we might deem that
authentication is complete between A and B if there is a K such that: A |≡
A
K
←→ B, B |≡ A
K
←→ B, A |≡ B |≡ A
K
←→ B, and B |≡ A |≡ A
K
←→ B.
The assumptions of the protocol are the following ones:
Assumptions
A |≡ A
KAS←→ S B |≡ B
KBS←→ S
S |≡ A
KAS←→ S S |≡ B
KBS←→ S
A |≡ A
KAB⇀↽ B B |≡ A
KBA⇀↽ B
S |≡ A
KAB⇀↽ B S |≡ A
KBA⇀↽ B
A |≡ (S |⇒ A
KBA⇀↽ B) B |≡ (S |⇒ A
KAB⇀↽ B)
A |≡ (S |⇒ (B |∼ X)) B |≡ (S |⇒ (A |∼ X))
A |≡ #(Na) B |≡ #(Nb)
The first four assumptions are about the shared keys between DSO local
representatives and the administrative replica. The next four concern A’s and
B’s authentication keys generated and assigned to them by the administrative
replica. The fact that the keys are unidirectional is represented by the fact
that each party believes, directly, only its own directional key. The next two
assumptions capture the belief of the client in the other party’s directional
authentication key via the administrative replica, that has jurisdiction over these
keys since it generates and assigns them. The next two assumptions indicates
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that parties trust the administrative replica to forward a message from the other
party honestly. This trust is used since the administrative replica distributes
the authentication keys. The last two assumptions show that two nonces are
used and who considers them to be fresh.
Starting from the assumptions we can now proceed with the analysis. A
receives message 2, so A ⊳ {A
KBA⇀↽ B}KAS . A can decrypt the message because
it knows and trusts KAS thus, by applying the message-meaning, revocation
check and jurisdiction postulates, we have:
A|≡A
KAS
←→S,A⊳{A
KBA
⇀↽ B}KAS
A|≡S|∼A
KBA
⇀↽ B
A|≡S|∼A
KBA
⇀↽ B,¬(A|≡¬(S|≡A
KBA
⇀↽ B)
A|≡S|≡A
KBA
⇀↽ B
A|≡(S|⇒A
KBA
⇀↽ B),A|≡S|≡A
KBA
⇀↽ B
A|≡A
KBA
⇀↽ B
Then B receive message 3 and he sees: B⊳{A
KAB⇀↽ B}KBS , {Nb, A
K
←→ B}K .
For the first part of the message we can apply the same rule we just applied
for A, thus by applying the message-meaning, revocation check and jurisdiction
postulates on the fist part of the message B sees, we have:
B |≡ A
KAB⇀↽ B
Now we can apply the key derivation postulate, and we get the following:
B|≡A
KAB
⇀↽ B,B|≡#(Nb)
B|≡A
K
↔B
where K = f(KAB,KBA, Nb, Na).
By applying the message meaning and nonce-verification postulate on the
second message received by B, we obtain:
B|≡A
K
↔B,B⊳{Nb,A
K
←→B}K
B|≡A|∼(Nb,A
K
←→B)
B|≡#(Nb),B|≡A|∼(Nb,A
K
←→B)
B|≡A|≡A
K
←→B
The protocol continues with B sending message 4 to A such that: A ⊳
{Na, A
K
←→ B}K . The analysis of this message is the same as the analysis
of the second message received by B in step 3 of the protocol. Thus, by also
applying the key-derivation, message-meaning and nonce-verification postulates
we obtain:
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A |≡ B |≡ A
K
←→ B
We can conclude that the authentication goals are satisfied, since from the
initial assumptions, the two participants reach the state where both of them
believe they share a key they both trust. Additionally, each of participants
believe the other party believes the same thing (strong authentication).
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Chapter 7
Support for Fine-Grained
Access Control
In Chapter 4 we described the access control model for Globe, and the three
types of rights—method invocation, method execution, and administrative rights—
that can be associated to DSO entities. Given that the underlying paradigm
behind Globe is to encapsulate functionality behind object interfaces, under this
basic access control model rights are essentially expressed as the ability of princi-
pals to invoke/execute the DSO’s public, private (internal), and administrative
methods.
The basic access control mechanism described in Chapter 4 involves encoding
rights as bitmaps, with each DSO entity being assigned two such bitmaps—the
forward access control bitmap and reverse access control bitmap—respectively
storing the method invocation and method execution rights granted to that en-
tity (administrative rights are encoded as rights to invoke/execute the DSO’s
administrative methods). In this case, the access control granularity is set to
method level, essentially, an entity is either allowed to invoke/execute a method
or not. This basic mechanism is quite expressive, and extremely efficient to
enforce, since an access control check only involves bit manipulation operations.
However, certain applications may require a more refined access control gran-
ularity; for example, an e-banking application may require different security
properties when requesting the same action—a money transfer—depending on
the amount being transfered.
In addition to this, some of the Byzantine fault tolerance techniques also
introduced in Chapter 4 involve sets of replicas (quorums) executing the same
user request, and possibly some other replicas auditing the results, in order to
reduce the potential damage that malicious replicas may cause (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.5). Such replicated method invocation and auditing behavior is not
possible to express only using the basic (bitmap-based) access control mecha-
nism.
To address these issues, in this chapter we describe a new access control
framework for Globe DSOs, which allows expressing fine-grained method invo-
cation and execution rights, based on parameter values, as well as other external
conditions. Using this new framework, it is also possible to express exceptional
method invocation and execution behavior:
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• Composite invocation subjects—this is a special DSO method invocation
behavior, where a number of users must collaborate for invoking a partic-
ular method instance (specified by the method name, and possibly by a
specific combination of parameter values).
• Composite execution targets—this is a special DSO method execution be-
havior, where a number of DSO replicas must collaborate for executing a
particular method instance (specified by the method name, and possibly
by a specific combination of parameter values).
• Audited execution—this is a special DSO method execution behavior,
where replicas executing a particular method instance (specified by the
method name, and possibly by a specific combination of parameter val-
ues) must sign the original request and the computed results, so those
can be subsequently audited by a different replica (this technique was
briefly discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.5, and will be explored in detail
in Chapter 8).
The main reason for supporting such exceptional method invocation/execution
behavior is Byzantine fault tolerance. Composite invocation subjects are useful
for protecting sensitive DSO operations by means of separation of privileges [54],
which may be mandated by organizational policies (for example, many banks
require high-value transactions to be approved by more than one bank official).
Composite execution targets, and audited execution are useful for protecting
DSO operations against possible compromise or malicious behavior from some
of their less trusted replicas. In this way, it is possible to run high-integrity
services on marginally trusted GOS infrastructure. This technique of “reliabil-
ity through replicated execution” is consistent with prior work on Byzantine
fault-tolerant distributed systems [65, 137].
Composite subjects and targets, as well as auditing significantly modify the
method invocation procedure outlined in Chapter 2 (the in-secure version) and
in Chapter 4 (the secure version). Essentially, instead of the typical “one user
proxy contacts one replica” behavior, multiple proxies may have to coordinate
to contact one replica (for composite invocation subjects), or one proxy may
have to contact multiple replicas for the same invocation (in the case of audit-
ing and composite execution targets). There are multiple ways such exceptional
behavior can be integrated with the overall DSO architecture; we present a few
examples in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. As a side-effect, integrating such exceptional
behavior has validated the modular structure of DSO local representatives, and
our choice of inter-subobject and inter-module interfaces, which pretty much
confine all the extra functionality (needed for composite subjects, targets, au-
diting) to the access control module.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 7.1 we describe the basic
ideas behind the fine-grained access control framework for Globe DSOs. In
Section 7.2 we describe how DSO administrative rights can be expressed in
the new framework. In Section 7.3, and 7.4 we describe how DSO method
invocation and execution rights can be expressed. Finally, in Section 7.5 we give
a brief overview on how the new access control mechanisms can be integrated
with Globe DSOs.
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7.1 Globe DSOs and Entity Roles
The basic idea for designing a more fine-grained access control framework for
Globe DSOs comes from an observation regarding the types of responsibilities
a DSO entity (replica, user) can have as part of the object. Essentially, given
the DSO’s replication strategy, and the administrative and security policies set
by the DSO administrator, there are only a limited number of logical “roles”
that can be associated to entities part of the object. For example, for a DSO
that employs a master-slave replication algorithm, there are at least two such
“roles” for replicas—namely master and slave replicas. In this example, master
and slave replicas would have different security properties: a master replica
needs to handle “write” operations (hence, it needs to be granted execution
rights for methods that modify the object’s state), while a slave replica is only
concerned with “read” operations.
Role-based access control (RBAC) [173, 174, 172] is a new framework for
expressing and enforcing access control in the context of large organizations
where rights associated to entities are expected to frequently change, and there
is no single point of enforcement. Under the RBAC framework, entities are
granted membership into roles based on their competencies and responsibilities
in the organization. The operations that an entity is permitted to perform
are based on that entity’s role. Entity membership into roles can be revoked
easily and new memberships established as operational assignments dictate.
Role associations can be established when new operations are instituted, and
old operations can be deleted as organizational functions change and evolve.
The basic assumption is that the underlying role hierarchy is reasonably stable
(it is not that frequent that new roles emerge, or that existing roles need to
be deleted). Under this assumption, RBAC simplifies the administration and
management of privileges; roles can be updated without updating the privileges
for every entity on an individual basis.
Our idea is to design a new access control framework for Globe DSOs based
on RBAC. We define a DSO role as a subset of the set of all rights that can be
associated to a Globe DSO. The total number of rights that can be associated
to a DSO depends on the access control granularity. When the granularity
is set to method-level, this number is proportional to the number of methods
implemented by the DSO (which can quite large); furthermore, when access
control granularity is set to method parameters values, the total number of
rights may even be infinite! Based on this observation, it appears that the
number of roles that can be associated to a DSO could be very large, since
it grows exponentially with the number of possible rights. However, most of
these potential roles are not likely to be useful for describing any meaningful
security policy. Deciding how complex the role hierarchy for a given DSO needs
to be, is ultimately a cost/benefit analysis problem for DSO administrator: a
more complex role hierarchy allows expressing more fine-grained access control
policies, but makes administration more difficult. Based on previous research
on RBAC [173], and on security policies for commercial applications [72], we
make the following assumptions regarding role hierarchies for Globe DSOs:
• Most DSO security policies can be expressed using a relatively small num-
ber of roles; most meaningful role hierarchies are reasonably compact.
• Role hierarchies are fairly static; for a given Globe application, one does
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not have to add a new class of users/replicas every day.
Based on this definition of a DSO role, the security policy for a given Globe
object can then be (logically) split into two parts: (1) the DSO role specifi-
cation is a data structure defining the DSO role hierarchy (the set of all roles
and the relationships among them), as well as the detailed permissions (rights)
associated to each role; (2) the DSO role assignment list details what roles are
assigned to each DSO entity (user replica). Based on these two data structures,
the role-based access control model for Globe DSOs is shown in Figure 7.1.
Essentially, there are three main phases: first two DSO entities mutually au-
thenticate and establish a secure communication channel (step 2 in Figure 7.1).
After that, each entity uses the role assignment list to map the identity of its
peer to the role (roles) assigned to it (steps 3 and 6 in Figure 7.1). Finally,
the forward and reverse access checks are performed by looking up those roles
in the role specification data structure, in order to find out whether they have
been granted permissions to invoke/execute the actual request (steps 4 and 7 in
Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1: Role-based access control model for Globe
Based on our assumptions that the number of roles for a given DSO is
not very large, and permissions associated to a given role do not change that
frequently, it follows that the DSO role specification data structure should be
quite compact and static. As such, it is scalable to have this data structure
distributed to all DSO entities at initialization time. On the other hand, the
DSO role assignment list is neither small (large DSOs may have thousands of
replicas and millions of users), nor static (new users may register at any time,
and replicas constantly come and go to accommodate dynamic user request
patterns). Given this, it is not scalable to have the role assignment list stored
by each DSO entity; instead, we use the technique described in Chapter 4 for
storing access control bitmaps as part of the local certificates associated to DSO
entities. In this case, instead of bitmaps, each DSO local certificates stores all
the roles associated to the entity given that certificate.
As explained in Chapter 4, there are three types of rights that can be as-
sociated to Globe DSOs: administrative rights, method invocation rights, and
method execution rights. In the next three sections we describe how each of
these types of rights can be represented as part of the DSO role specification
data structure.
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7.2 Expressing Administrative Rights
In order make it easier to explain how administrative rights are represented,
we separate DSO roles into two categories: administrative roles and operational
roles. Administrative roles include administrative rights; on the other hand,
operational roles do not include any administrative rights, instead they only
contain method invocation and method execution rights. Operational roles can
be further divided into user roles and replica roles.
RoleRoleRole
DSO Administrator
Regular Replica
User Roles
Administrative Replica
B C
D E F
Administrative
role
Operational
role
canAssign canAssign
canAssign
canAssign
canAssign
Role
RoleA
Role
Figure 7.2: Sample DSO role graph
Administrative rights are represented as the ability of administrative roles
to delegate other roles. Then, an intuitive way to see a DSO’s role hierarchy is
as a directed graph, with each node corresponding to a role; in such a graph,
an edge from a node RoleA to a node RoleB, implies that role RoleA is an
administrative role, and has the right to delegate role RoleB under the DSO’s
security policy. A sample role graph is shown in Figure 7.2; such a graph must
have the following properties:
• It has exactly one node of in-degree 0; this is the object administrator
role, which (implicitly) has all the rights that can be associated with the
DSO, so it should be able to delegate all the other administrative roles.
• All nodes corresponding to administrative roles (except for the object
administrator role) have non-zero in-degrees and out-degrees (because an
administrative role should be able to delegate at least one role).
• All nodes corresponding to operational roles must have a zero out-degree
(because an operational role does not include any administrative rights,
hence it cannot delegate any roles).
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• The graph does not contain any cycles of length greater than one edge.
We permit one-edge cycles, in order to allow administrative replicas to
replicate themselves.
In addition to this, one property that needs to be enforced when designing a
role hierarchy is monotonicity—namely an entity should not be able to acquire
more privileges through delegation. This property can be satisfied by ensuring
that any administrative role AdmRole (implicitly) has all the administrative
and operational rights that are associated to roles below it in the role hierarchy
graph (these are roles that AdmRole can directly or indirectly delegate). For
example, in Figure 7.2, RoleD, RoleE, and RoleF are below the administrative
role RoleB in the role hierarchy graph. Thus, RoleB must include all the rights
included in RoleD, RoleE, and RoleF . If this were the case, and if, for example,
RoleD included rights not part of RoleB, then an entity in RoleB could escalate
its privileges by delegating RoleD to itself.
Designing such a role graph is equivalent to describing the DSO adminis-
trative policy. For a given DSO, this is done by the object administrator, who
is in charge of the overall object security policy. One way of un-ambiguously
describing a directed graph is by describing all its edges; this can be done using
a policy language construct of the type:
RoleA canAssign RoleB
Here, RoleA and RoleB are role names (role IDs—small integers—in the
actual implementation). Part of the DSO role specification data structure con-
sists of a number of such statements, fully describing the DSO administrative
policy. The DSO role specification data structure is passed to each DSO local
representative at initialization time. A policy interpreter (part of the access
control module of the security subobject) processes all these statements and
constructs the role graph. The graph is first checked to ensure it follows the
monotonicity properties. After that, all nodes with non-zero in- and out-degrees
are interpreted as administrative roles. All the other ones (except for the object
administrator role) are interpreted as operational roles.
Once the role hierarchy is in place, DSO entities are assigned roles according
to the rights they are granted when registering with the object. The role as-
signed to an entity is incorporated into the local certificate issued to that entity.
In addition to this, DSO replicas register the roles they have been assigned with
the Globe Location Service (GLS). This facilitates proxies in finding replicas
assigned specific roles (when a user invokes a given DSO method, the proxy
needs to find a replica that has been granted execution rights for that method).
As explained in Chapter 4, each DSO entity has some local credentials, which
consist of the local certificate, plus the certificates of all intermediate adminis-
trative entities that link it to the object administrator. Given the new access
control model we introduce in this chapter, there are a number of constraints
on the local credentials format:
• The credentials chain must start with a certificate that includes the object
administrator role.
• The sequence of roles in the certificates in the chain correspond to a valid
path in the DSO role graph (this means that for each certificate, the role
in the certificate canAssign the role in the next certificate in the chain).
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All these checks are done by the access control module, when the local repre-
sentative establishes a secure connection to another local representative. After
authenticating the remote representative, the authentication module passes its
credentials to the access control module by calling registerRights() (see Chap-
ter 4, Section 4.1); the access control module performs then all the checks.
7.3 Expressing Method Invocation Rights
Besides administrative rights, a DSO entity can also have method invocation
rights; such rights describe which of the DSO’s methods that entity is allowed to
invoke, and under what conditions. One of the goals of the new access control
framework is to allow expressing fine-grained method invocation rights (based
on method parameter values, for example).
A method invocation privilege can be expressed through a policy statement
of the form:
RoleSubject canInvoke Method underConditions Conditions
Here RoleSubject is a role name, or a combination of role names, previously
declared in a canAssign statement; role combinations are useful for allowing
granting of method invocation rights to composite role subjects (these will be
discussed in more detail in the next section). Method is the name of one of
the DSO’s methods; Conditions is a boolean expression that puts constraints
on the way the Method can be invoked by the role, or composite role subject
identified by RoleExpr.
Composite Role Subjects
The role subject policy element introduced in the previous section is a construct
that allows rights to be granted to a role or to a composite role subject. A
composite role subject consists of a number of entities assigned certain roles,
which must cooperate in order to perform a specific action (a method invocation
in this case). The generic role subject format is:
<RoleSubject>:: <Role> | <CompositeRoleSubject>;
<CompositeRoleSubject>:: <RoleGroup> |
<RoleGroup> "&&" <CompositeRoleSubject>;
<RoleGroup>:: <PositiveInteger> "*" <Role>;
For example a role expression of the form 3∗RoleA&&2∗RoleB implies that
a given DSO method, under certain condition, can be invoked only by a com-
posite role subject consisting of three users assigned into RoleA and two users
assigned into RoleB. These five users must collaborate and agree on this method
invocation. Composite subjects are useful for protecting sensitive operations by
means of separation of privileges [54]. In many cases, such separation of privi-
leges is mandated by organizational policies, especially in areas such as banking,
or the military. For example, most banks require high-value checks be signed
by two bank employees. By supporting composite role subjects, our access con-
trol framework provides a straightforward way to translate such organizational
policies into security policies for Globe DSOs.
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Invocation Conditions
The underConditions clause in a method invocation policy statement allows
to express fine grained constraints on method invocation rights. A condition
has the following format:
<Condition>:: <RelExpr>;
<RelExpr>:: "(" <RelExpr> ")" |
<RelExpr> "&&" <RelExpr> |
<RelExpr> "||" <RelExpr> |
"!" <RelExpr> |
<IntRelExpr> | <FloatRelExpr> | <StringRelExpr> |
"true" | "false" ;
Essentially, a condition can be a relational expression, or a number of rela-
tional expressions connected using the and, or and not logical operators. In turn,
a relational expression is a logical expression that can contain integer numbers,
floating point numbers, method parameter names, additional entity attribute
names, and external functions, connected using logical and arithmetical opera-
tors (for a detailed description see Appendix 11.3). Of particular importance are
method parameter names, additional entity attributes, and external functions;
these allow expressing fine-grained constraints on method invocation rights:
• Method parameter names—this allows expressing constraints on method
invocation rights based on the actual parameter values for a given request.
For example, consider a Globe e-banking application; transferFunds is one
of its public methods, amount is one of the method parameters, and Clerk
is a role. A policy statement of the form:
Clerk canInvoke transferFunds underConditions (amount < 10000);
restricts a DSO user assigned a Clerk role to only transfer amounts less
that 10000 dollars.
• External functions—this allows expressing constraints on method invoca-
tion rights based on functions external to the access control module. Such
functions have to be separately declared in the policy data structure, so
that the policy engine knows how to invoke them. External functions can
impose constraints on the way a method can be invoked based on things
like the DSO state, the resources available on the system running the
replica, time of the day, or the location where the request originates. The
only requirement here is that such external functions are synchronous—
this ensures the policy engine cannot be blocked on an external function.
As an example, consider the same e-banking application discussed ear-
lier, and assume that another policy requirement is that a clerk can only
transfer funds during regular working hours. ToD is an external function
(implemented by the security subobject) that returns the current time of
the day. Then, the policy requirement can be expressed through a state-
ment of the form:
Clerk canInvoke transferFunds underConditions
(amount < 10000)&&(ToD() > 9)&&(ToD() < 17);
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• Additional attributes—these are expressed as name-value pairs and are
incorporated in the caller’s local credentials. The main purpose of such
attributes is to allow a more refined differentiation among entities, while
keeping the role hierarchy reasonably simple. As an example, considering
the same e-banking application discussed earlier, assume that a policy re-
quirement is that a manager can only read the accounts of the customers
she has been assigned. In this case, Manager is a role, readAccount is a
DSO public method, customerName is one of its parameters, extAttr name
is an additional attribute—part of a user certificate—that stores the user’s
name, and whichManager is an external function which, provided a cus-
tomer name, returns the name of the manager assigned to that customer.
Then, the policy requirement can be expressed through a statement of the
form:
Manager canInvoke readAccount underConditions
(extAttr name == whichManager(customerName));
Without external attributes, the only way to express such a rule would be
to create a separate role for each individual manager; this clearly would
not be a scalable solution.
Integration with the DSO Architecture
A DSO’s forward access control policy can be fully described through a set of
canInvoke statements, specifying which roles, or composite role subjects are
allowed to invoke each of the DSO’s methods, and under which conditions. This
forward access control policy is set by the object administrator, and is encoded
as part of the DSO role specification data structure. This data structure is then
distributed (as a text file), together with the DSO blueprint (see Chapter 4, Sec-
tion 4.7), and is passed to the access control module when a local representative
is initialized.
Composite role subjects significantly modify the method invocation proce-
dure outlined in Chapter 2 (the in-secure version) and in Chapter 4 (the secure
version). Essentially, instead of the typical “one user proxy contacts one replica”
behavior, composite role subjects may require a number of user proxies to con-
tact the same replica for a given method invocation. However, the modular
structure of DSO local representatives, and our choice of inter-subobject and
inter-module interfaces, ensures that even this fundamentally different method
invocation behavior has minimal impact on the functionality of subobjects and
modules other than the access control module.
As explained in Chapter 4, on the client side, the secure method invocation
procedure involves the replication subobject passing the invocation request to
the access control module by calling securelyInvoke() on the secRepl standard
interface. From the replication subobject’s point of view, invocation requests
that involve composite role subjects are treated exactly the same way as normal
requests; essentially, the replication subobject does not need to be modified to
support this type of security policies.
All the additional work required for method invocations involving composite
role subjects is handled by the access control module. To show how this is
done, consider an example where invocation of a methodM involves a composite
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subject consisting of three users in RoleA; the method needs to be invoked on
a replica in RoleB. This corresponds to policy statements of the form:
3 ∗RoleA canInvoke M underConditions ..; RoleB canExecute M
underConditions ..;
The procedure is shown in Figure 7.3:
1. Up to the point where the invocation workflow exits the replication subob-
ject, it follows exactly the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
2. The access control module receives an invocation request from the replica-
tion subobject. The module checks the role specification data structure,
and determines the request involves a composite subject.
3. From the role specification data structure, the access control module de-
termines the replica role that can handle the request. The module queries
the Globe Location Service (GLS) for a replica assigned that role.
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4. The access control module contacts other local representatives in the roles
specified in the composite role expression, and coordinates with them for
the method invocation. The way the module finds the other representative
is implementation and application dependent. We discuss some possible
options in the next section.
5. The cooperating local representatives pairwise authenticate, and establish
secure channels. This involves their respective authentication modules.
It is important to note that composite subjects are transparent to these
authentication modules, which only see a number of establishSecChannel()
requests coming from the access control modules.
6. The cooperating local representatives negotiate the composite subject call.
This negotiation is again application and implementation dependent. We
discuss some possible options in the next section.
7. Once all the local representatives in the composite subject agree to co-
operate, the (multiple) invocation request is sent to the replica that can
handle it (discovered at Step 2). The way this is done is implementation
dependent. In Figure 7.3, the cooperating local representatives send the
signed request packets to the initiating proxy, which then sends them to
the replica, together with the peers’ credentials. Alternatively, each of the
cooperating peers may contact the replica and send the request separately.
8. The designated replica receives all the invocation requests from the co-
operating peers. The access control module detects that these multiple
invocation requests are part of the same composite subject request, checks
that the composite subject is correctly constructed (the right number of
callers, assigned the right roles, as stated in the role specification data
structure), and finally passes a single execution request to the replication
subobject by calling msgArrived() on the commCB interface. From the
point the execution flow leaves the access control module, it follows exactly
the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
9. The access control module on the replica sends the result to the peer
module on the initiating proxy.
10. The access control module on the proxy forwards the results back to the
calling process (through the replication and control subobjects), following
exactly the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
Handling Composite Subjects
Probably the most difficult part in integrating the new access control framework
with the Globe DSO architecture is the handling of composite role subjects. As
explained, such composite subjects require a number of users to collaborate in
order to issue particular method invocation requests. This represents a signifi-
cant departure from the traditional Globe invocation semantics (“one user—one
request”). However, due to the modular structure of DSO local objects, and
our careful choice of subobject and module interfaces, most of the changes are
confined to the access control module. Essentially, in order to accommodate a
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security policy using composite role subjects, a DSO administrator has to either
code, or re-use an access control module that “understands” such subjects.
When designing such a module, there are a number of issues that need to
be addressed:
• How does the initiator of the composite subject call find the other roles
(i.e. users/replicas assigned in those roles) specified by the composite
subject?
• How do the various roles involved actually negotiate the composite subject
call?
• What is the actual RPC format?
With respect to the first issue, the solution depends on whether the compos-
ite role involves replicas or users. The Globe Location Service (GLS) provides an
efficient mechanism for finding replicas assigned given roles. In the case of users,
things are a bit more complicated. In theory, user proxies can register with the
GLS as well, but this is a rather heavyweight option; the latency associated
with a GLS registration may be unacceptable for some interactive applications.
An alternative is to designate a special replica acting as a user lookup service
only for that particular DSO. Each time a user proxy is instantiated, it regis-
ters with the lookup replica, by calling a register proxy() DSO private method.
During this registration, the proxy reports its contact point and assigned role;
the lookup replica then authenticates the proxy to ensure it has reported the
correct role. A proxy that needs to find other proxies with a given role can then
query the lookup replica by calling find proxy()—another DSO internal method.
After the initiator has located all the roles needed for the composite subject,
it contacts them and mutually authenticates, in order to ensure each of them
has indeed been assigned in the right role. At this point, the entities in the
composite subject need to negotiate the composite subject call. This involves
the call initiator distributing the actual invocation request to all entities part
of the composite subject, and each of them checking this request to ensure it is
acceptable. The way this check is done may depend on whether the composite
subject consists of user or replica roles:
• In the case of replica role composite subjects, the check is automated. For
example, a state update involving a composite replica role may require that
each replica involved performs some application-specific state consistency
checks before approving the update.
• In the case of user role composite subjects, the check is likely to involve
some interaction with the users behind the proxies. This may require
each proxy actually informing the user about the composite call (e.g. a
pop-up window with a question like “User U assigned role R has initi-
ated a composite subject call for method M with parameters P. Do you
agree to cooperate?”). Each user can then make a decision on whether
the method invocation conforms with the application-specific security and
administrative policies, and based on this, approve or reject the request.
Once the method invocation is approved by all entities part of the composite
subject, a RPC request needs to be sent to the replica that actually executes the
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call. This should be done in a way that preserves the traditional Globe method
invocation semantics (e.g. the replica that sees requests from multiple entities
should “understand” this is a composite subject invocation, and only execute
the call once). It is also important that a replica is able to distinguish a role
participating in more than one composite subject invoking the same method
instance.
One way to accomplish this is to have the DSO provide a special “guard”
variable for protecting composite subject calls. Each access to this guard vari-
able increments it, and is guaranteed to be atomic. For example, there can be
one DSO replica that has write-access to the guard variable; each local rep-
resentative that wants to access the guard has to contact the replica, which
guarantees atomic operations.
Prior to starting the composite subject request, the access control module on
the initiator accesses the guard variable, and obtains its value. This value is then
passed to all the entities in the composite subject. The access control module
on each of these entities then constructs a module-specific protocol message,
including the RPC request, as well as the value of the guard variable, and sends
this message to the replica designated to execute the call, as a regular request.
Upon seeing the module-specific format of the request message, and the same
value for the guard variable in each message, the peer access control module on
the replica recognizes them as part of the same composite request, verifies that
callers have the appropriate roles, and executes the request, only once.
7.4 Expressing Method Execution Rights
Finally, another class of rights that can be associated to a DSO entity are
method execution rights; such rights describe which of the DSO’s methods that
entity is allowed to execute, and under what conditions. One of the goals of
the new access control framework is to allow expressing fine-grained method
execution rights (based on method parameter values, for example), as well as
expressing exceptional method execution behavior, such as the “execute then
audit” technique (described in Chapter 4, Section 4.5), for ensuring Byzantine
fault tolerance.
A method invocation privilege can be expressed through a policy statement
of the form:
RoleExpr canExecute Method underConditions Conditions
This policy statement is very similar to the canInvoke statement intro-
duced in Section 7.3. Again, Method is the name of one of the DSO’s meth-
ods. Conditions is a boolean expression that puts constraints on the way the
Method can be executed; it has exactly the format described in Section 7.3,
which allows conditions to be expressed in terms of method parameter values,
external functions and additional attributes present in entity local credentials.
The only difference that appears (compared to the canInvoke statement) is the
RoleExpr which replaces the RoleSubject. Role expressions are more complex
than role subjects; they can describe roles, composite role targets, as well as
other types of exceptional method execution behavior, as we describe next.
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Role Expressions and Exceptional Method Execution Behavior
In a canExecute policy statement RoleExpr is an expression of the form:
<RoleExpr>:: <CompositeRoleSubject> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> ‘‘auditedBy’’ <Role> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> ‘‘doubleCheckedBy’’ \
<PositiveInteger> "%" <Role> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> ‘‘auditedBy’’ <Role> \
‘‘doubleCheckedBy’’ <PositiveInteger> "%" <Role>;
Such an expression is used to describes a group of replicas in possibly differ-
ent roles, and the way these replicas need to be contacted by a user that wants
to invoke Method (under some given conditions) on the DSO. There are three
types of method execution behavior:
• Replicated invocation: the same method is invoked on a number of (less
trusted) replicas. The result is accepted only when a majority of them
agree on the return value. This protects the user against replica Byzantine
faulty behavior: in order to make a user accept an incorrect result, a
number of malicious replicas have to collude. In this case the number of
types of replicas than need to be contacted is expressed as a composite
role subject. For example, a policy statement of the form:
3 ∗RoleA&&2 ∗RoleB canExecute M underConditions ..;
states that an execution request for method M needs to be handled by
three replicas in RoleA and two replicas in RoleB, and a majority of these
have to agree on the result before the user accepts it.
• Traceable results: a (less trusted) replica or composite replica subject that
executes a method has to sign (with their respective replica keys) the
invocation request and the return value. The user proxy then forwards
these traceable request-result pairs to a more trustworthy auditor replica.
Auditing involves re-executing the request and comparing the result with
the one signed by the replicas. In this way, less trusted replicas acting
maliciously can be traced and eventually excluded from the DSO (we
discuss this technique in detail in Chapter 8). For example, a policy
statement of the form:
RoleA auditedBy RoleB canExecute M underConditions ..;
states that an execution request for methodM can be handled by a replica
in role RoleA. However, this replica needs to sign the computed result,
before returning it to the user. The user proxy needs to forward this signed
result to a replica in role RoleB which does the auditing.
• Double-checking: the client first invokes the method on a less trusted
replica (or group of replicas specified as a composite role subject), and
then may double-check the result with a more trustworthy replica. In
order to avoid overloading the trusted replica, the double-checking is done
statistically (for each request there’s only a small probability that request
will be double-checked). For example, a policy statement of the form:
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3 ∗RoleA doubleCheckedBy 5%RoleB canExecute M
underConditions ..;
states that an execution request for method M can be handled by three
replicas in RoleA. A majority of these have to agree on the result before
the user accepts it. Furthermore, the user proxy must double-check the
result with a replica in RoleB on a statistical basis, with a probability of
five percent.
Exceptional method execution behavior, such as “execute then audit” and
“execute then double-check” are techniques that can be used to improve a DSO’s
tolerance to Byzantine failures on behalf of its replica. Such techniques become
particularly useful in the context of Globe objects replicating on third-party,
partially trusted infrastructure. In this chapter we only discuss policy language
constructs needed for expressing such exceptional method execution behavior.
We will explain all these techniques in detail in Chapter 8.
Integration with the DSO Architecture
A DSO’s reverse access control policy can be fully described through a set of
canExecute statements, specifying which roles, or composite role targets are
allowed to invoke each of the DSO’s methods, and under which conditions, as
well as instances of exceptional method execution behavior (auditing, double-
checking), dictated by the object’s Byzantine fault tolerance requirements. This
reverse access control policy is set by the object administrator, and is encoded
as part of the DSO role specification data structure. This data structure is then
distributed (as a text file), together with the DSO blueprint, and is passed to
the access control module when a local representative is initialized.
Composite role targets and exceptional method execution behavior, signifi-
cantly modify the method invocation and execution procedure outlined in Chap-
ter 2 (the in-secure version) and in Chapter 4 (the secure version). Essentially,
instead of the typical “one user proxy contacts one replica” behavior, composite
role targets may require a user proxy to contact a number of replicas for a given
method invocation. However, the modular structure of DSO local represen-
tatives, and our choice of inter-subobject and inter-module interfaces, ensures
that even this fundamentally different method invocation/execution behavior
has minimal impact on the functionality of subobjects and modules other than
the access control module.
All the additional work required for method invocations/execution involving
composite role targets and auditing/double-checking is handled by the access
control module. To show how this is done, consider an example where execution
of a method M needs to be handled by three replicas in role RoleA, with the
result being audited by a replica in role RoleB. This corresponds to a policy
statement of the form:
3 ∗RoleA auditedBy RoleB canExecute M underConditions ..;
The procedure is shown in Figure 7.4:
1. Up to the point where the invocation workflow exits the replication subob-
ject, it follows exactly the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
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2. The access control module on the user proxy receives the invocation re-
quest from the replication subobject. The module checks the role specifi-
cation data structure, and determines the request needs to be handled by
three replicas in RoleA, with the result audited by a replica in RoleB.
3. The module queries the Globe Location Service (GLS) for a contact point
for three replicas in RoleA and one replica in RoleB.
4. The user proxy authenticates (through the authentication module) the
four replicas, and establishes secure communication channels with them.
5. The access control module sends the invocation request to its peer access
control module on the three replicas in RoleA. Additional steps, such as
special encoding of RPC requests, may need to be taken, in order to ensure
the replicas recognize the request as a composite target (we will discuss
this in more detail in the next section). Each of the replicas peer access
control modules checks the role specification data structure to ensure the
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caller has the right to invoke the method. From the role specification
data structure, the access control module on each replica learns that the
particular method execution involves a composite subject (three replicas
in RoleA), and that the result has to be audited.
6. The access control modules on the three replicas may have to coordinate
in order to ensure this replicated execution does not change the method
semantics (i.e. this execution appears as one atomic operation). The way
modules coordinate to accomplish this is application and implementation
dependent. We will discuss this in more detail in the next section.
7. Each replica’s access control module passes the execution request up to
the replication subobject. From that point, the execution flow follows
exactly the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7. The method
is executed by the semantics subobject, and the result is sent back.
8. When the result reaches the replica’s access control module, the module
creates a “pledge” packet, containing (among other things, to be described
in Chapter 8), the result and the original request. The “pledge” packet is
signed using the replica key and sent back to the user proxy.
9. Upon receiving the three pledges, the access control module on the proxy
verifies the replicas signatures and checks that at least two of them agree
on the result value. If this is the case, the result is accepted, and passed up
to the replication subobject. From this point, the execution flow follows
exactly the same steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
10. The proxy access control module forwards the three pledges to the auditor
replica (in RoleB). The auditing takes place at a later time, and involves
re-executing the request in order to ensure the replicas have computed the
correct result. Replicas found to be cheating are excluded from the DSO.
We describe the auditing procedure in detail in Chapter 8.
Handling Composite Targets
As with composite subjects, handling composite targets is not straightforward,
since this represents a significant departure from the traditional Globe invoca-
tion semantics (“one user—one request”). However, due to the modular struc-
ture of DSO local objects, and our careful choice of subobject and module
interfaces, most of the changes are confined to the access control module. Es-
sentially, in order to accommodate a security policy using composite role targets,
a DSO administrator has to either code, or re-use an access control module that
“understands” such targets.
When designing such a module, there are a number of issues that need to
be addressed:
• How does the initiator of the composite target call find the replica roles
(i.e. replicas assigned in those roles) specified by the composite target?
• What is the actual RPC format?
• How do the various replicas in the target coordinate to ensure the expected
method execution semantics are achieved (i.e. this execution appears as
one atomic operation).
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With respect to the first issue, the solution is a straightforward extension
of the regular method invocation procedure: the caller uses the Globe Location
Service to find multiple replicas assigned the roles specified in the composite
target (as opposed to the caller searching for one replica, in the case of regular
method invocation).
On the other hand, defining an RPC format for composite target method
invocation is more complex. Essentially, the replicas in the composite target
need to be able to distinguish a composite target call from a regular call, oth-
erwise each replica would execute the request independently. This is essential
for methods that are not idempotent (multiple executions of the same method
instance produce different results than just one execution—this could be the
case with methods that change the DSO state for instance).
One solution for this is to use the same technique described in the previous
section for handling composite subjects. A DSO could provide a special “guard”
variable for protecting composite target calls. Again, access to this guard vari-
able increments it, and is guaranteed to be atomic. Then, prior to starting
the composite target request, the access control module on the initiator proxy
accesses the guard variable, and obtains its value. This value is then passed to
all the replicas part of the composite target, incorporated in a module-specific
protocol message, also including the RPC request and the contact points for the
other replicas. Because the protocol-specific message, the replicas recognize the
composite request; furthermore, the guard variable is used to “serialize” this
type of requests (if the same composite target receives more than one request
in a short time, network re-ordering may cause different replicas to receive their
part of the request in different order; the guard variable ensures the execution
is deterministic).
Finally, the various replicas in the composite target may have to coordinate
in order to ensure the expected method execution semantics are achieved. The
way this is done is very much application-dependent (for example this may
depend on the application consistency model). For example, in the case of
“read” requests, coordination among composite target members can be achieved
by having a special stateVersion DSO internal variable, atomically incremented
on each replica each time the DSO state is updated. A simple coordination
scheme for a composite target request would require replicas part of the target to
verify they hold the same value for the stateVersion variable, prior to executing
a “read” operation. This would ensure the results they return to the caller are
consistent.
There are a great variety of techniques for implementing replicated method
invocation in object-based distributed systems (this could be by itself a topic
for a PhD thesis!). For further details, the reader is referred to [41, 132, 167]
7.5 Implementation
In this section we provide a brief description of the implementation of the role-
based access control framework presented in this chapter. More details can be
found in [188].
A DSO role specification is encoded as a text file, which is signed by the
object administrator using the object key, and is then distributed to all local
representatives, together with the object blueprint (described in Chapter 4). Be-
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cause the role specification file is signed with the DSO key, local representatives
are assured it is created by the administrator, even when this file is retrieved
from an untrusted (or partially trusted) source, such as a regular DSO replica.
One of the problems with this approach is that once in place, the role speci-
fication is difficult to change. Essentially, when the security policy changes (for
example when new roles need to be added), all local representatives need to
be informed, so they stop using the old role specification file and retrieve the
new one. We handle this problem through revocation. Essentially, we add a
special entry in the replica revocation list (described in Chapter 4), which may
include information on revoked role specification files. A role specification file
is identified through a version number; this number is incremented whenever
the file is modified. When a new version is issued, the old version number is
included in the replica revocation list, so local representatives are informed to
discard the old file. This is an elegant solution, since local representatives are
required to obtain the latest version of the replica revocation list anyway, as
part of the authentication protocol.
The role specification file is written using the policy language described in
Appendix 11.3. The highest-level language element is called Policy and has the
format:
<Policy>:: <VersionField> <Declarations> <RoleHierarchy>
<InvocationRights> <ExecutionRights>;
A policy consists of five parts: the version number (which we discussed
earlier), declarations, the role hierarchy, invocation rights description, and the
execution rights descriptions.
Declarations
Declarations include complex data types, the DSO methods, external functions,
and additional attributes that may be present in local credentials. The generic
format for the declarations section of the policy is:
<Declarations>:: <ComplexDataTypesDecl>? <MethodsDecl>
<FunctionsDecl>? <AttributesDecl>?;
The policy grammar supports only one simple data type—Scalar. Values of
this type are represented as character strings, and depending on their format are
interpreted either as integers, floats or strings. Complex data types (structures
and arrays) can be constructed from this scalar type.
All the DSO’s methods need to be declared in the policy file. When these
methods use complex parameter types, these types have to be declared as well.
External functions that may be used in the underConditions part of can-
Invoke and canExecute statements also need to be declared before they can be
used. Complex parameter types which may be used by these external functions
have to be declared as well.
Finally, method invocation and execution conditions may also include ad-
ditional attributes part of DSO entities local credentials. These attributes are
represented as attribute name—attribute value pairs. Our policy only supports
attributes that are simple (scalar) values. All the attribute names need to be
declared before they can be used.
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The Role Hierarchy, Invocation and Execution Rights
The DSO role hierarchy is represented in the policy file as a set of canAssign
statements, as explained in Section 7.2. Method invocation and method exe-
cution rights are represented as sets of canInvoke, respectively canExecute
statements, as explained in sections 7.3 and 7.4. Invocation rights and execu-
tion rights appear after the declarations section of the policy file, so that any
complex types, external functions and attributes are declared before they are
used for conditional statements.
7.6 Discussion
The RBAC model presented in this chapter is based on persistent role mem-
bership. With persistent membership a principal interacting with a resource
is assigned into a role (for that resource) upon authentication, and can fully
exercise all the privileges associated to that role for the entire duration of her
interaction with that resource, with the possible exception of role revocation.
Role revocation permanently removes all rights granted to that principal.
An alternative approach is dynamic role membership. With dynamic mem-
bership principals explicitly activate roles when they need to exercise privileges
associated to these roles. Role activation is strictly controlled by means of acti-
vation rules. For a given role, activation rules have to hold true at the time of
activation as well as during the time period the role is active. A dynamic role is
automatically de-activated at the moment any of its activation rules is no longer
valid. Different from a principal revoked from persistent role, a principal whose
dynamic role is de-activated does not permanently lose the rights associated to
that role; there is always the possibility to re-activate the role in the future.
An example of an access control framework that uses dynamic role member-
ship is OASIS [113, 35]. The main differences between the OASIS role model
and traditional RBAC are:
• OASIS roles are dynamically activated during sessions. Roles have acti-
vation conditions which may include prerequisite roles, appointment cre-
dentials (essentially third-party long-term credentials), and environmental
constraints (e.g. “time of the day”).
• There is no delegation of roles.
• Depending on application constraints, roles may be parametrised.
• OASIS provides an active security environment. Activation conditions are
monitored during the entire session, and roles are de-activated when these
conditions no longer hold.
A comparison between the OASIS access control model and static RBAC
is presented in [33]. The main advantage for OASIS is the ability to enforce
dynamic separation of duties requirements in a distributed environment. This
is the case when the system security policy allows a principal to be assigned
multiple roles but places constraints on which roles may be active at the same
time (e.g. a manager may sign purchase orders for employees, but may not
sign his own purchase orders). Because activation conditions are continuously
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monitored, OASIS can instantly detect such separation of duties violations and
take corrective actions (e.g. de-activate incompatible roles). On the other hand,
such continuous monitoring in a distributed environment requires un-interrupted
network connectivity, and may introduce additional latencies (due to network
delays) when processing requests.
In the context of Globe we believe that an access control model based on
persistent role membership (static RBAC) is more appropriate for the following
reasons:
• Globe DSOs are mainly intended for building distributed applications over
wide-area, “unregulated” networks (e.g. the Internet). In such an envi-
ronment, continuous network connectivity cannot be guaranteed (in fact
one of the main reasons for having replicated DSOs is to tolerate network
partitioning!). As such, an active security environment required to handle
dynamic roles becomes harder to implement. We believe that OASIS-like
access control is better suited in a LAN/corporate WAN environment.
• As [33] points out, dynamic role membership requires frequent (poten-
tially once per session) issuing of role credentials. In Globe, issuing a new
credential is an expensive operation (see Chapter 9).
• Globe is intended to be generic middleware. We believe that dynamic
separation of duties (one of the main reasons to have dynamic role mem-
bership), while certainly important, is only relevant for specific classes of
applications (for example medical databases). As such, we believe that
in Globe it is better to implement separation of duties mechanisms as
application-specific security extensions.
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Chapter 8
Byzantine Fault Tolerance
In Chapter 3 we have identified Byzantine fault tolerance as one of the fun-
damental set of requirements for the Globe security architecture. Essentially,
one of the two possible motivations to replicate Globe objects is fault tolerance
(scalability is the other one). In this context, it is important to have a security
framework ensuring that Globe objects work correctly even when some of their
replicas exhibit faulty (possibly malicious—Byzantine) behavior.
There are many reasons why a DSO replica may exhibit Byzantine-faulty
behavior. The main reason is intrinsic to the Globe DSO deployment model,
which allows object replicas to be placed on third-party controlled servers. This
is in fact one of the key strengths of the Globe object model, allowing world-wide
replicated DSOs, without requiring DSO owners to deploy a world-wide support
infrastructure. Deploying DSO replicas on third-party infrastructure is conve-
nient, but also gives GOS administrators complete control over the replicas they
host. Malicious GOS administrators can thus “high-jack” hosted replicas, and
alter their functionality to their will. To make things worse, replicas may exhibit
Byzantine-faulty behavior even in the absence of malicious intent from hosting
GOS administrators: given the frequency of network attacks (i.e. worms) that
propagate nowadays on the Internet, negligence alone (for example, a GOS ad-
ministrator who fails to timely apply all the relevant security patches) may cause
GOS server corruption (which implies the corruption of all replicas hosted on
that server).
Given this situation, it is safe to assume that, unless highly trustworthy in-
frastructure is used for replication, for a given DSO, at least some of its replicas
will be compromised during its lifetime. Highly trustworthy infrastructure can
be very expensive, so a more economical alternative may be to provide Byzan-
tine fault-tolerance mechanisms allowing a DSO to function correctly even when
some of its replicas have been compromised. As described in Chapter 4, Byzan-
tine fault-tolerance mechanisms that can be integrated with the Globe security
architecture fall into two categories: those that aim at damage prevention and
those that aim at damage control.
The first category includes mechanisms for preventing malicious replicas
from causing any damage to their DSOs, except possibly denial-of-service. In
Chapter 4 we discussed a number of such mechanisms, including state signing,
and state machine replication. Both these techniques have been around for quite
some time, are well understood by the research community, and have been ap-
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plied to secure a variety of distributed applications (see [95, 141, 42, 147, 135] for
applications of state signing, and [176, 65, 137] for state machine replication).
In the context of Globe applications, it is quite straightforward to integrate such
mechanisms with the overall Globe object model:
• State signing can be used in conjunction with certain classes of Globe
applications, which mostly deal with client read requests, where results of
all possible requests can be predicted in advance (static Web sites [168]
are the prime example). In this case, the solution is to sign all possible
results using the DSO key. Signed results can then be served by untrusted
replicas; even when such replicas behave maliciously, they cannot pass
wrong results to clients, since they do not have access to the object key.
• State machine replication can be employed for building highly secure
Globe applications, by requiring that object methods (or at least a subset
of them—those implementing highly sensitive operations) are simultane-
ously executed by a number of untrusted replicas (a composite target—see
Chapter 7). A client then accepts the result of such an invocation only
if the majority of the replicas in the target agree on the same value. In
this way, a number of malicious replicas would have to collude in order to
pass an erroneous result to a client. The access control policy language
described in Chapter 7 can be used to specify such composite targets (in
terms of replica roles involved) for a given DSO.
Both state signing and state machine replication are quite powerful tech-
niques, but they cannot be used indiscriminately. State signing is only suited
for a rather restricted class of applications—those mostly dealing with static
data reads. On the other hand, state machine replication can be quite expen-
sive to implement: for a composite target method invocation, the amount of
resources required is multiplied by the size of the composite target, compared
to the regular (one client—one replica) scenario. The client-perceived request
latency is also likely to increase in this case, since it is dictated by the slowest
replica in the target.
Given these shortcomings, for the Globe security architecture we are also
considering a second class of Byzantine fault tolerance techniques, which aim
at restricting the amount of damage malicious replicas can cause to a DSO, de-
tecting when this damage occurs, and possibly taking corrective action after the
breach. Clearly, restricting, detecting, and repairing is not as good as prevent-
ing altogether, but on the other hand, this second class of mechanisms are much
more efficient to implement, hence the potential tradeoff. Damage-restricting
mechanisms are based on an optimistic assumption that replica corruption hap-
pens relatively infrequently, so the security architecture should be designed to
handle the common case efficiently—namely when everything works correctly.
One way to do damage control is through the reverse access control and
trust management mechanisms described in chapters 4, 7, and 5. Recall that
replicas are granted method execution rights that specify which of the DSO’s
methods they are allowed to handle. In this way, execution of security-sensitive
operations can be restricted to replicas running on trusted hosts, while trust
management mechanisms can be employed to determine the amount of trust
that can be placed on each host. This technique can be used in conjunction with
result auditing—having a trusted replica examine all the results produced by the
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marginally-trusted ones. In this way, potential erroneous results produced by
malicious replicas are guaranteed to be eventually detected, so that corrective
action can be taken.
The technique outlined above is quite new, and to the best of our knowledge,
Globe is one of the first systems where this has been proposed. For the rest
of the chapter we will focus on this auditing technique, and describe in detail
how it can be integrated with the overall Globe DSO model. The rest of the
chapter is organized as follows: in Section 8.1 we explore the design space, in
order to identify which technical properties would be required for an audit-based
Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism, and which types of Globe applications
could be secured using it. In Section 8.2 we describe this new technique in detail,
showing how it can be integrated with the overall Globe security architecture.
Finally, in Section 8.3, we provide a concrete application scenario.
8.1 Design Issues
The basic idea behind the new Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism we propose
is to ensure that method invocation results produced by marginally trusted
replicas part of a DSO are audited by other (trustworthy) replicas part of the
same object, such that any erroneous results (due to malicious replicas) are
eventually detected, so that corrective action can be taken.
In order to design a Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism based on this idea,
we need to address the following issues:
• Applicability—which types of methods can be protected by this technique?
• Trust management—how does one determine which replicas should be
allowed to execute such methods? how does one determine which replicas
should be the auditors?
• Auditability—it should be possible for the auditor to determine whether
any given result is correct (with respect to the original request) with 100%
certainty.
• Linkability—a given result needs to be securely associated with the replica
that has produced it.
• Corrective Action—should the auditor detect incorrect results, it should
be possible to take corrective action—repair the damage caused by that
incorrect result.
Applicability
With respect to the first issue, it is important to understand that auditing is
not well-suited for securing all types of DSO methods. In the first place, this
is a fault-detection mechanism, and, from a security point of view, provides
lower assurance than fault-prevention techniques. As such, it is not appropriate
for securing highly sensitive DSO operations, where even one fault may not be
acceptable. Another observation is that this technique works well with read
operations; in this case, a correct result means the correct execution of the
read method. On the other hand, in case of write operations, this may not
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hold; in this case, a malicious replica may return the correct result (“OK”—the
write was successful), while still failing to propagate the write to other replicas
(or worse—propagating incorrect state information!). Deciding which methods
are suited for this type of protection mechanism (auditing), is in the end an
application-specific issue, and should be done by the DSO administrator.
Trust management
The second design issue deals with selecting which replicas should execute the
“auditable” methods, as well as selecting which replicas should act as the audi-
tors. In both cases, the selection criteria is replica trustworthiness. In the case
of the auditor replicas, those should be highly trustworthy, since in the end, the
correct functioning of the DSO depends on them (it is impossible to provide
any assurance, when the policy enforcers are cheating!). On the other hand,
audited replicas may only provide some “average” assurance level (with respect
to the application-specific assurance requirements). They need not be highly
trustworthy (the whole point of this Byzantine fault-tolerance technique is to
allow the DSO to function using mostly marginally trusted infrastructure, which
provides more flexibility and economical deployment—see the discussion at the
beginning of this chapter). On the other hand, audited replicas should not be
totally untrustworthy either, otherwise the optimistic assumption—namely that
such replicas should behave correctly most of the time—would fail. Again, de-
ciding which replicas should be audited and which ones should be the auditors is
the responsibility of the DSO administrator, and is an application-specific task.
While for some applications requiring high assurance, this auditing technique
may be inappropriate altogether, there are other cases when this may be useful
(we provide a concrete application scenario in Section 8.3). The DSO admin-
istrator can employ the trust management mechanisms outlined in Chapter 5
to determine the replicas that should act as auditors, and the ones that should
be audited. Once replicas are assigned to either “audited” or “auditor” roles,
the DSO’s access control policy can be described in terms of these roles, as
explained in Chapter 7.
Auditability
The third design issue regards how to construct “auditable” responses. More
specifically, given a an instance of a method invocation I and the corresponding
result R, it should be possible for the auditor to determine whether R is correct
with respect to I, with 100% certainty. Assuming that only read operations are
protected by means of auditing (see the arguments in the previous subsection),
a naive solution would be to send for each method invocation/execution, the
pair (I, R) to the auditor. Given that the size of the result R can be quite large,
a simple refinement would be to only send a secure hash H(R), instead of the
entire result. The auditor can then re-execute I and take the hash of the result
it obtains; if the two hashes match, the result was correctly computed by the
audited replica, otherwise, the replica cheated.
This naive solution fails to address the possibility that the state of the object
may have changed between the time the result was computed by the replica,
and the time it was re-computed by the auditor. In such a situation, the audit
check may fail, despite the fact that the request I was correctly executed by
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the audited replica (given the DSO state at the time the request was originally
issued). To handle this, the audit pair (I, H(R)) needs to be modified, to
include some additional information S. S should allow the auditor to uniquely
identify the state of the DSO at the moment the request/result (I,R) were
issued/executed. The auditor may have to re-execute requests on past object
state; this is a significant departure from the traditional Globe DSO method
execution semantics and consistency model outlined in Chapter 2. We will
show how such change can be accommodated in Section 8.2.
Linkability
Yet another design issue is how to link a particular (R,S) request/result pair to
the replica that has received/produced it. Linking a request/result to a replica
is important when the auditor detects that the result is incorrect (the replica
that has generated it has cheated). In this way, malicious replicas that produce
erroneous results can be identified, and (depending on the corrective action
model chosen by the object—see the next section) possibly excluded from the
DSO in order to prevent further harm.
Given that each DSO creates its own PKI (see Chapter 4), linkability is
straightforward to achieve by requiring that each replica that needs to be audited
signs the previously described auditing tuple (I, H(R), S) with its private replica
key. When invoking methods whose execution should be audited (as specified
by the DSO’s access control policy—see Chapter 7), clients would not accept a
result returned by a replica unless it is accompanied by such a pledge—the tuple
(I, H(R), S) signed with the replica’s private key. After verifying the replica
signature on the pledge, the client forwards it to the auditor, which later verifies
it for correctness.
Corrective action
Finally, there is the issue of what happens when things go wrong, namely when
the auditor detects that one of the pledges it verifies is incorrect.
Given that pledges are securely linkable to the replica that has produced
them, an incorrect pledge directly incriminates the replica that has signed it.
Essentially the replica is caught “red handed”, meaning that it is proven to have
acted maliciously, and should be excluded from the DSO in order to prevent
it from causing further harm. This exclusion can be accomplished using the
revocation mechanisms described in Chapter 4. Furthermore, a malicious replica
does not act on its own will, but it is controlled by the hosting GOS, which in
turn is controlled by the server administrator. Depending on the replica hosting
terms (possibly a hosting contract) that binds the two parties (the DSO and
GOS administrators), once a replica is caught “red-handed”, further corrective
action can be taken by legal means against the server administrator responsible
for the malicious replica. In this case, the incriminating pledge signed by the
malicious replica can be used as evidence in courts.
This type of corrective action only prevents malicious replicas from causing
further damage, but does not repair whatever damage they may have caused.
One way to repair the damage is to simply ignore it; although this may seem a
strange way to fix problems, there are some cases where this could work. In the
case of applications that provide information aggregation an manipulation—
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search engines, news aggregators (Slashdot-like)—it may be possible to filter
erroneous results by means of direct inspection (e.g. human users ignore data
that is incomprehensible, or just far-fetched); the only way malicious replicas
can still cheat is to provide partial results, which amounts more or less to denial
of service. In this situation, simply removing malicious replicas after detection
may be reasonable. At the end of this chapter we provide a concrete application
scenario where this type of damage-repairing mechanism may be appropriate.
In other situations, corrective action may require reverting the application to
the state previous to the first erroneous results produced by the malicious replica
(for example when state changes may have occurred as a result of incorrect read
values). We will elaborate further on how this could be done in Section 8.2.2.
As a general observation, it is important to understand that damage-repair
techniques are very much application-dependent, and in the end it is the DSO
administrator’s duty to decide which technique best suits his object.
8.2 Integration with the Globe architecture
Given the design guidelines outlined in the previous section, in this section we
describe a novel audit-based Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism, and show
how this can be integrated with the Globe security architecture. The discussion
in this section has two parts: first we look operational details—namely the
steps that need to be taken by DSO administrators for integrating audit-based
Byzantine fault-tolerance with their objects; second, we look at the technical
properties of the new mechanism—namely how it handles read operations, write
operations, and auditing.
8.2.1 Operational details
In order to integrate the new Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism with a Globe
object, the DSO administrator needs to take the following steps:
1. Decide whether the mechanism is appropriate for the object. This is
accomplished by examining the application modeled by the DSO, more
specifically its security requirements, and answering the following ques-
tions:
• Can the application tolerate its users (occasionally) receiving erro-
neous results? For applications requiring high-assurance (for exam-
ple services that provide stock market quotes), this may not be the
case, so alternative Byzantine fault-tolerance techniques (that pre-
vent faults altogether) may have to be considered.
• Which state consistency model is required by the application, and is
this compatible with the model that can be supported in conjunction
with audit-based Byzantine fault tolerance? As we will explain in
Section 8.2.2, the audit-based technique we propose can only sup-
port a relatively weak consistency model. This consistency model
should be sufficient for a wide range of distributed application (in
particular, anything related to Web caching falls into this category—
see Section 8.2.2). However, there may be applications requiring
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stronger consistency, and for those, audit-based Byzantine fault tol-
erance is not appropriate.
• Which mechanisms can be used for taking corrective action, once ma-
licious replicas are detected? Again, this is application-dependent;
for some applications, revoking malicious replicas in order to prevent
further harm may be enough, for other, it may be necessary to re-
vert to a correct state (prior to the security breach), while for other
types of applications there may be simply no acceptable way to take
corrective action, so alternative protection mechanisms may have to
be considered.
2. Decide which of the DSO’s (public) methods can be protected using this
technique. Given the discussion in the previous section, methods that
change the DSO state (write methods) are not well suited. In the case
of read methods, it may be necessary to differentiate among them based
on their security assurance requirements. Read operations that require
very high assurance (i.e. it is absolutely unacceptable that they ever
return incorrect result to clients) are not well suited for an audit-based
protection mechanism, and their execution may have to be restricted to
highly trustworthy replicas. All the other read methods are potential
candidates for being protected by means of auditing.
3. Decide which replicas should be audited and which ones should be the
auditors. Using the access control framework described in Chapter 7,
this requires designing a role hierarchy for the DSO, where certain replica
roles are allowed to execute the methods that have been determined as
“auditable” (at Step 2), while other replica roles should act as the auditors.
With this role hierarchy in place, the DSO administrator also needs to
specify which replicas should be assigned each of these roles, essentially
writing the object’s trust management policy, as described in Chapter 5.
4. Encode this auditing policy into the DSO’s access control policy. This
entails to writing access control rules describing which replicas execute
which “auditable” methods, and which other replicas do the auditing. As
described in Chapter 7, such rules have the form:
RoleAauditedByRoleB canExecute Method underConditions
Conditions
where Method is one of the “auditable” methods identified at Step 2,
RoleA is one of the replica roles that should be allowed to executeMethod
(identified at Step 3), RoleB is the replica role that should audit this (also
as identified at Step 3), and Conditions encode whatever conditions that
may restrict the applicability of this rule (see Chapter 7).
8.2.2 Technical details
In this section we describe the technical details of the new, audit-based, Byzan-
tine fault-tolerance mechanism we propose. We discuss the following aspects:
the state consistency model, the way write (state-changing) methods are han-
dled, the way read methods are handled, and the way read results are audited.
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume a DSO for which all the read methods are
exclusively handled by marginally trusted replicas (so each read result needs to
be audited). It is straightforward to generalize this to the case where certain
read operations require high assurance, so they are only handled by trusted
replicas.
State consistency model
For Globe objects that employ audit-based Byzantine fault-tolerance, the basic
operational model is as follows: write (state-changing) operations are executed
(as a consequence of client method invocations) by the trusted replicas. Our
only requirement is that writes are executed in some sequential order (sequential
consistency for write operations). The algorithm for handling writes is described
in more detail in the next section. On the other hand, read operations are
executed by less trusted (cache) replicas (those are the ones which are audited),
and they only guarantee a weaker form of consistency: essentially the result of
a read request may not take into account state changes that have occurred in
the “recent past”.
A special parameter maxLatency is used to quantify this concept of “recent
past”. Essentially, our read consistency model can be formalized as follows: a
write operation that occurs at time T1 is guaranteed to to be taken into account
for all read operations performed after time T2 = T1 +maxLatency. For this
definition, we assume that all DSO replicas and clients have loosely synchronized
clocks, and the clock skew is negligible compared to the maxLatency parameter.
The consistency model we introduce here is rather weak, but for many types
of distributed applications it may be sufficient. Consider for example Web
caching using content delivery networks: in this case, content is first updated
on the master site, and then changes propagate to all the mirrors. Depending
on timing and network conditions, a client accessing a mirror after the master
has been updated may still receive the old content copy, but this is acceptable,
as long as such inconsistencies are short-lived.
The write protocol
Given this consistency model, the algorithm for handling write operations is
shown in Figure 8.1:
There are four (logical) steps:
1. A client (user) initiates a write, by invoking one of the state-changing
DSO methods. The client connects to a (trusted) master replica allowed
to handle the write method (according to the DSO’s access control policy),
and sends the request. The replica performs the access control check, and
if the client is allowed to invoke the method, it executes it.
2. The master replica propagates the write to the other masters. Here we use
the term “master replica” in a broad sense: it includes all the DSO replicas
that have the right to propagate state updates, essentially all the replicas
that have been granted invocation rights for the stateUpdate() internal
DSO method (see Chapter 4). The write should be propagated in a way
that guarantees some sequential ordering of concurrent write operations.
There are many protocols that accomplish this [114, 66, 94]; for example
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Figure 8.1: The write protocol
efficient reliable broadcast [114] could be a likely candidate. In addition
to the sequential ordering of write operations, we also require the DSO
to have a special internal variable—stateVersion—which is (atomically)
incremented with each state update.
3. At the end of Step 2, the state update has been propagated to all the
master replicas, and all these replicas have incremented their stateVersion
internal variable to reflect the change. At this point, the write operation
has successfully completed, and the first replica (the one that has executed
the write) reports this to the client.
4. The master replicas propagate the state update to the (marginally trusted)
slaves. Here we use the term “slave replica” in a broad sense: it includes
all the DSO replicas that do not have the right to execute and propagate
write operations (no invocation right for stateUpdate()—see Chapter 4),
but instead they rely on master replicas for state updates. Each master
replica propagates the new state to all the slaves that are registered with
it. In addition to the state update, each master also sends its slaves a lease
for the new state. A lease is simply the value of the stateVersion variable,
timestamped, and signed by the master. Essentially, a lease gives a slave
the permission to serve read requests on a given version of the DSO’s
state. A lease is valid from the moment it is issued, and it expires after
maxLatency time. This guarantees that a slave cannot serve read requests
that are based on stale state older than maxLatency. We provide more
details on how leases are used in the next section, when we discuss the
read protocol.
The distinctive feature of the write algorithm described above is the “lazy”
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propagation of state updates to slave replicas. Essentially, a slave receives an
update only after the corresponding write operation has completed (from the
point of view of the client that has initiated it). The reason we require this
“lazy” state update algorithm, as opposed to having masters and slaves par-
ticipate in some sort of total ordering broadcast, is performance. Since only
masters are trusted (not to exhibit Byzantine-faulty behavior), a total ordering
broadcast protocol including the slaves would have to be resistant to Byzantine
failures, and implementing such an algorithm over a WAN is extremely expen-
sive. “Lazy” state updates make the write protocol much more efficient, but
also weaken the consistency model, since a client cannot be guaranteed that
once his write is committed it will be seen in all subsequent reads.
The read protocol
Read operations are invoked by clients on slave replicas. Since these replicas
are only marginally trusted, they may return incorrect results to client requests.
In order to leverage this threat, results produced by slave replicas need to be
audited; the read protocol is designed to facilitate this process. This protocol
is shown in Figure 8.2, and consists of four (logical) steps:
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Figure 8.2: The read protocol
1. A user invokes a read method which is protected by means of auditing
against Byzantine faults. In the DSO’s security policy, this is specified by
a rule of the form:
RoleAauditedByRoleB canExecute Method underConditions
Conditions
The user proxy finds a DSO (slave) replica assigned RoleA (using the
Globe Location Service—GLS—see Chapter 2), connects to it and sends
the method invocation request.
2. The slave replica performs the access control check to ensure the user
is allowed to invoke Method under the DSO’s security policy. If this is
the case, the slave executes the read request, and sends back the result,
together with a pledge, a valid lease for the version of the DSO state on
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which the result was computed, as well as the DSO credentials of the
master replica that has issued the lease.
The pledge sent by the replica has the following format:
{H(request), H(result), stateV ersion, timestamp}yreplica
The pledge contains a secure hash of the original request, a secure hash
of the result, the value of the stateVersion variable (as it appears in the
lease) and a timestamp, indicating the time when the result was computed
by the slave.
3. Upon receiving the data from the slave, the user proxy performs the fol-
lowing checks:
• It verifies the master replica credentials received from the slave, en-
suring that all signatures are correct, and the credentials grant in-
vocation rights for the stateUpdate() internal DSO method. If these
checks pass, it means that the master replica that has these creden-
tials has indeed the right to issue state version leases to the slave
that has produced the read result.
• It verifies the lease, by checking the master replica’s signature on it,
and ensuring the timestamp in the lease is less than maxLatency old.
• It verifies the pledge, by checking that the hashes in the pledge match
the hash of the original request, and the hash of the result (as sent
by the slave), that the stateVersion in the pledge matches the one in
the lease, and that the timestamp in the pledge is within maxLatency
from the timestamp in the lease.
4. If all the checks pass, the user proxy accepts the result, and forwards the
original request, the lease, the pledge, and master replica credentials to the
auditor. As specified by the access control rule (see Step 1), the auditor
is a replica assigned RoleB, which the proxy can find using the GLS.
The distinctive characteristic of the read protocol is that the client performs
a series of checks on the result, the lease, and pledge associated with the result,
before accepting them. These tests alone are not sufficient to detect erroneous
results; instead their purpose is to ensure that the pledges signed by the slaves
can potentially be used as proofs of misbehavior. Essentially, a pledge, con-
structed as described above, commits the slave replica that has signed it to a
unique combination of the DSO’s state, read request, and result (for that re-
quest). A trusted auditor that has access to the same version of the DSO state
can simply re-execute the request; should the hash of the result (as computed
by the auditor) not match the one in the pledge, the pledge becomes a self-
incriminating proof of the slave’s misbehavior. In the next section we explain
this auditing process in detail.
Auditing
Probably the most important feature of the Byzantine-fault tolerance mecha-
nism we propose is auditing. This is done by trusted auditor replicas; its purpose
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is to detect potentially erroneous results produced by the (untrusted) slaves, so
that corrective action can be taken against them.
Compared to regular (non-auditor) replicas, each auditor replica holds two
additional data structures: the read requests list (RRL) and the state updates
list (SUR).
The RRL consists of five fields, corresponding to the information sent by
clients at the end of the read protocol (see the previous section): the read request
as issued by the client, the pledge signed by the slave that has computed the
result, the lease, the credentials of the master replica that has issued the lease,
as well as the local user Id corresponding to the user proxy that has requested
the audit. Entries in the RRL are ordered by the value of the stateVersion
variable, as it appears in the lease.
The SUR consists of state update requests, in the order in which they change
the object’s state. Essentially, each entry in this list corresponds to a new version
of the DSO’s state, and describes how the new state can be reached.
The auditor fills these lists with data it receives from clients—(request,
pledge, lease, master credentials) tuples—and master replicas—state update
messages, re-executes the read requests in order to check their correctness, while
occasionally applying state updates in order to (loosely) keep in sync with the
DSO state. The invariant we want to preserve here is that a state transition is
performed only after all the read requests that depend on the previous state ver-
sion have been verified by the auditor. One way to achieve this is to introduce
some additional delay, determined by a stateUpdateDelay parameter, between
the time a state update is initiated, and the time the update is applied by the
auditor. This delay is necessary to protect audit requests sent by clients just
before a state transition. Should the auditor apply state updates immediately,
an audit request sent by a client just before the transition, but delayed by the
network, would reach the auditor after the update would have been applied,
and it would thus be impossible to verify. The value of the stateUpdateDelay
parameter should be large enough to cover this possible variation in network
transmission time.
The audit process works as follows:
1. The auditor takes a client read request from the RRL and executes it.
2. The auditor takes the hash of the result, and compares it to the hash in
the pledge. If the two hashes match, the result is correct, and the auditor
moves to the next request; otherwise, the auditor moves to Step 3 in order
to perform additional checks.
3. If the two hashes do not match, the auditor verifies the pledge, lease, and
master replica credentials for the audit request, performing all the checks
that should have been performed by the client before accepting the result
being audited (see previous section). The purpose of these checks is to
determine whether the slave has indeed produced an erroneous result, or
the client is misbehaving, sending bogus data for auditing. Depending on
the outcome of these checks we have two possibilities:
(a) The pledge, lease, and master replica credentials are all valid. In this
case, the client is honest, and the slave replica has indeed produced
erroneous results. The auditor proceeds with taking corrective action
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against the (now proven) malicious slave (we provide more details on
how this could be done in the next section).
(b) At least one of the pledge, lease, or master replica credentials is not
valid. In this case, the client is acting maliciously, since, according
to the read protocol, it should have verified their correctness before
requesting the audit. In this case, the auditor needs to take corrective
action against the client, as we will describe next.
The distinctive feature of the audit protocol is that it has been optimized
to ensure fast verification of read results. Given our optimistic assumption
(that slave misbehavior is infrequent), in normal circumstances this verification
only requires the auditor to re-execute the request and compute a hash value
(a fast operation). The auditor does not perform any signature or credentials
verification, since it is assumed this was done by the client, as part of the
read protocol. A malicious client could have omitted these checks, but our
assumption is that clients are rational, and are interested in getting correct
results.
In order to ensure fast auditing, further optimizations can be introduced:
for example, the auditor can keep a small associative cache containing (read
request, result hash) pairs. Before re-executing a request, the auditor can search
for it in this cache; if an entry is found, the auditor can simply take the hash
of the result in the cache and compare it against the one in the pledge, thus
saving the request execution time. This cache needs to be flushed after each
state update.
The reason for all these optimizations is to ensure the auditor can keep up
with the workload. Essentially, the auditor has to perform the same work as
(many) slaves, this being the only way we could achieve economies of scale
to justify our Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism. There are a number of
solutions for tackling the problem of the auditor not being able to keep up with
the workload:
• Replicate the auditor. This has the drawback that more trustworthy com-
puting resources are required.
• Perform probabilistic auditing. In this case the auditor only verifies a
random subset of all the received audit requests. This is more economical
(does not require extra auditors), but has the drawback that it may take
longer to detect a malicious slave.
Dealing with malicious clients
In the architecture described above, the auditor is clearly the security bottle-
neck. Essentially, the security of our scheme can be compromised by taking the
auditor out of action, by launching a DoS attack against it.
We assume that external attacks (low-level network denial of service) can be
dealt using standard techniques (we discuss some of them in Chapter 4). The
other type of DoS attacks we are concerned with is those coming from malicious
clients.
A malicious client can simply overwhelm the auditor with audit requests.
There are two cases that need to be considered:
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• The audit requests are valid, in the sense that they correspond to actual
read operations performed by the client on some untrusted salve. In this
case, a malicious client may attempt to perform a large number of such
operations, in order to overwhelm the slave and the auditor. This type
of attack can be dealt with using standard DoS protection techniques,
such as limiting the request rate for the client (the slave can simply apply
some exponential back-off strategy in introducing response delays after
receiving too many requests from the same client).
• The audit requests are invalid, in the sense that they do not correspond to
actual read requests performed by the client. In this case, at least one of
the pledge, lease, or master replica credentials sent by the client are bogus,
so the verification performed by the auditor at Step 3 of the audit protocol
(see previous section) will fail. In this case, the malicious client wastes
the auditor’s resources by forcing it to re-execute bogus requests, or verify
bogus signatures. Once the auditor detects such bogus requests coming
from a client, it can simply ignore any subsequent audit request coming
from the same client. Further punishment can be inflicted by revoking
the client’s local object credentials, essentially excluding it from the DSO
trust domain.
Dealing with malicious slaves
The last part of the Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism we propose regards
the corrective action that should be taken once a malicious slave is identified.
As explained in the previous sections, this happens once the auditor detects a
mismatch between the hash of the result of a read request it re-executes, and
the hash committed in the pledge by the slave which has originally computed
the result.
The first action the auditor needs to take is to revoke the slave replica’s local
credentials. This essentially excludes the replica from the DSO trust domain,
prevents further client requests from being directed to that replica, and thus
prevents further damage. Depending on the contractual agreements between
the DSO administrator and the administrator of the GOS hosting the malicious
replica, further legal action can be taken. The pledge signed by the slave can
be used in courts as irrefutable evidence of its misbehavior.
Preventing further damage is useful, but something may need to be done to
fix the damage already caused by the malicious replica. As explained earlier,
there are two alternatives that may be considered:
First, damage can be fixed by reverting the DSO to an old state, not affected
by the erroneous results computed by the malicious replica. Although slave
replicas only compute read results, depending on the application functionality, it
may be possible that a client uses such an (erroneous) read result in a subsequent
write operation, in which case the DSO state is (indirectly) compromised by the
malicious slave.
Reverting to a safe old state is relatively straightforward to implement, since
the auditor is guaranteed to always “lag behind” with state updates. At the
moment an erroneous read result is detected, the auditor can simply broadcast
a “recovery” state update, reverting the state of all DSO replicas to the version
it has at that moment (which is not affected by the erroneous read). Having
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detailed knowledge of the application functionality may allow the auditor to
perform even more “intelligent” recovery, for example only reverting to an old
state if it detects write operations that may depend on the erroneous read result.
Although such a recovery strategy may seem appealing, we were not able
to identify any realistic application scenarios where this may be useful. The
main problem with reverting state is that it does not work well with interactive
user applications, where an erroneous read result may cause the user to perform
some irreversible action (printing a file, making an electronic payment, etc.).
Reverting state is effective in case of applications doing (distributed) batch pro-
cessing; in this case, reverting only requires some of the batched operations to be
re-executed. However, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, one motiva-
tion for having an audit-based Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism is reducing
response latencies, by executing user requests on (marginally-trusted) replicas
close to the user. In case of batch processing, response latency is much less
of a concern, and in this case alternative Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanisms
(based on state machine replication, for example) may be more effective.
As a conclusion, taking corrective action by reverting to an old state is defi-
nitely possible with our scheme, but we do not expect this correction mechanism
to suit well the kind of applications to which our scheme can be applied.
The second damage-repair mechanism that can be applied is actually ex-
tremely simple: revoke the malicious replica from the DSO, and simply ignore
whatever damage it might have caused. Ignoring damage may seem a strange
way of fixing it, but, as explained in Section 8.1, we were able to identify a
rather wide class of applications where this may suffice. We provide a concrete
example in the next section.
8.3 An Application Scenario
In this section we provide an application scenario where the new audit-based
Byzantine fault-tolerance mechanism we propose may be appropriate. More
specifically, we consider an e-commerce application. The system model we are
considering consists of the following entities:
• The vendor—this is a company selling products on-line.
• The product description—each product sold by the vendor has a product
description associated with. This consists of a variety of data items—text
files for technical specifications, images, possibly video files, etc.
• The product database—all product descriptions are stored in a prod-
uct database. The database supports read operations (browsing, search-
ing for products matching a certain criteria, etc.) and write operations
(adding/removing products, modifying product descriptions, etc.).
• Sales representatives—the vendor’s employees, they are responsible for
operational details, such as adding/removing products to the product
database, updating product descriptions, and so on.
• Customers—they browse/search the product database, examine product
descriptions and (possibly) purchase the products they are interested in.
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• Trusted infrastructure—this is infrastructure (e.g. computers) directly
controlled by the vendor.
• Marginally trusted infrastructure—this is infrastructure outside the ven-
dor’s administrative control, which the vendor may want to use for op-
timizing its operations. For example, many e-commerce companies use
commercial content delivery networks to replicate some of their product
data.
Given this system model, the vendor decides to model its e-commerce appli-
cation as a Globe distributed object. This DSO supports the following public
methods:
Method Description
browse() Browse the product database
search() Search the product database
buy() Buy a product
addProduct() Add a new product to the database
modifyDescription() Modify a product description
Figure 8.3: Public methods for sample e-commerce application
For this DSO, the vendor defines two classes of users, identified by two user
roles: customers (identified by the Customer role), and sales representatives
(identified by the SalesRepresentative role).
The vendor also defines three classes of replicas: master replicas—which
must run on trusted infrastructure and are identified by the Master replica
role, slave replicas—which run on third-party (marginally-trusted) infrastruc-
ture, and are identified by the Slave role, and auditor replicas—which must run
on trusted infrastructure, and are identified by the Auditor role.
The idea is that customers should be allowed to invoke the browse(), search(),
and buy() methods, while sales representatives should be allowed to invoke ad-
dProduct() and modifyDescription(). Given the access control policy language
described in Chapter 7, this can be encoded through the following statements:
Customer canInvoke browse;
Customer canInvoke search;
Customer canInvoke buy;
SalesRepresentative canInvoke addProduct;
SalesRepresentative canInvoke modifyDescription;
In case of method execution, the idea is that methods that change the ob-
ject state (buy(), addProduct(), and modifyDescription()) can only be executed
by the “trustworthy” replicas (those assigned the Master role. Read methods
(browse() and search()) can be executed by the less trustworthy slave replicas,
but in order to ensure Byzantine fault-tolerance, the results must be audited.
This can be encoded through the following statements:
8.3. AN APPLICATION SCENARIO 165
Master canExecute buy;
Master canExecute addProduct;
Master canExecute modifyDescription;
Slave auditedBy Auditor canExecute browse;
Slave auditedBy Auditor canExecute search;
The result of a browse or search operation is a set of product descriptions.
The product descriptions are relatively static (they do not change that often), so
it is feasible to protect them by means of state signing. Essentially, each product
description is signed using the DSO key. Before displaying the description to
the customer, the user proxy does the signature verification; in this way, a
potentially malicious slave cannot pass bogus product descriptions.
On the other hand, the actual aggregation of product descriptions that form
the result of a search() or browse() operation is highly dynamic, so it is not
feasible to have each potential result signed. In order to guarantee their cor-
rectness, the results of search() and browse() operations (as computed by the
slaves) are audited. In this case, once a slave is detected to have produced bo-
gus results, it is acceptable to simply exclude (revoke) it from the DSO, without
taking any further corrective action. Essentially, a malicious slave can only do
the following:
• Provide the customer with too many hits, by including in the result prod-
uct descriptions that do not match the criteria specified by the customer.
This amounts to a denial of service attack against the customer, who is
overwhelmed with useless hits. In this case, the customer can still de-
tect bogus hits by visual inspection (for example if it sees DVD product
descriptions when searching for audio CDs).
• Provide the customer with too few hits, by not including in the result
some product descriptions that would match the customer’s criteria. This
amounts to a denial of service attack against the vendor, which may lose
some purchase orders as a result of customers not being able to find the
products they were interested in.
It is important to understand that in no circumstances can a malicious slave
trick a customer into making a purchase based on bogus product information,
since slaves cannot alter product descriptions. Given this, taking a course of ac-
tion where slaves are simply excluded from the DSO once proven malicious (thus
preventing further DoS against customers/vendor) is an acceptable solution.
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Chapter 9
Performance
In order to validate the design described in this thesis, we have extended the
Globe prototype implementation [40] to incorporate some of the security mech-
anisms introduced in Chapters 4 to 8. In this chapter we provide a performance
evaluation of the “secure Globe” prototype. But before we plunge into numbers
and charts it is important to clarify some issues:
What is the Globe prototype? In one sentence, the Globe prototype can be
described as a proof of concept implementation of the Globe middleware. The
prototype consists of the following:
• The Globe runtime [40]—support libraries that need to be loaded by ev-
ery client before interacting with Globe objects. The runtime provides
support for identifying objects (RPC stubs for interacting with the Globe
Name Service), locating objects (RPC stubs for interacting with the Globe
Location Service), retrieving local object implementations, and instanti-
ating local objects. This runtime is written in Java; it essentially consists
of a number of Java packages.
• The Globe Object Server (GOS) [40]—a Java application server for hosting
DSO replicas. The GOS provides support for instantiating and managing
replicas, providing them with isolated execution environments, private
storage, and some (very basic) resource management.
• The Globe Naming Service (GNS) [96]—a (Java) prototype implementa-
tion of the GNS, as described in [45].
• The Globe Location Service (GLS) [27]—a (Java) prototype implementa-
tion of the GLS, as described in [45].
• The Globe Infrastructure Directory Service (GIDS) [122]—a (Java) pro-
totype implementation of the GIDS, as described in [123].
• Library subobjects—Java reference implementation for a limited num-
ber of commonly-used Globe subobjects, such as a master-slave replica-
tion subobject, a point-to-point TCP communication subobject, and a
few Globe semantics subobjects implementing some (relatively) simple
distributed applications (GlobeDoc [181]—implementing replicated static
Web documents, GDN [39]—implementing a replicated software distribu-
tion application, etc.).
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• Development tools—include an interface definition language [182], a com-
piler for generating Java control subobjects from IDL specifications, and
GAIA—Java support libraries for accessing Globe DSOs from Java pro-
grams.
What is the purpose/limitations of the Globe prototype? The Globe proto-
type is mostly intended as a proof-of-concept implementation. Its purpose is
to allow rapid development and deployment of Globe applications. Overall per-
formance is less of a issue (hence the choice of Java as the main development
language). Furthermore, the Globe prototype lacks sophisticated application
management and administration tools that would be expected in a production
system.
What is the goal of the performance evaluation with respect to the overall
Globe security design? The goal is to prove that our design is viable, in the
sense it does not introduce unacceptable performance penalty. As a result,
our comparison points are typically the “secure” and “insecure” versions of the
Globe prototype. There are two main reasons we do not focus on comparing
secure Globe applications against similar secure non-Globe applications:
• Secure Globe applications need to be built on top of the (already not-
so-efficient) Globe prototype. Comparing them with similar secure non-
Globe applications would not be fair from the point of view of the Globe
security architecture, since a significant fraction of performance penalty
is due to the underlying (insecure and not-so-efficient) Globe prototype
implementation.
• Not that many Globe applications have been actually built. Once the
Globe model becomes popular, we expect a Globe developers community
to emerge; such a community would hopefully develop a variety of Globe
applications. At the moment, this is not the case. Globe is more or less an
academic project. The purpose of this thesis is to design and evaluate a
security architecture for Globe, and not to design new Globe applications.
Given this lack of applications, we had to come up with alternative ways to
evaluate our security design. The main idea is to measure the performance
of (our limited number of) Globe applications with and without security
features enabled. By comparing the non secure application version with
different secure versions (corresponding to settings where various security
features are enabled/disabled) we can get some insight of the actual “cost”
of security (in terms of the performance penalty introduced).
Which parts of the Globe security architecture have been implemented in the
Globe prototype? Given the limited time and resources (programmers) available,
we could not implement all the mechanisms described in our security design.
Instead, we have focused on fundamental features which we expect to be re-
quired by any type of secure Globe application. Our aim is to provide all the
mechanisms necessary for secure (isolated) execution of object replicas, and for
secure method invocation. These include:
• Authentication mechanisms allowing local representatives to prove to each
other membership in a given DSO trust domain, and to establish secure
communication channels for method invocation. So far, our secure Globe
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prototype supports the public-key authentication mechanism described
in Chapter 4, as well as the novel symmetric key scheme described in
Chapter 6.
• Access control mechanisms for restricting method invocation privileges
(for users) and method execution privileges (for replicas). So far, our
secure Globe prototype only supports the bitmap-based scheme described
in Chapter 4.
• Trust management mechanisms allowing negotiation between users, DSO,
and GOS administrators. Given the (so far) restricted Globe user/developer
base, we provide a very simple trust management infrastructure, to be de-
scribed in more detail in Section 9.1.
• (Basic) platform security mechanisms allowing for secure isolated execu-
tion of multiple replicas on the same GOS.
Our strategy is to implement/measure the common case—applications that
use relatively simple access control policies and with limited support for Byzan-
tine fault tolerance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 9.1 we de-
scribe the experimental setup, both in terms of technical characteristics of the
hosts/software stacks involved, as well as in terms of the security mechanisms
considered in the performance tests. In Section 9.2 we present our first exper-
iments series, which aims at measuring the security overhead associated with
initialization operations, such as creating new objects and replicas. In our sec-
ond experiment series presented in Section 9.3, we focus on security overhead
during client method invocation on a DSO replica. We break down this method
invocation process into (logical) stages (for example the client finding the replica,
the client contacting the replica, authentication, etc.) and we measure the du-
ration of each stage in various security settings. Based on these measurements
we calculate the (theoretical) replica throughput (i.e. how many invocations per
second can the replica handle), and then we validate this theoretical throughput
against the real one, which we measure by having multiple clients concurrently
issuing requests. Finally, our third experiment series presented in Section 9.4,
consists of a number of (synthetic) micro-benchmarks, stressing different parts
of the replica hosting system - the CPU, disk and network stack. The purpose of
these micro-benchmarks is to measure the security overhead by comparing the
real throughput of a replica accessed by concurrent clients in various security
settings.
9.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiments typically consist of one or two “main” hosts and a number
of “auxiliary” hosts. The “main” hosts are two identical computers: Host
A—ginger.cs.vu.nl and Host B—sporty.cs.vu.nl. In our experiments, these are
mostly used to host DSO replicas. The “auxiliary” hosts are part of the DAS-2
grid [43], and they are mostly used in our experiments to run client proxies.
All the hosts we use are located at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. On all
hosts the Globe middleware runs on top of the Java 2 runtime version 1.4.2 02.
Figure 9.1 shows the technical specification for our experimental setup.
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“Main” hosts
Dual PIII 933MHz, 2 GB memory, 100 Mb/s Ethernet, Adaptec 29160
Ultra-160 SCSI controller Seagate 73 GB 10.000 rpm disk, RedHat 7.2
Custom configured 2.4.9 kernel running single-processor mode
“Auxiliary” hosts
PIII 1GHz, 1 GB memory, 100 Mb/s Ethernet RedHat 7.2,
Custom configured 2.4.19-pre10 kernel
Table 9.1: Experimental setup
Given this experimental setup, for the rest of this section we briefly describe
the Globe software used in our experiments. The goal of these experiments is
to measure the security overhead; as such, we need to describe which of the
security mechanisms described in Chapters 4 to 8 have been implemented and
evaluated:
9.1.1 Trust management
For all our experiments we used a simple trust management framework. We
operate one certification authority named Fuego, which issues X.509 [108] iden-
tity certificates. All (human) users participating in the Globe experiment are
required to obtain such an identity certificate; at this point, participation to the
Globe experiment is restricted to people affiliated with the Vrije Universiteit.
Our operational procedures require Globe users to physically identify (by means
of a university ID). The name of the user (as it appears in the university ID)
is then incorporated in the Fuego identity certificate. In this context it is im-
portant to understand the difference between a Globe user and a DSO user: a
Globe user is a person registered with the Fuego CA, and participating in the
Globe experiment; a DSO user is a Globe user registered with a given DSO.
Once Globe users have registered with the Fuego CA, they are allowed to
operate object servers (as part of the Globe experiment), and to create and use
Globe objects. Each time a Globe user creates a new DSO, he also generates a
pedigree certificate for that DSO, which combines the object’s name and public
key, and is signed with the user’s public key (from his Fuego identity certificate).
Thus, the DSO’s trust management credentials consist of the owner’s Fuego
identity certificate, plus the DSO’s pedigree certificate. Similarly, when a Globe
user begins operating a new GOS, he creates a pedigree certificate for that GOS,
which combines the server’s network address and public key, and is signed with
the user’s public key (from his Fuego identity certificate). Thus, the GOS’ trust
management credentials consist of the owner’s Fuego identity certificate, plus
the GOS’ pedigree certificate.
For the DSOs and GOSes used for our experiments we employ the following
trust management policies:
• Trust management during user registration:
– on the user side: the user TM engine checks the DSO’s trust manage-
ment credentials chain, and ensures this chain begins with a Fuego
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identity certificate (which is associated with the DSO’s owner).
– on the DSO side: the DSO TM engine checks the user’s Fuego identity
certificate.
• Trust management during replica creation:
– on the DSO side: the DSO TM engine checks the GOS’ trust man-
agement credentials chain, and ensures this chain begins with a Fuego
identity certificate (which is associated with the GOS administrator).
– on the GOS side: the GOS TM engine checks the DSO’s trust man-
agement credentials chain, and ensures this chain begins with a Fuego
identity certificate (which is associated with the DSO’s owner).
9.1.2 Authentication
In our experiments we evaluate both the symmetric and public key authenti-
cation mechanisms described in chapters 4 and 6. In the case of symmetric
key authentication protocols, we have implemented the off-line TTP scheme
described in Chapter 6, using the latest Java cryptographic extensions library
(JCE)—which at this point is the most efficient cryptographic library for Java.
For public key authentication protocols, we use the PureTLS [14] Java imple-
mentation of TLS [79]. PureTLS uses the Bouncy Castle Java cryptographic
library [10], which, from a performance point of view is inferior to JCE. To
address this issue, we have also provide our own TLS implementation, using
JCE. The performance numbers associated with our own TLS implementation
should be viewed as a best case scenario for public key authentication mecha-
nisms; however, our TLS library has been developed for research purposes only,
and has not been hardened through years of deployment and public scrutiny, so
for implementing actual Globe applications we recommend using off-the-shelf
authentication components.
We have paid extra attention in implementing and evaluating authentica-
tion mechanisms, because empirical evidence shows these are the performance
bottlenecks in most security designs. Furthermore, improving performance was
one of the motivations for designing the new symmetric-key authentication pro-
tocol described in Chapter 6. Extensive measurements (see Section 9.4), show
that, indeed, careful choice of the authentication protocol can lead to significant
performance improvement.
9.1.3 Access control
In all our experiments we use the bitmap-based access control mechanism de-
scribed in Chapter 4. As a general observation, access control operations are
very fast, since they only involve bit-wise comparison/manipulations. At the
time we performed our experiments, the implementation of the fine-grained ac-
cess control mechanism described in Chapter 7 was not completed, hence we
could not evaluate its performance impact. However, we believe that as long
as the DSO specification data structure (see Chapter 7) is compact enough to
be kept in memory (this should be the common case since extremely complex
security policies—in the order of tens of thousands of rules—are rarely used in
the real world) its performance impact should be similarly low.
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9.1.4 Byzantine fault tolerance
At this point the only generic Byzantine fault tolerance mechanism we support is
based on reverse access control (essentially restricting the execution of security-
sensitive operations on trusted replicas).
9.1.5 Platform security
We use the platform security mechanisms provided by the Java runtime en-
vironment. Essentially, each DSO replica hosted on a GOS runs in its own
protection domain [103]. Protection domains ensure isolated replica execution
(i.e. the replica cannot interfere with the functioning of the GOS or of other
hosted replicas), as well as limited access to the GOS storage (each replica its
assigned its own directory, and cannot access any files outside that directory).
Currently, it is not possible to do fine-grained resource monitoring for replicas
(i.e. restrict the amount of memory/CPU cycles a replica may consume), but
this is a general limitation of the Java security model.
9.2 Initialization Overhead
The purpose of the first experiment series is to measure the security overhead
associated with initialization operations. We identified two relevant cases: cre-
ating a new DSO, and instantiating a new replica.
For the first experiment series we use three different security settings:
• An insecure version of the Integer DSO (where all Globe security features
have been turned off).
• A secure version of the Integer DSO using public key authentication (using
the PureTLS implementation of the TLS protocol).
• A secure version of the Integer DSO using using symmetric key authenti-
cation, namely the oﬄine TTP protocol described in Chapter 6. For this
protocol we consider three possible cases:
– Case I: the oﬄine TTP protocol with the RKL size set to 20 and the
UKL size set to 1000 (thus, the DSO can support at most 20 replicas
and 1000 users).
– Case II: the oﬄine TTP protocol with the RKL size set to 100 and
the UKL size set to 10000 (thus, the DSO can support at most 100
replicas and 10000 users).
– Case III: the oﬄine TTP protocol with the RKL size set to 1000 and
the UKL size set to 100000 (thus, the DSO can support at most 1000
replicas and 100000 users).
9.2.1 Experiment 1.1—creating a new DSO
The purpose of the first experiment is to evaluate the security overhead asso-
ciated with creating a new DSO. In this experiment we simply create a new
Integer using different security settings and measure the amount of time nec-
essary for this operation. The Integer DSO is a distributed implementation of
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the Integer Java class, using a master-slave replication algorithm; as such, this
is probably one of the simplest possible Globe objects.
We repeat the create DSO operation 100 times for different security settings
and measure the average duration. The results are shown in Figure 9.1. We
also place a number of timers in the source code, and measure the duration of
security-related operations. The results are shown in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.1: Time to create a new Globe DSO when various security features are enabled
Operation Duration (msec)
Generate public key pair 1273
Generate public key certificate 32
SSL handshake 323
Generate RKL and UKL—(20, 1000) 216
Generate RKL and UKL—(100, 10000) 1076
Generate RKL and UKL—(1000, 100000) 9105
Figure 9.2: Creating a new DSO—security overhead
Creating a new DSO involves the following security-related operations:
• Generate the DSO public/private key pair.
• Generate a public/private key pair for the DSO administrator.
• Generate a public/private key pair for the DSO administrative replica.
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• Issue the administrator’s certificate (signed with the DSO key).
• Issue the DSO administrative replica certificate (signed with the DSO
key).
• An SSL connection to the GOS where the administrative replica is to be
hosted.
• Generating the RKL and UKL for the administrative replica (when the
DSO uses symmetric key authentication mechanisms).
Even when symmetric key authentication is used, public/private key pairs
and certificates still have to be generated for the DSO administrator and for the
administrative replica, since these are used for authenticating to object servers
when instantiating new replicas. Symmetric key authentication is only used
between the DSO’s local representatives.
As seen in Figure 9.2, in the case of DSOs employing public key authentica-
tion mechanisms, key generation is the most expensive operation. In the case
of symmetric key authentication mechanisms, initialization overhead depends
on the size of the RKL and UKL. As explained in Chapter 6, these are initial-
ized with symmetric (AES) master keys for the maximum number of users and
replicas expected to register with the DSO. It is important these symmetric keys
are random, so the overhead associated with initializing the RKL and UKL is
mainly dictated by the performance of the random number generator. In case
of large DSOs (at most 1000 replicas and 100000 users), this overhead can be
significant (more than 9 seconds). Although the initialization cost for symmet-
ric key authentication is significant, this is compensated by greatly improved
performance during regular operations (e.g. method invocations), as we will
show in sections 9.3 and 9.4.
9.2.2 Experiment 1.2—creating a DSO replica
The purpose of the second experiment is to evaluate the security overhead asso-
ciated with creating a DSO replica. In this experiment we use the Integer DSO
from Experiment 1.1 and we create a new replica.
We repeat the create replica operation 100 times for different security settings
and measure the average duration. The results are shown in Figure 9.3. We
also place a number of timers in the source code, and measure the duration of
security-related operations. The results are shown in Figure 9.4.
Creating a new replica involves the following security-related operations:
• Generating the replica public/private key pair (when the DSO uses public
key authentication mechanisms).
• Issuing the replica’s certificate (when the DSO uses public key authenti-
cation mechanisms).
• Generating the RR-set and RU-set (see Chapter 6) authentication creden-
tial sets (when the DSO uses symmetric key authentication mechanisms).
• An SSL connection to the GOS where the new replica is to be hosted.
9.2. INITIALIZATION OVERHEAD 175
Figure 9.3: Time to create a DSO replica when various security features are enabled
Operation Duration (msec)
Generate public key pair 1256
Generate public key certificate 32
SSL handshake 346
Generate RR-set and RU-set—(20, 1000) 776
Generate RR-set and RU-set—(100, 10000) 4731
Generate RR-set and RU-set—(1000, 100000) 25433
Figure 9.4: Overhead associated with various security-related operations
As seen in Figure 9.4, generating the replica authentication credentials is the
most expensive security operation during replica creation. In the case of public
key authentication, this involves generating a new public/private key pair for the
replica and issuing a new digital certificate for this key. In the case of symmetric
key authentication, the overhead is dictated by the size of the RR-set and RU-
set for the new replica. Generating the RR-set and RU-set involves generating
a large number of (random) AES keys, generating the tickets corresponding to
each of these keys (see Chapter 6), and sending these authentication sets to the
new replica over an SSL connection.
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9.3 Workload breakdown and maximum through-
put
The purpose of the second experiment series is to evaluate the security overhead
during the normal operation of a Globe DSO, namely during the processing of
client requests. Again, we use the same Integer DSO described in the previous
section. In this case, a (master) replica of the object is instantiated on main
host A (ginger.cs.vu.nl). We instantiate a number of clients (user proxies) on
the auxiliary hosts. The user proxies bind to the Integer DSO master replica,
and issue a write request (Integer.setValue()). Given this setup, we perform two
experiments, one to obtain the detailed workload breakdown, and the other to
measure the maximum replica throughput.
For this experiment series we use four different security settings:
• An insecure version of the Integer DSO (where all Globe security features
have been turned off).
• A secure version of the Integer DSO using public key authentication (using
the PureTLS implementation of the TLS protocol).
• A secure version of the Integer DSO using public key authentication (using
our own implementation—OwnTLS of the TLS protocol).
• A secure version of the Integer DSO using using symmetric key authenti-
cation, namely the oﬄine TTP protocol described in Chapter 6. In this
case, the RKL size is set to 100 and the UKL size is set to 10000 (thus,
the DSO can support at most 100 replicas and 10000 users).
9.3.1 Experiment 2.1
The purpose of this experiment is to obtain a detailed breakdown of replica/proxy
workload during regular DSO operation. For this experiment, the object ID for
the DSO being accessed is cached by the client (thus, there is no need for a GNS
lookup). The client is also already registered with the object and has cached
its local DSO credentials, as well as the proxy blueprint. Figure 9.5 shows the
stages involved during a client request on a DSO replica:
1. The client instantiates the user proxy for the DSO, using the cached proxy
blueprint. When security is enabled, the client initializes the proxy’s se-
curity subobject with the (cached) client authentication credentials.
2. The proxy queries the GLS for a replica allowed to execute Integer.setValue().
3. The proxy connects to the contact point returned by the GLS.
4. If security is enabled, the proxy and the replica mutually authenticate and
establish a secure channel.
5. The proxy sends the Integer.setValue() request to the replica (over the
secure channel established at Stage 4 if security is enabled, or over the
regular TCP channel established at Stage 3 if not). The replica executes
the request and sends the result back to the proxy.
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Figure 9.5: Stages involved in a client request
We repeat the Integer.setValue() operation 500 times for different security
settings and measure the average duration for each of the five stages. The results
are shown in Figure 9.6.
We can see that authentication and secure channel establishment is by far
the most expensive stage during regular DSO operation. Public key authenti-
cation is particularly expensive. When using the PureTLS library (which, as
already mentioned, is not particularly efficient), authentication alone increases
the client-perceived latency by almost 300 msec. Even when using our own (op-
timized) TLS implementation, authentication still accounts for almost 100 msec
of the client-perceived latency. The good news is that using the symmetric
key authentication protocol introduced in Chapter 6 can dramatically improve
performance. In this case, the authentication-introduced latency is an order of
magnitude smaller compared to compared to public key authentication mecha-
nisms.
Another measurement of interest is the total amount of CPU time used by
the replica when serving one client request. Having this, essentially allows us to
compute the maximum (theoretical) throughput for the replica (e.g. how many
client requests per second can the replica serve). Figure 9.7 shows the results
for this measurement:
From Figure 9.7 we can see that using the symmetric key authentication
protocol introduced in Chapter 6 can significantly increase the maximum replica
throughput. In the next section we will validate the numbers in Figure 9.7 by
having the replica serve concurrent client requests.
Experiment 2.2
The purpose of this second experiment is to validate the theoretical throughput
results from Experiment 2.1. The idea is to have concurrent clients continuously
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Figure 9.6: Stages involved in a client request and their duration
sending requests to an IntegerDSO replica. We want to measure the maximum
throughput the replica can sustain, and compare this to the (theoretical) values
derived in the previous section. We run different numbers (ranging from 1 to
30) of concurrent clients on the auxiliary hosts; these clients continuously send
Integer.setValue() requests to a master replica on main host A (ginger.cs.vu.nl)
for 500 iterations. We measure the amount of time necessary to complete one
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Security features Total replica CPU Maximum theoretical
enabled time (msec) throughput (req/sec)
No security 2.47 404.85
PureTLS 169.17 5.91
OwnTLS 50.05 19.98
Symmetric 6.49 154.08
Figure 9.7: Replica CPU time spent per request and maximum replica throughput
request. Based on this, we then calculate the “real” replica throughput. The
results are shown in Figure 9.8.
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Figure 9.8: Measured throughput for various security settings. The bold lines represent the
theoretical throughput derived from Experiment 2.1. The Y-axis of the graph is on logarithmic
scale.
The results of this experiment validate the maximum theoretical throughput
values derived in Experiment 2.1. We can see from Figure 9.8, that with only
one client continuously sending request, the replica throughput is considerably
lower than the maximum throughput achievable; the reason for this is that
the replica sits idle during the time the (sole) client is doing processing, and
during the time requests/results are transfered over the network. The replica
throughput rapidly increases as more clients join in with sending requests; in this
case, the previously idle replica time is used to serve concurrent requests. The
maximum throughput is achieved with somewhere between 5 to 10 concurrent
clients. Above this threshold, the overhead associated with multi-threading
(each client request is served as a separate thread) begins to affect the replica
performance (basically some CPU cycles are used on multi-threading instead of
useful work).
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9.4 Micro-Benchmarks
The purpose of this final experiment series is to evaluate the security overhead
through a series of micro-benchmarks. For our experiments, we run one DSO
replica on main host A (ginger.cs.vu.nl) and a number of (concurrent) clients
(user proxies) on the auxiliary hosts. Each client repeatedly executes a trans-
action for many iterations (typically 500). At the end we measure how many
transactions per second the replica can sustain for different numbers of con-
current clients, different security configurations, and different workloads. Each
transaction consists of the following steps:
• bind()—in this step the client downloads the object proxy code and in-
stantiates its object local representative, then finds the replica, connects
to it, and runs the mutual authentication protocol.
• performOperation()—in this step, the client issues the actual method invo-
cation request. For our benchmarks, the operations are artificial workloads
stressing different parts of the replica hosting system—the CPU, disk, and
network stack.
• unbind()—the client disconnects.
Each micro-benchmark simulates a different type of workload—CPU work-
load, disk workload, and network workload. We provide details about each of
these workloads in sections 9.4.2 to 9.4.4. In addition to this we also consider the
“empty” micro-benchmark which consists of an “empty” transaction—basically
the client binds to a replica and then immediately unbinds without issuing any
request.
The purpose of the experiment is to compare the overhead introduced by
our security architecture. We use four different security settings:
• An unsecure version of the DSO (where all Globe security features are
turned off).
• A secure version of the DSO using public key authentication (using the
PureTLS implementation of the TLS protocol).
• A secure version of the DSO using public key authentication (using our
own implementation–OwnTLS of the TLS protocol).
• A secure version of the DSO using using symmetric key authentication,
namely the oﬄine TTP protocol described in Chapter 6. In this case, the
RKL size is set to 100 and the UKL size is set to 10000 (thus, the DSO
can support at most 100 replicas and 10000 users).
9.4.1 Experiment 3.1—“empty” transactions
In this experiment we measure the replica throughput under a workload of
“empty” transactions. Figure 9.9 shows the results.
Although this is not a very realistic workload, it gives insight into the actual
cost of security. We can see that when all security mechanisms are disabled,
Globe performs several times better than the most efficient security implemen-
tation. On the other hand, using the symmetric key authentication module is
an order of magnitude more efficient compared to public key authentication.
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Figure 9.9: Replica throughput under “empty” transactions workload. The Y-axis of the graph
is on logarithmic scale.
9.4.2 Experiment 3.2—CPU workload
In this experiment we measure the replica throughput under a (synthetic) CPU
workload. We consider two cases:
• “Light” CPU workload which consumes 10msec of CPU time per transac-
tion.
• “Heavy” CPU workload which consumes 300msec of CPU time per trans-
action.
Figures 9.10 and 9.11 show our results.
In the case of the “light” transactions, we can notice that symmetric key
authentication brings almost an order of magnitude performance improvement
over public key. Most importantly, the secure version of the DSO replica using
symmetric key authentication performs only fractionally worse than the unse-
cure version. We can find an explanation for the poor performance associated
with public key authentication by looking at some of our measurements in Sec-
tion 9.3.1. In Figure 9.6, we can see that the CPU workload for public key
authentication is 161.86 msec for the PureTLS implementation and 46.55 msec
for the OwnTLS implementation. This authentication overhead pretty much
“dwarfs” the “useful” CPU load of 10 msec per transaction, hence the poor
performance of the public-key authentication-enabled DSO.
For “heavy” transactions, the situation is quite different. Basically in this
case, the “useful” CPU load (300 msec) is significantly higher than the au-
thentication overhead, even in the case of public key protocols. As such, the
throughput for all security settings is in the same order of magnitude, although
the PureTLS implementation performs almost twice worse than the unsecure
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Figure 9.10: Replica throughput—“light” CPU transactions workload.
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Figure 9.11: Replica throughput—“heavy” CPU transactions workload.
version. We can also see that in this case, the symmetric key secure implemen-
tation performs almost identically to the unsecure version.
9.4.3 Experiment 3.3—disk workload
In this experiment we measure the replica throughput under a (synthetic) disk
workload. We consider two cases:
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• “Light” disk workload which consists of 1 disk access per transaction.
• “Heavy” disk workload which consists of 100 disk accesses per transaction.
Figures 9.10 and 9.11 show our results.
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Figure 9.12: Replica throughput under “light” disk transactions workload. The Y-axis of the
graph is on logarithmic scale.
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Figure 9.13: Replica throughput—“heavy” disk transactions workload.
The results for the disk benchmarks are quite similar to the results for the
CPU benchmarks. In the case of “light” disk transactions, symmetric key au-
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thentication mechanisms boost the overall replica throughput by an order of
magnitude compared to public key authentication. Essentially, in this case, the
high CPU load caused by running public key operations dominates the low disk
load. For “heavy” transactions, the performance of the secure DSO version im-
plementing symmetric key authentication is almost similar to the performance
of the insecure DSO version. In this case, the relatively light load due to security
mechanisms is “dwarfed” by the heavy “useful” disk load.
9.4.4 Experiment 3.4—network workload
In this experiment we measure the replica throughput under a (synthetic) net-
work workload. We consider two cases:
• “Light” network workload which transfers 10KB of data per transaction.
• “Heavy” network workload which transfers 1MB of data per transaction.
Figures 9.14 and 9.15 show our results.
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Figure 9.14: Replica throughput under “light” network transactions workload. The Y-axis of
the graph is on logarithmic scale.
The results for the “light” network benchmark are quite similar to the re-
sults for the other “light” benchmarks (disk and CPU). Essentially, symmetric
key authentication mechanisms boost the overall replica throughput by an or-
der of magnitude compared to public key authentication. The only difference
we can observe here is that the non-secure DSO version performs significantly
better than the most efficient secure version (the one using symmetric key au-
thentication). In this case, the bulk of the security overhead is not only the
authentication, but also the link encryption during the data transfer. For the
other “light” benchmarks, the bulk of the security overhead was solely dictated
by the authentication mechanism.
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Figure 9.15: Replica throughput—“heavy” network transactions workload.
Figure 9.16: Maximum throughput for “light” transactions.
In the case of “heavy” network transactions, things look very different. While
for the other “heavy” workloads (CPU and disk), the throughput associated
with symmetric key authentication was almost identic to the one associated
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with the non-secure DSO, in this case, symmetric key authentication performs
much worse. In fact, the throughput associated with symmetric key authenti-
cation is similar to the one associated with our own TLS implementation. The
explanation for this is the overhead associated with link encryption. Essentially,
the efficient symmetric key authentication mechanism is offset by the overhead
of doing link encryption for a large amount of data (1 MB), which is done for
all secure Globe implementations, but is disabled in the non-secure version.
9.4.5 Conclusion
Figures 9.16 and 9.17 provide a summary, “head-to-head” comparison of the
maximum achievable throughput for all workloads. From these figures, we can
see that in the case of “light” transactions, security adds a significant overhead.
On the other hand, this is also where the symmetric key authentication protocol
we propose shows the most promising results, since it typically performs almost
an order of magnitude better than public key authentication schemes.
In the case of workloads consisting of “heavy” transactions, the performance
penalty introduced by security mechanisms is much lower (in relative terms),
since a larger fraction of the computing resources used per transaction are spent
for doing the actual work.
Figure 9.17: Maximum throughput for “heavy” transactions.
We believe the results of these experiments validate our security design. Al-
though security introduces a significant penalty, it is by no means a performance
killer; most importantly, our modular design allows application developers to
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mediate between security and performance by choosing the modules that best
fit their needs. For applications where lightweight transactions are the norm, we
believe that our symmetric key authentication protocol can be a great advan-
tage. For applications where a more heavyweight workload is to be expected,
decision on whether to use symmetric or public key authentication will likely be
determined by additional factors (besides performance), such as whether non-
repudiation is an issue, or a highly dynamic (and unpredictable) user population
needs to be accommodated.
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Chapter 10
Related Work
In this chapter we examine existing security architectures for object-based mid-
dleware, and compare them to our Globe security design. More specifically,
we focus on four technologies: CORBA, DCOM/.NET/Microsoft Web Services,
Java/Java RMI/Jini, and Globus, which are examined in detail in the following
four sections. Our approach is to first provide a brief overview of each tech-
nology, and then examine the specific mechanisms used to secure it. We then
compare these security mechanisms against the five classes of security require-
ments identified for the Globe security architecture.
10.1 CORBA
CORBA (the Common Object Request Broker Architecture) is an open dis-
tributed object computing infrastructure standardized by OMG (the Object
Management Group). The detailed CORBA specification [25] includes a language-
independent object model, a number standard of middleware services, and
guidelines for a distributed applications development environment.
CORBA’s goal is to enable heterogeneous applications written in various
languages running on various platforms to interoperate. CORBA achieves this
by providing platform and location transparency.
10.1.1 CORBA architecture overview
The CORBA architecture model is shown in Figure 10.1. It consists of five
groups of architectural elements:
• Application objects—these are software components which are built into
specific, CORBA-enabled applications. They can be seen as the equivalent
of semantics subobjects in Globe.
• Horizontal facilities—consist of general-purpose high-level services which
are independent of the application domain. Examples include facilities for
user-interface management, information management, task management
or system management.
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Figure 10.1: The CORBA architecture model.
• Vertical facilities—consist of high-level services targeting specific applica-
tion domains. Examples include vertical facilities targeting the banking,
health-care, or manufacturing environment.
• Common object services—domain-independent (lower-level) services that
facilitate implementing CORBA distributed applications. These services
are equivalent to the Globe middleware services, but richer in functionality.
For example, CORBA provides naming and directory services (like Globe),
but also synchronization, transaction, fault tolerance services (to name
just a few), which are not present in the Globe specification. However,
some of these “missing” services are implemented in Globe on a per-object
basis (e.g. fault-tolerance is achieved in Globe by means of replication).
• The Object Request Broker (ORB)—the core of any CORBA distributed
system, is responsible for enabling remote method invocations from clients
to their objects, while hiding issues related to distribution and heterogene-
ity.
Like Globe, CORBA provides an Interface Definition Language which is
used to specify objects and services. CORBA IDL specifications can then be
translated into existing programming languages interfaces (C, C++, Java, etc.)
using language-specific interface compilers.
On the client side, there is an IDL proxy that sits between the client ap-
plication and the client ORB. The IDL proxy essentially translates application
requests into the IDL syntax (which is the only language “understood” by the
ORB). The client ORB then transparently forwards the request to the server
ORB (where the requested object is located). The server ORB then passes the
request to an IDL skeleton which maps it into the appropriate method request,
which it then invokes on the actual object. This remote method invocation pro-
cedure is quite similar to Globe, with the IDL proxy and skeleton playing the
role of the Globe control object, and the ORB performing (some of) the tasks
of the Globe replication and communication subobjects.
Although there are similarities between CORBA and Globe, they differ in a
number of aspects; these differences have implications for security as follows:
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• Support for application replication is a key feature of Globe and is ad-
dressed at the architectural level (e.g. the replication subobject in the
Globe object model). Replication introduces a number of unique security
challenges (for example the need for reverse access control); the Globe ob-
ject model allows these security challenges to be addressed in a consistent
manner. In contrast, CORBA does not provide any support for replication
at the architecture level; as such, in CORBA it is more difficult to handle
replication-induced security issues in a consistent way.
• Globe objects are self-contained, handling most of their nonfunctional as-
pects, such as replication, persistence, and security, and only making use
of a limited number of middleware services such as naming and location.
In contrast, CORBA provides a rich set of services (which will be briefly
covered in the next section). This makes the life of application develop-
ers easier, but also significantly increases the size of the CORBA global
trusted computing base.
• Chain invocation (i.e. an object invoking a method on another object)
is supported in CORBA but not supported in Globe. This makes the
access control model for CORBA significantly more complicated, since
rights need to be delegated through the invocation chain.
• From the very beginning, Globe was targeted towards the WAN environ-
ment. On the other hand, although not explicitly stated, there is often
an implicit “LAN assumption” in the various parts of the CORBA de-
sign. For example, CORBA focuses on building distributed applications
as sequences of objects interacting through chain invocation. While this
works well in a LAN environment, chain invocation is likely to introduce
significant performance penalty over a WAN. This focus on the WAN en-
vironment has introduced additional constraints on the types of security
mechanisms that can be supported by the Globe security architecture.
10.1.2 The CORBA security architecture
A good overview of the CORBA security architecture is given in [127] and [55].
The complete security specification can be found in [26]. Shortcomings of the
CORBA security design are examined in [28].
One of the main goals of the CORBA security architecture is to be totally
unobtrusive to application developers. The idea is that most developers lack
security expertise, thus security-unaware objects should be able to run securely
on a secure ORB without any active involvement. Given this principle, CORBA
puts all the security enforcement responsibilities on the ORB. As such, all object
invocations are mediated by the appropriate ORB security functions, to enforce
various policies (for example access control). The ORB placement in the overall
CORBA architecture (see Figure 10.1), guarantees that security enforcement
cannot be bypassed (since all object interactions are mediated by the ORB).
Needless to say, this also mandates that the ORB is part of the system’s trusted
computing base.
Another important goal of the CORBA security architecture is facilitating
security management and administration. To achieve this goal, CORBA allows
administrators to define security policy domains—sets of objects controlled by
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a common security policy. Security policy domains are managed at the ORB
level, and are transparent to application objects. As such, security-unaware
applications can be securely operated by including them in the appropriate
domains; from there on the security properties required by the domain policy are
automatically enforced by the ORB. In addition to this, CORBA also supports
security-aware objects, which can influence the security policy an ORB enforces
on their behalf.
Given these general goals of the CORBA security architecture, for the rest
of this section we will examine how CORBA handles specific security require-
ments. In turn, we will look at the five sets of security requirements identified
in Chapter 3.
Trust Management—the CORBA security architecture provides relatively
little support for trust management. Essentially, security administration in
CORBA is centered around security policy domains. The implicit assumption
is that most interactions occur between principals (users) and objects part in
the same domain, and that the domain administrator a-priori defines the rules
governing these interactions. In order to support interactions between enti-
ties (objects, principals) in different security domains, CORBA introduces the
concept of a security gateway. A security gateway connects two domains, and
provide mappings between the names, policies, and actual security mechanisms
(e.g. encryption algorithms) in these domains. However, security gateways are
only specified as opaque, high-level architectural elements, and not in terms of
concrete functionality and/or application interface. Essentially, it is the security
administrators’ or the CORBA implementor’s task to provide means to enable
policy inter-operation between different security domains. Such an ad-hoc ap-
proach is likely to cause significant interoperability problems should CORBA
be used in a large scale, open environment, like the one envisioned for Globe.
Authentication—in CORBA authentication is centered around the secu-
rity policy domains. Essentially, each policy domain functions as an authenti-
cated domain. CORBA defines the principals in such domains as the end-users
(the humans invoking CORBA objects). However, given that ORBs part of one
domain typically communicate over (physically) insecure networks, the domain
also needs to provide an inter-ORB authentication infrastructure. For end-users,
CORBA provides a single-sign-on facility, where the user authenticates to the
ORB on his computer by invoking a special Security Principal Authenticator
CORBA object, which provides a standard authentication interface. In order to
perform the authentication, this object may interact with an external authen-
tication server (for example a Kerberos TGT). Upon successful authentication,
the authenticator object creates a Credentials object which encodes all the priv-
ileges (relative to the domain) that can be associated with the principal. For
each CORBA execution context (i.e. each method invocation), there is a Cur-
rent object which contains a reference to the Credentials object of the caller.
This object is passed from the client ORB to the target ORB, in order to allow
the target to evaluate the request against the caller’s credentials.
Authentication between ORBs in the same domain is achieved through the
Secure Common inter-ORB Protocol (SECIOP). The purpose of the SECIOP
is to allow ORBs to establish secure channels to be used for remote method
invocations, and to safely transfer Credentials objects from the client to the
target ORB. SECIOP is a powerful protocol, supporting various authentication
mechanisms (Kerberos, public key, etc.) and allowing multiple secure channels
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to be multiplexed over the same TCP connection. However, this versatility
makes SECIOP difficult to actually implement. Its merits and shortcomings are
debated in [28].
Access Control—The CORBA access control model is based on the trusted
ORB model. Essentially, there is a standard Access Control object built into ev-
ery ORB, which acts as a reference monitor and cannot be bypassed; this object
is automatically invoked by the ORB on every access, for both security-aware
and security-unaware applications. CORBA specifies separate access control
tests on both the client and target ORBs; in both cases these tests are per-
formed by an Access Decision object which holds the local access policies. The
Access Control object obtains the client credentials from the Current object.
In addition to the ORB access control, CORBA also supports application-
level access control for security-aware applications. This type of access control is
enforced by a standardDomain Manager object which is called on each access by
security-aware applications and evaluates the access request against application-
specific policies encoded as Policy objects.
In order to support chain invocation (objects invoking methods on other
objects), CORBA provides an elaborate model for delegating rights with the
following options:
• No Delegation—the client’s (caller’s) credentials are only used in the first
step of the invocation chain. For each subsequent steps, the access control
decision is based on the credentials of the previous object in the invocation
chain.
• Simple Delegation—the client’s credentials are passed all the way through
the invocation chain. At each step in the chain, the access control decision
is solely based on the credentials of the original caller.
• Composite Delegation—this is a combination of No Delegation and Simple
Delegation; at each step in the invocation chain, the access control decision
is based both on the original caller’s credentials and on the credentials of
the previous object in the chain.
• Traced Delegation—this is similar to Composite delegation, except that at
each step in the invocation chain the access control decision is based on all
the intermediate credentials up to that point (starting with the original
caller’s credentials).
Byzantine Fault Tolerance—The CORBA security architecture does not
provide explicit support for Byzantine fault tolerance. Such features need to be
implemented as extensions of the standard security design. There are a number
of (mostly academic-related) projects that attempt to achieve this. An overview
of the research efforts in this area is presented in [151] and [98]. In general, this
type of research can be divided into three strategies:
• Integration Strategy—in this case Byzantine fault tolerance is provided
by modifying the ORB, for example by adding a reliable, totally ordered
group communication mechanism for delivering requests. Examples of this
strategy are presented in [53] and [134]. The drawback of this approach
is that the resulting ORB will likely not be compliant with the CORBA
standard.
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• Interception Strategy—in this case, requests made by CORBA clients to
objects are captured externally to the ORB, by means of operating system
level interceptors. Such interceptors modify the original requests, trans-
forming them into replicated invocations. Examples of this strategy are
presented in [152] and [74]. The obvious advantage of this strategy is that
the ORB does not need to be modified. On the other hand, since replica-
tion invocation is completely transparent to the ORB, it is not clear how
object replicas are kept consistent when executing write requests.
• Service Strategy—in this case, Byzantine-fault tolerance support is pro-
vided as a separate CORBA service, part of the CORBA horizontal fa-
cilities (see the CORBA architecture overview, at the beginning of this
section). Fault tolerant CORBA applications register their object replicas
with this service, which takes care of state consistency and of forward-
ing client requests to multiple replicas. An example of this strategy is
presented in [98], which was later extended into an OMG standard for
fault-tolerant (FT) CORBA [23]. Although quite elegant, this approach
to fault-tolerance is (unfortunately) only a later addition to the CORBA
specification, and thus introduces the problem of interoperability with
legacy (non-FT compliant) CORBA implementations.
Although possible, extending the CORBA security architecture to support
Byzantine-fault tolerance introduces various shortcomings (as explained above).
In our opinion, the underlying cause for these shortcomings is the original
CORBA object model which does not directly support replication (the ba-
sic building block for fault-tolerant applications!). In contrast, replication is
an intrinsic feature of the Globe object model, and this leads to a relatively
straightforward integration of Byzantine-fault tolerance mechanisms into the
Globe security architecture, as described in Chapters 4 and 8.
Platform Security—CORBA deals with platform security by introduc-
ing the concept of a protection domain. A protection domain consist of a set
of application components which are isolated (from a security point of view)
from application components in other protection domains. Components in one
protection domain are intended to trust each other, in the sense they do not
interfere with each other’s correct functioning. The CORBA security architec-
ture mentions that an implementation of protection domains should also provide
means of protected communication across domain boundaries (for example by
message passing, or shared memory). Besides this (rather general) definition
and high level requirements, the CORBA security architecture does not specify
any other functional/implementation aspects of protection domains (e.g. in-
terface API, low-level software architecture). Essentially, most of the platform
security design is the task of the CORBA system developer.
10.1.3 Conclusion
Overall, the CORBA security architecture does a reasonably good job for the en-
vironment CORBA was designed for, namely local area networks. The ease of se-
curity administration and management (for example, the ability to “group man-
age” many CORBA objects part of the same policy domain) are the strongest
points of this design. In this respect, the Globe security architecture is less
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“security administration-friendly,” in the sense that the basic security model re-
quires individual DSO administration. However, it is still possible to administer
DSO groups, by having a single administrative entity act as the administrative
replica for each object in the group, and have all objects in the group use a single
role hierarchy for access control (see Chapter 7). It is important to note the dif-
ference in usage scenarios envisioned for CORBA and Globe: while in CORBA
the focus is on building services out of chains of objects (where a client request
typically translates into a chain invocation), in Globe the model focuses more
on applications designed as stand-alone DSOs, which justifies our preference for
a per-DSO security administration model. One weak point of the CORBA secu-
rity design is its limited support for trust management, which make it difficult
to scale to open wide-area environments such as the Internet. Another weak
point is its lack of direct support of Byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms, but
this is a direct consequence of the CORBA non-replicated object model.
10.2 DCOM/.NET/Web Services
The Component Object Model (COM) [170] is a Microsoft proprietary tech-
nology for supporting object-based software components. Its most important
features are support for inter-component communication across process bound-
aries, and dynamic component object creation in a variety of programming
languages. The Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) [81], is the
extension of COM to a distributed computing environment. In comparison to
COM, the main addition in DCOM is the support for remote method invocation
(RMI) on objects across the network.
DCOM is mainly a LAN-centric technology. To facilitate developing WAN-
based distributed applications, Microsoft has introduced the .NET framework [67].
Broadly, .NET distributed applications fall into four categories:
• Legacy DCOM applications (.NET ensures backward compatibility).
• .NET Remoting applications—essentially the remoting approach is similar
to DCOM, except it fully takes advantage of .NET’s new features—such
as “polyglot programming” (to be described next), and more flexible RMI
mechanisms.
• .NET Web applications—they are similar to remoting applications, except
they are hosted inside the Internet Information Server—IIS (the standard
Microsoft Web server), and provide their user interface as regular Web
pages (clients access them through a standard browser).
• Web services [77]—latest trend in providing interoperable distributed ap-
plications over the Internet; the infrastructure enabling this interoperabil-
ity is described in a number of standards:
– WSDL [70]—the (XML-based) Web Service Description Language.
– SOAP [148]—the Simple Object Access Protocol—an XML based
standard for encoding remote procedure calls.
– UDDI [156]—Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration—an
XML-based registry allowing businesses worldwide to list their Web
services.
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.NET is fully compliant to all these Web services standards, and provides
a framework for developing such services on the Windows platform.
We provide a quick (technical) overview of these technologies, and then
examine the security mechanisms associated with them, and compare them to
the Globe security architecture.
10.2.1 DCOM/.NET/Web Services—technical overview
Programming Language Support—like Globe and CORBA, DCOM aims
to be programming language-independent, and this is achieved by providing
an interface definition language—MIDL (the Microsoft IDL). Application pro-
grammers use MIDL to define specifications for their DCOM classes, and then
pass these specifications to language-specific IDL compilers (e.g. Java, C++),
to obtain the headers and source file stubs for these classes. The programmer
only needs to complete the source stubs, compile them, and register the new
classes with the DCOM runtime (such class name—implementation bindings
are typically stored in the Windows registry).
.NET supports programming language independence by allowing applica-
tions to be written in multiple languages (“polyglot” programming). This con-
cept is quite powerful; it may allow, for instance, a routine written in a language
L1 to directly call another routine written in a different language L2, or to have
a class in L1 inherit from a class in L2 (assuming L1 and L2 are both OO).
.NET achieves this by having specialized compilers which output object code
in an intermediate language (the Microsoft Intermediate Language—MSIL). In
turn, this intermediate code is then automatically compiled into native object
code when the application is executed (just in time compilation—JIT). To make
this possible, .NET relies on a common naming scheme. Once a .NET class is
compiled, and registered with the runtime, a mapping is constructed between
the fully qualified class name and the resulting MSIL code. This fully qualified
name can then be referenced in source files defining other .NET classes (possibly
written in different programming languages).
Finally, .NET supports the Web Services Description Language (WSDL)
[70]—a standard XML-based IDL for defining Web services, endorsed by the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [19]. WSDL describes the public interface
to the web service, namely the supported operations and messages (described
abstractly), as well as the concrete network protocol and message format. .NET
provides a special tool (SOAPSUDS.EXE) which facilitates interoperability be-
tween remoting objects and web services by (1) generating WSDL files based
on .NET assembly classes (remoting servers ↔ generic web clients), and (2)
generating client proxy and server stub code (in any of the .NET-supported
languages) based on WSDL specifications (remoting clients ↔ web services).
Naming—COM/DCOM introduce two separate name spaces: one for classes
and interfaces, and the other one for the actual objects. The first name space is
global: DCOM classes and interfaces are assigned unique 128bit IDs (the CLSID
and IID respectively) when they are created (a special uuidgen tool is used for
generating these IDs). In the case of objects, in COM/DCOM these are inher-
ently transient, so they are not assigned global names. Essentially, basic object
usage in COM/DCOM has the form “bind to an object of class Y” (different
from Globe, where each object is unique). Upon receiving such a request, the
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DCOM runtime attempts to find a (local) library implementing the requested
class, or the address of a DCOM server that can instantiate the class (such class
name—implementation bindings are normally stored in the Windows registry).
With this approach, an object can be used only after its class has been reg-
istered; COM/DCOM provide no naming/location service allowing automatic
registration based on the global CLSID. This approach is clearly less scalable
than the Globe Naming/Location Service.
COM/DCOM support persistent objects by introducing the concepts of
monikers. A moniker is a special object that allows persistent references to
specific instances (objects) of other COM classes. Each moniker specifies the
CLSID of its referred object, as well as the object name (which can be specified
as a directory path, URL, etc.). Any (regular) DCOM object can “name” itself
by creating a moniker and registering it with the COM runtime on its host.
Clients can then bind to the named object by first binding to the moniker, and
asking it for a reference to the object (through a standard IMoniker interface).
However, COM/DCOM does not specify any global naming service for monikers,
so when binding to one, clients have to find its name by out of band means.
.NET also provides separate name spaces for classes and objects. In case of
classes, there are actually two complementary naming mechanisms: namespaces
and assemblies. A namespace is a logical naming scheme for types in which
a simple type name is preceded with a dot-separated hierarchical name, and
is used for grouping types into logical categories of related functionality. An
assembly establishes the name scope for types at run time, and forms the logical
unit for type identity, versioning, and security. An assembly is fully identified
by the following four components:
• Name—a human-readable name assigned to that assembly.
• Culture—an identifier for the (human) language used by that assembly.
• Version—a 128-bit number identifying the version of the assembly.
• Public key—the assembly’s public key, which can be used to uniquely
identify it.
.NET objects are also implicitly transient, so they are not directly assigned
global names. Instead, .NET introduces the concept of a service, which is a
globally unique combination of an interface specification and network address
(where the service can be accessed). As explained earlier, such services can be
either .NET Remoting services, .NET Web applications, or .NET Web services.
In the case of remoting services, naming works as follows:
• On the server side, a given class (identified by the class name, its com-
plete namespace, and assembly name) is registered as a well known service
(.NET provides a service API for this purpose). The new service is as-
signed a unique local name. The global service name consists of the local
name, and network contact point.
• On the client side, the client asks its .NET framework to bind to the
remote service, by specifying the class name (which is used to construct
the proxy), and the URI of the remote service (which is the concatenation
of the service name and the contact point).
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.NET Web applications are hosted by the IIS. Each application has its own
home directory; the name of this directory is the (local) application name.
Clients can access the application using its global name, which is the combi-
nation of the local name and the name of the server (running the IIS).
In the case of Web services, .NET supports Universal Description, Discov-
ery, and Integration (of web services)—UDDI. Essentially, UDDI is a database
schema combined with with the client API specification. Based on this specifi-
cation, it is possible to build UDDI registries—online databases of Web services,
registries which in turn are also presented as Web services. The types of infor-
mation included in a UDDI registry include:
• Businesses—information such as name, (physical) contact address, and
list of web services offered.
• Services—information such as the technical/business description, catego-
rization (service “keywords”), binding information, and technical model.
• Binding information—information on how a specific service can be ac-
cessed (e.g. the URN of the service).
• Technical Model—the technical specification of the service, which can be
used by the client to construct a proxy. Typically, this is the URL for the
WSDL file describing the service.
Based on this schema, UDDI organizes information in a similar way to a
phone book with colored pages (e.g. white pages sorting businesses by name,
yellow pages sorting services by category, green pages sorting services based on
technical specifications). An effort to create a “universal public UDDI registry”
(global database of Web services) has been recently discontinued due to lack
of applicability [121]. Private UDDI registries (facilitating closed group B2B
interactions) are currently used in the commercial environment, while federated
UDDI registries [177] have been proposed by the academia. While the UDDI
approach seems more general/extensible than the Globe solution (GLS/GNS)
it is not clear it can provide better scalability.
Binding—Similarly to Globe, in DCOM clients bind to objects by instan-
tiating proxies for those objects in their address space. Because DCOM objects
may provide multiple interfaces, each proxy is associated with the specific in-
terface requested by the client during binding. The DCOM runtime provides
standard functions for binding to un-named objects (“bind to interface I of an
object of class C”), and for binding to monikers. Normally, binding is static, in
the sense that a client needs to know the signatures of the methods of the inter-
face to which it binds. This information is stored in type libraries, is generated
by the MIDL compiler from the IDL interface specification, and needs to be
installed on the client host. DCOM also allows dynamic late binding—invoking
methods on a remote object for which the signature is unknown—and this is
accomplished by having objects implement a special IDispatch interface which
allows runtime inspection of the object’s interfaces.
Upon receiving a bind request for a given interface of an object it hosts, a
server constructs an interface reference, which includes the interface Id (IID), the
server’s network address, and the (local) identifier of the object. This reference
is then passed to the client which uses it to initialize the proxy.
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Finally, DCOM objects use reference counting to determine the number of
clients bound to them. Each time a client binds to one of the interfaces exported
by a DCOM object, a reference count associated with that object is incremented.
All DCOM interfaces are derived from a standard IUnknown interface which
provides, among other things, methods for incrementing/decrementing the ob-
ject’s reference count (clients are responsible for correctly invoking these meth-
ods). Whenever the reference count associated with an object becomes zero, the
DCOM runtime automatically destroys the object. In order to deal with network
partitions and crashed clients, DCOM also periodically pings client proxies, and
decrements the reference count whenever a proxy becomes unreachable.
.NET remoting objects fall into two categories: client activated objects are
created by clients, which then have full control of their lifetime by means of a
leasing mechanism (the object is destroyed only after the lease expires, and it is
not renewed by the client). Server activated objects are created by servers upon
receiving of client requests; these can be further classified as either single call—
which are immediately destroyed after the client call, and singleton—whose
lifetime may be also controlled by the client through the lease mechanism. This
object leasing mechanism is intended to replace the garbage collection used in
DCOM, which has proven to work poorly over WANs.
Once a server has registered a .NET service (as a well known service—see
the Naming section), clients can bind to it, which, depending on activation
type, may result in new instances (objects) of that service being created. A
client binds to a service by calling a system function (CreateInstance), provid-
ing the URI of the service and the fully qualified name of the class implementing
the service. This typically requires the assembly for that class to be installed
on the client’s host; .NET also allows dynamic late binding, though the SOA-
PUDS.EXE tool (described earlier) which dynamically generates the required
assemblies on the client side by contacting the service before the actual binding
(this requires the server to generate the WSDL file for the service, but does not
require to export it as a web service). Binding alone does not typically result in
a service instance being created on the server side (except for client-activated
objects); normally this only happens when the client makes the first method
invocation.
Remote method invocation—The DCOM RMI protocol is called ORPC
(Object RPC) [61] and is based on the DCE RPC protocol [106]. ORPC is a
proprietary protocol, and requires nonstandard network ports for communica-
tion, which make it difficult to deal with firewalls and NAT boxes. Essentially,
ORPC does marshalling and unmarshalling of method parameters using the
standard Network Data Representation (NDR), which takes care of things such
as byte ordering, and floating point format. ORPC also allows passing interface
references across the network. An interface reference is marshalled by simply
converting all the information associated with it (the IID, server address, local
object ID, etc.) into NDR format. Upon receiving such a marshalled reference,
the client side unmarshalls it, and constructs the appropriate proxy object,
which is then passed back to the caller. All proxy objects are derived from an
ObjRef basic class, which by default marshalls invocation parameters and sends
them to the server side. Application programmers can define custom proxies by
deriving the ObjRef class; custom proxies can be used for implementing “smart”
proxies, handling, for example, result caching or replicated invocations.
With respect to invocation models, originally, DCOM only offered two al-
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ternatives: pure synchronous invocations (the caller is blocked until receiving
the result of the RMI), and call-back invocations (the caller keeps running after
performing the RMI; upon completing the request, the server informs the caller
via a call-back interface). Support for asynchronous calls, RMI cancelation,
events, and transactional queues were added later as part of a COM+ extension
of DCOM [82].
In the case of .NET Remoting, the RMI protocol is similar to DCOM, except
that there are more transport and marshalling options. For transport, .NET
supports RMI on top of TCP, HTTP, and SMTP. The TCP transport has the
lowest overhead, but uses non-standard ports, which make it difficult to operate
across firewalls; HTTP and SMTP transport can be used to work around this
problem. For marshalling, there are binary and SOAP options. Binary mar-
shalling is similar to NDR, and has the advantage of being compact and efficient
to process. However, portability is limited to .NET (applications outside .NET
cannot process binary marshalled RMIs). When interoperability is important,
as is the case of .NET Web services, RMIs can be marshalled using SOAP.
Essentially, SOAP is a standard for encoding exchanging XML-based messages
over the network. SOAP defines a set of rules for encoding basic data types,
array types, and compound data structures. Using these rules, it is possible
to convert any RMI into a SOAP message; because this message is text char-
acters, many of the interoperability problems associated with binary encoding
(byte ordering, floating point representation, etc.) can be avoided. The price
paid for this interoperability is performance: because it involves text processing,
marshalling/unmarshalling a SOAP RMI is significantly slower compared to its
binary equivalent.
Runtime environment—DCOM objects are in general self-contained (each
object runs in its own process). What DCOM provides is a generic mechanism
for activating/creating objects. A special process—the Service Control Man-
ager (SCM)—is in charge of this. When the SCM receives a binding request for
an interface I of an object of class C, it inspects the local registry to find the
appropriate implementation, instantiates an object, marshalls a reference to the
requested implementation, and returns it to the client.
In the case of .NET Remoting, the server runtime is responsible for main-
taining a list of well known services. There is a programming API that allows
new services to be registered, which involves specifying the class and assem-
bly implementing the service, the service name, and the network contact point
(port) where clients can access it. Upon receiving client requests, the runtime is
responsible for loading the appropriate classes and starting the remoting object
implementing the service. The runtime is also responsible for doing the “just
in time compilation” (described earlier in this section) for converting the MSIL
implementation of the class into executable code.
Finally, .NET Web applications and Web services are run as part of Mi-
crosoft’s standard web server, the Internet Information Server (IIS). Like any
web server, the IIS exports a subtree of its host file system to the Internet.
Directories managed by the IIS may contain, among other things, regular Web
documents, as well as Web applications and services. In the case of Web ap-
plications, the role of the traditional index.html file (for regular Web sites) is
taken by a special file, with the same name as the application and the .aspx
extension, which serves as the “entry point” for the clients; .aspx file contain
contain both HTML controls and .NET source code, which is “just in time”
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compiled into object code the first time a client accesses the application. Web
services are hosted in a similar way, essentially, each Web service has its own
directory. The directory name is the local name of the service (the global ser-
vice name is the concatenation of the name of the server and the service’s local
name). This service directory may contain the MSIL assembly implementing
the service, the WSDL description of the service, and configuration information.
IIS supports access to a Web service either via SOAP, or as a regular HTTP
GET/POST request. In case of HTTP access, clients simply point the browser
to the service’s global name; the IIS then automatically constructs an HTML
page that allows access to the service’s (public) methods, which are exposed as
HTML forms taking as inputs the parameters associated with these methods.
Replication—at the system level, DCOM does not provide any support for
object replication; this aspect is left to the applications. One option for doing
this is by subclassing the ObjRef class, in order to implement “smart” proxies
capable of handling RMIs on replicated objects.
This same approach of providing “smart” proxies can also be applied to repli-
cating .NET remoting objects. A possible implementation is described in [169].
Finally, Microsoft provides no support for replication of Web services, and
we are not aware of any project aiming to provide such support for services
exported through the IIS. [145] describes a framework for building replicated
Web services, targeting Byzantine fault tolerance; however, this framework is
built on top of open-source Web service-deployment platforms, and provides no
support for services exported though the IIS.
10.2.2 DCOM/.NET/Web Services—security mechanisms
In this section we examine the security mechanisms involved in the various Mi-
crosoft distributed middleware technologies.
DCOM
DCOM is the oldest of these technologies, and, as mentioned, has been mostly
designed for a LAN/intranet environment. This design decision is very much
visible in its security architecture. Here, we provide an overview of this archi-
tecture; more details can be found in [81].
Authentication is handled in DCOM by means of security support providers
(SSPs). A SSP is essentially an authentication module that exports a standard
programming interface (the Security Support Provider Interface—SSPI). SSPI
is based on the Generic Security Service API, an Internet standard described
in [129, 187], and provides functionality for authenticating clients, delegating
privileges, and performing signing/encryption of data sent across the network.
Originally, DCOM provided only two standard SSPs: the NT LAN Manager
(NTLM) [18] is based on a proprietary Microsoft authentication protocol, and
has serious limitations, both in terms of security (it is vulnerable to brute-force
attacks), and functionality (it does not allow delegation). As a (better) alterna-
tive, DCOM also provides a standard SSP based on the Kerberos protocol [119].
Both NTLM and Kerberos are symmetric key-based, which limits their usability
to a LAN environment. Newer versions of DCOM (incorporated into the .NET
framework) attempt to provide WAN functionality by supporting additional,
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public-key based SSPs, for instance implementing the SSL/TLS [79] protocol
suite. For a given SSP, DCOM defines a number of authentication levels:
• None—no authentication is performed.
• Connect—the client is only authenticated when binding to an object.
• Call—the client is authenticated prior to each method invocation (this is
useful for protecting sensitive methods, for example a password change).
• Packet Integrity—the channel established between the client and the ob-
ject protects data integrity.
• Packet Privacy—the channel established between the client and the object
protects data integrity and privacy.
Finally, given that clients and servers may support multiple authentica-
tion protocols, DCOM also provides Secure and Protected Negotiation (SP-
NEGO) [37], a “meta” protocol allowing the two parties to securely negotiate
which authentication protocol to use during their interaction.
Because DCOM mainly targets the LAN/intranet environment, it provides
relatively little support for trust management. In such an environment, trust
is typically centralized (e.g. all parties are governed by one security policy—for
example a company-wide policy for accessing DCOM resources), so there is not
much motivation to support “open” interaction models, where trust manage-
ment is used to negotiate rights between “strangers” (from a security point of
view). The notion of central trust is represented in DCOM as a policy domain,
which contains one (centralized) domain controller, handling authentication,
and possibly privilege administration. DCOM also supports cross-domain au-
thentication, as a simple trust management mechanism. For example, in case
of the Kerberos SSP, this allows the domain controller (ticket granting server)
in one domain to issue tickets for services in another domain. Cross-domain
authentication requires administrators to manually set up the authentication
keys between the two domain controllers, which limits scalability in a WAN
environment.
Access Control is enforced in DCOM through a combination of runtime
and operating system mechanisms. Each time a remote client is authenticated
by an SSP, the DCOM runtime on the server associates the client’s identity
(typically a Windows user name) with the process executing on behalf of that
client (e.g. the process executing the object to which the client is bound). At
that point, any actions performed by that process are checked by the Windows
access control framework against a (system-wide) ACL stored in the registry;
the idea is that each access to single Windows resource (e.g. file, directory,
DCOM object, registry entry) is controlled through some entry in this ACL.
Conceptually, the DCOM access control model has three classes of protec-
tion: launch security, access security, and configuration access. Launch security
deals with enforcing access control on client requests to instantiate new DCOM
objects (during binding), and is implemented by associating (in the registry)
each CLSID with the identities of the clients allowed to create instances of that
class. Launch security is enforced by the SCM upon receiving bind requests
from clients. Once a client is bound to an object, and the process running that
object is created, the other two types of control (access and configuration), are
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automatically enforced by the Windows OS for every resource access, by check-
ing the client identity associated with the process against the registry entry
protecting the resource. This (standard) access control model is quite coarse, in
the sense that fine grained checks (on individual methods or parameters values)
are not supported. To support fine-grained checks, one option is to have DCOM
objects (programatically) perform these checks by accessing registry entries pro-
tected using fine-grained AC policies (e.g. the first thing a method does is to try
to access the registry entry protected by the fine-grained permission, and return
error upon an access violation). Alternatively, DCOM objects can implement
their own (fine-grained) access policies by storing their own AC database.
To facilitate policy administration and management, DCOM allows multiple
resources to be grouped as one application ID (AppID) which specifies one uni-
fied access control policy. Finally, in order to support security-unaware objects,
DCOM also provides mechanisms for specifying system-default settings for all
security parameters.
Finally, DCOM supports four privilege delegation models:
• Anonymous—the server is not allowed to obtain the identity of the caller.
The main advantage of this option is that it protects the privacy of the
client.
• Identify—the server is allowed to authenticate the caller, but cannot im-
personate it.
• Impersonate—the server authenticates the caller, and is allowed to access
local resources using the caller’s identity.
• Delegate—the server authenticates the caller, which fully delegates its se-
curity identity (e.g. the server is allowed to perform arbitrary operations
on behalf of the client—including calling other remote DCOM objects).
Depending on the SSP being used, not all delegation models may be avail-
able. For example, NTLM does not support the Delegate option.
As explained earlier, DCOM does not provide system support for object
replication. Applications that need such feature need to implement it them-
selves, and this is typically done by subclassing the DCOM system class imple-
menting the client proxy, resulting in “smart” proxies capable of dynamically
selecting the server on which to bind. This same technique could be used for
supporting Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) DCOM objects, essentially im-
plementing proxies capable of binding to multiple replicas of the same object
(i.e. the state machine replication technique described in Chapter 8). We are
not aware of any actual implementation of such BFT DCOM objects.
Finally, DCOM does not support mobile code, so typical platform pro-
tection mechanisms associated with such technology (e.g. code signing, sand-
boxing) are not incorporated into the DCOM runtime. Since DCOM objects
can only be instantiated using local code (implicitly trusted), a security breach
can only occur through a combination of faulty programming and active client
attack. For example, a malicious client may be able to inject malware into the
server by passing malformed input parameters to a vulnerable object (i.e. one
which does not perform input sanity checks) and causing a buffer overflow. The
DCOM access control mechanism can be used to limit the amount of damage
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caused by such a breach, by mandating that potentially vulnerable objects al-
ways run under the identity of the caller (i.e. no Anonymous delegation for
vulnerable objects).
.NET remoting and Web applications
Authentication is supported in .NET using the same set of primitives as in
DCOM, namely the Windows SSPs. The only difference is that .NET does not
provide any default implementation/enforcement of authentication mechanisms.
Instead, .NET remoting applications need to (programatically) implement au-
thentication, by using the SSPI API. The place where authentication can be
implemented is the client/server proxy. .NET allows creating custom proxies,
by subclassing a base proxy class. .NET remoting applications can then im-
plement their own authentication mechanisms, by defining a custom proxy for
this purpose. A sample implementation of such a proxy is described in [48].
While .NET remoting objects can only use Windows SSP authentication ser-
vices, IIS provides more authentication options for .NET Web applications.
In addition to the standard SSPs, IIS also provides forms authentication, and
Passport authentication. Forms authentication is password based; essentially
each Web application can specify a login page which prompts the client for a
username/password upon accessing a protected resource; in this case each Web
application needs to implement its own authentication logic (providing a pass-
word file, a password database, etc.). Upon authentication, a symmetric key
authentication ticket is stored as a browser cookie on the client side; this ticket
can be used for subsequent authentications (thus, the user only needs to type
his password once). Passport is a wide-area authentication service provided by
Microsoft. Registered users can authenticate to the central Passport server by
means of a username and password, and receive an authentication ticket, stor-
ing their unique ID (the Passport User ID—PUID), encrypted under a Passport
key, which is then stored as a browser cookie. Service providers can also register
with Passport and establish shared keys. When a registered user needs to au-
thenticate to a Password-enabled service, the site redirects the user’s browser to
the Passport server, which (upon re-authenticating the user based on the user
ticket) issues a service-specific authentication ticket (containing the PUID, and
encrypted using the Passport-service key), which is then used by the service to
authenticate the user. In this way, services do not need to maintain any authen-
tication database, but instead a simpler ACL associating permissions to PUIDs;
as an additional benefit, users only need to have one password for the Passport
service, allowing them to authenticate to all Passport-affiliated services (single-
sign-on). Despite these advantages, Passport also suffers from all the problems
associated with symmetric key authentication over LANs (see Chapter 6). A
detailed list of Passport vulnerabilities is presented in [120].
Trust management is supported in .NET through the Active Directory
technology, which allows the migration of DCOM, centralized, LAN-based, pol-
icy domains to a federatedWAN environment. An Active Directory is essentially
a collection of policy domains operated by one organization (in Microsoft ter-
minology, this is described as a domain forest); such forests contain information
regarding users, resources, and access policies. Inside a forest, the Active Direc-
tory technology provides mechanisms for setting hierarchical trust relationships
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(typically following the DNS naming hierarchy), or peer-wise trust (between
top-level domains). The end result is that two entities in different domains in
the same forest can authenticate, and negotiate rights for possible interaction,
according to their respective local domain policies, and possibly policies set by
domains higher-up in the forest. It is also possible to setup cross-forest trust
relationships, in order to support federated applications (applications spanning
multiple organizations). More information on this can be found in [60].
For .NET remoting applications, access control is implemented through a
combination of Windows generic and custom mechanisms (i.e. programatically
implemented by the developer). A principal identity authenticated by a SSP can
be incorporated into a standard IPrincipal object; the .NET API then allows to
associate such objects with a given process. Thus, once a client is authenticated,
the .NET remoting skeleton on the server side can associate its corresponding
IPrincipal to the process that runs the actual (remoting) object. At that point,
access to Windows resources can be controlled by the standard Windows access
control mechanism (described in the DCOM security section). Fine-grained
control (e.g. at method level) needs to be enforced programatically (by placing
checks inside the source code); in this case, .NET supports two types of policies:
with declarative security, access control policies are expressed by means of a
custom syntax, and stored in metadata associated with assemblies. In this case,
permission granularity is at best on method level, but the advantage is that an
assembly consumer can statically check which permissions are required in order
to run that assembly, by examining the assembly’s metadata (.NET provides
a permview.exe tool for this purpose). With imperative security, permissions
can be checked directly in the source code, using a standard PermissionCheck
.NET class. This allows finer-grained access control (beyond method level), but
cannot be statically checked.
In the case of .NET Web applications, access control mechanisms are similar
(as for .NET remoting), except that the IIS does most of the enforcement (as
opposed to relying on programmers to implement the reference monitor). When
SSP authentication is used in connection with caller impersonation, access to
resources is controlled by the standard Windows access control mechanism. In
this case, the IIS automatically associates the authenticated identity of the
caller to the server process running the invoked object. In the case of forms
and Passport authentication, the IIS only enforces coarse access granularity at
the application level (e.g. which users are allowed/denied to invoke any of the
application’s methods); this kind of policies are supported by means of simple
text ACLs placed in the application’s directory. Finally, Web applications can
also use programatic access control (both declarative and imperative), in the
same way as for remoting applications. Programatic checks can be performed
using the IPrincipal object which the IIS automatically associates with each
process running a Web application.
Since .NET does not provide system support for object replication, Byzan-
tine fault tolerance (BFT) mechanisms need to be implemented by applica-
tion developers. The straightforward way to integrate such mechanisms with
the the .NET object model is by means of “smart proxies” implementing the
BFT logic. [169] describes an architecture for supporting replicated .NET ob-
jects; although in this case replication is used mainly for scalability, it could be
extended to handle BFT as well.
.NET provides strong support for platform security, with elaborate mech-
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anisms for code verification, code access security, and expressing execution poli-
cies.
Before loading an assembly, the .NET CLR verifies the MSIL code in that
assembly. Based on this verification, code is classified as follows:
• Invalid MSIL—syntactically incorrect code, which is never executed.
• Valid MSIL—syntactically correct, but not necessary “safe” code (e.g.
using unsafe pointer arithmetic, incorrect access to class members, etc.).
Depending on the execution policy such code may or may not be executed.
• Type-safe MSIL—valid MSIL that is determined to be type safe based on
static (compile-time) checks.
• Verifiable MSIL—type-safe MSIL that can be proven to also run as type-
safe. Not all type-safe MSIL can be verifiable; for example, C++ compiled
code is not (as opposed to C#).
Code verification plays an essential role in security enforcement. With veri-
fiable MSIL, the CLR can completely isolate assemblies from each other; in this
way, verifiable components can execute safely in the same process even if they
are trusted at different levels.
Code access security assigns permissions to an assembly based on the assem-
bly’s proof of origin. Types of permissions include rights to access the system’s
protected resources (files, registry entries, etc.), rights to access external devices
(display, printers, etc.), rights to access the network, rights to skip MSIL verifi-
cation, and so on. Proofs of origin include the secure hash of the assembly, the
assembly’s public key, the publisher’s certificate, the URL where the assembly
was downloaded from, and so on. When an assembly is loaded, after the MSIL
verification, the CLR determines the origin of the assembly and grants it all the
rights that can be derived under the system’s execution policy (given its origin).
Any actions performed by code in that assembly (as a result of a client call) are
checked against the assembly’s rights. Thus, an assembly may be denied access
to resources, even though the actual caller has the rights to access them (but
cannot exercise these rights through untrusted code).
Finally, .NET provides rich support for expressing execution policies, which
specify how permissions are associated with assemblies based on their origin. To
simplify management, .NET introduces the concept of a code group—essentially
a conditional expression and a permission set. The conditional expression com-
bines origin identifiers (e.g. all code coming from microsoft.com and signed by
Microsoft); an assembly whose origin satisfies the expression is then assigned the
permission set. The system policy can then be described as a tree of such code
groups (the group with the most general expression being the root). .NET also
provides a number of default, intuitive, permission sets (for example, a default
permission set for code downloaded from the Internet).
.NET Web Services
.NET Web Services are hosted by the IIS, which internally handles authenti-
cation, trust management, and access control in the same way as for Web
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applications. The only differences concern external message formats and proto-
cols; essentially, .NET Web services are compliant to the Web Services Security
Standard [149] (WS-Security), developed by the OASIS [11] (a global consor-
tium aimed at the development, convergence and adoption of WS standards).
Essentially, the WS-Security describes a way of incorporating authentication, in-
tegrity, and confidentiality protection to SOAP messages, by means of standard
security headers.
On the server side, platform security is enforced using the same mech-
anisms as for regular .NET applications, namely MSIL verification and code
access security. The interesting thing about Web Services is that clients can
safely run untrusted proxies; as explained earlier, the MSIL code for the proxy
is automatically generated using the WSDL description of the service, and is
guaranteed to be safe, given that WSDL is purely a declarative language.
.NET provides no support for replication of Web services, and we are not
aware of any project aiming to provide such support for services exported
through the IIS. [145] describes a framework for building replicated Web ser-
vices, targeting Byzantine fault tolerance; however, this framework is built
on top of open-source Web service-deployment platforms, and provides no sup-
port for services exported though the IIS.
10.2.3 Conclusion
DCOM/.NET are in essence Microsoft’s response to the problem of develop-
ing/deploying/managing distributed applications. The evolution of these tech-
nologies (spanning over more than a decade) closely follows Microsoft’s position-
ing vis-a-vis distributed computing, starting with applications spanning multiple
processes on the same host (COM), LAN distributed applications (DCOM), and
finally WAN services (.NET). This technology series is undoubtly complex; there
are cases where the same problem is handled by multiple, non-orthogonal solu-
tions (for example, object naming and location is handled through the registry,
monikers, the Active Directory, DNS, etc.).
From a security point of view, probably the most useful feature is .NET’s
careful approach to platform security, which provides two strong mechanisms—
MSIL verification and code access security, and flexible mechanisms for defining
policies. Its limitations include the lack of support for BFT, and the rather
coarse access control model (fine-grain access control mechanisms need to be
implemented by application developers). Despite this criticism, we believe it was
useful to closely examine the DCOM/.NET, given the fact they are probably
the most successful distributed object middleware so far (being incorporated
in all Windows distributions since 1995, thus running on the vast majority of
desktop PCs!). As [179] puts it: “It is not hard to criticize DCOM. However ..
it can be justifiably argued that DCOM is a technology that to a certain extent
has proven itself. With millions of people using Windows daily in a networked
environment, DCOM itself has become widely used. In this case, CORBA, or
any other distributed system, still has a long way to go”.
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10.3 Java/Java RMI/Jini
Java (the Java Platform more exactly) is a computing environment developed
by Sun Microsystems. It consists of the following:
• the Java programming language.
• the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)—the runtime system.
• the Java Development Kit (JDK)—a set of development tools, including
support libraries, as well as stand-alone applications.
Java has been designed with the goal to provide an environment for devel-
oping mobile Web applications. Key aspects facilitating this include platform
independence (with the support of the JVM, Java applications can run on any
hardware/OS), and strong platform protection mechanisms (static code verifi-
cation and sandboxing), which make it safe and convenient to deploy and host
mobile code.
The Java RMI API is an extension of the Java language, offering a pro-
gramming interface for performing remote procedure calls on Java objects. In
addition to this API, Java RMI also specifies a limited number of standard
services for building distributed applications, such as an object registry, and
mechanisms for performing distributed garbage collection for Java objects.
Finally, there are a number of wide-area middleware technologies built on
top of Java/Java RMI [102, 86, 92, 84]. Jini [84] is one of the better known
examples; it provides “true” middleware services (compared to Java RMI), han-
dling, among other things, object location and discovery, hosting, transactions,
and security.
10.3.1 Java/Java RMI/Jini—technical overview
In this section we provide an overview of Java, and Java-based object middle-
ware, and examine how these could be used for building distributed applications.
The Java programming language
Java is an object-oriented programming language, loosely following the C++
syntax. The key Java feature is platform independence, which is achieved by
having source code “halfway” compiled to an intermediate language (Java byte-
code) which is then interpreted by the JVM. Interpreted bytecode runs signif-
icantly slower than native instructions. To mediate this problem, some Java
compilers also support direct compilation, just-in-time compilation (similar to
MSIL in the case of DCOM), and dynamic recompilation (at runtime, the JVM
may compile assembly code for parts of the executable, based on program be-
havior).
Although the Java language is syntactically similar to C++, there are sig-
nificant differences between the two with respect to programming methodology:
• Java does not support multiple inheritance from classes, but only from
interfaces. Java interfaces are pure abstract classes with no data members;
essentially they hold method signatures.
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• Java does not support operator overloading.
• Java does not allow the programmer to explicitly allocate/deallocate mem-
ory; instead, it uses automatic garbage collection of dynamic objects.
Furthermore, Java provides direct support for threading, and more expres-
sive exception handling compared to C++.
Object naming and location
Java uses separate name spaces for classes and objects. The class namespace
is global; the full name of a class consists of a (global) package name, and the
(local) class name inside the package. Packages essentially group classes with
similar functionality. The global naming convention for packages is described
in [24]; typically, a package name follows a hierarchical pattern, with level in
the hierarchy separated by periods. [24] suggests that a package name begins
with the top level DNS domain name of the organization that has created it,
continuing with the organization’s domain, and then any subdomains listed
in reverse order. The organization can then choose a specific name for their
package. Although this naming convention can produce globally unique class
names, there is no mechanism to enforce it (an organization can cheat, and use
package names that it does not control). For this reason, the class namespace
cannot be used for security purposes.
The name space for objects depends on the remote objects technology being
used. In case of Java RMI, remote object names are stored in a special database
— the RMI registry. Each host running remote objects needs to run its own
registry; the global name of a hosted object consists of the host’s DNS name,
RMI port number (this is typically 1099), and the (local) object name inside
the registry.
Finally, Jini provides a lookup services which bears certain similarities to
the Globe Location Service. Like in the GLS, Jini services are assigned unique
service IDs (128b long). The Jini lookup service maps these IDs to the actual
Java RMI proxy stubs (used by clients to bind to the service) and to attribute
sets (text strings) describing the service. Clients have multiple query options:
they can search services based on their service ID, based on the Java interfaces
exported by the service (which are exposed by the proxy stored by the lookup
service), or based on the attribute sets associated with the service. Once a client
finds the desired service, it downloads the proxy and connects to the service via
RMI.
Binding
In Java RMI, clients bind to remote objects by invoking a special RMI runtime
function (java.rmi.Naming.lookup()), passing it the global name of the remote
object (described in the previous section). The lookup function returns a proxy
for the remote object; this proxy is just a regular Java object, implementing the
same interfaces as the remote object. Java RMI places two constraints on the
types of interfaces that can be exported by remote objects:
• All these interfaces have to extend a standard java.rmi.Remote interface.
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• All methods in these interfaces have to declare that they throw a stan-
dard java.rmi.RemoteException exception (this is used to handle failures
associated with remote method invocations, for example due to network
partitioning).
On the server side, the remote object is registered by invoking a special RMI
runtime function (java.rmi.Naming.bind()), passing it a reference to the remote
object, and the (local) name assigned to it. The RMI runtime then creates
the proxy object, and stores it in the RMI registry (associated with the object
name). The registry will return this proxy (in a serialized format) whenever a
client invokes java.rmi.Naming.lookup() for that particular name.
Binding to Jini services is similar to binding to RMI objects, except that
the client obtains the proxy from the Jini lookup service. Unlike RMI, Jini does
not place any restriction on the type of the proxy object; this can implement
a private protocol between itself and the remote service (this allows creating
“smart” proxies implementing locally part of the remote service functionality).
Remote method invocation
The foundation for the Java RMI transport layer is the TCP/IP stack. On top
of this, RMI provides two session/presentation layer protocols: the Java Remote
Method Protocol (JRMP) is a proprietary Sun protocol, and is available for all
Java versions. In addition to this, the RMI-IIOP protocol is available for Java
version 1.3 and higher, and is compatible with the CORBA IIOP, allowing Java
↔ CORBA interoperability.
Java RMI provides relatively simple method invocation semantics. Essen-
tially, remote objects are persistent, and they can be either permanently kept
in memory, or stored on disk and activated only as a result of client requests.
For each client request, the RMI runtime creates a new thread that executes the
request by calling the appropriate remote object method; if concurrency con-
trol is needed, it has to be implemented by the object (however, Java provides
extensive support for concurrency control and threading).
In the case of RMI calls, method parameters and results are passed by value
(this is different from regular Java method calls which pass parameters by ref-
erence). Parameters represented as simple types are marshalled in a standard,
machine-independent format and directly sent across the wire. In case of object
parameters, Java provides a standard mechanism for marshalling them, namely
object serialization. Any Java class that implements a standard Serializable in-
terface can be serialized. By default, serialization is applied recursively to all
class fields, until reaching primitive types, which are then converted into ma-
chine independent format. It is also possible to prevent certain fields from being
serialized, by declaring them transient, or provide custom serialization.
In the case of Jini, remote invocation is handled by an extension of the RMI
stack called the Jini Extensible Remote Invocation (JERI). JERI allows cus-
tomizing the RMI transport and marshalling layers. In the case of marshalling,
possible customizations include support for implicit parameters, result caching,
and fine-grained access control based on parameter values (we will discuss more
about this when explaining the Jini security model). Customizing the JERI
transport layer allows Jini to support arbitrary transport protocols for method
invocation (as opposed to only TCP/IP in the case of RMI).
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Replication
There are two main strategies for integrating support for object replication with
the remote method invocation model provided by Java RMI and Jini.
The first approach is based on the concept of object groups. An object
group is the equivalent of a Globe DSO, and essentially consists of a set of
replicas of an RMI/Jini remote object, replicas bound together according to
an (application-specific) replication strategy. This object group strategy is in
the case of the Jgroup architecture [143]. On the client side, Jgroup provides a
generic group proxy Java class which forwards method invocations to member
replicas using the RMI stack, while also handling network partitioning (dealing
replica subgroups) and read/write invocation semantics (reads are only executed
on one replica, while writes are multicast to all reachable replicas). On the server
side, the Jgroup daemon is the equivalent of the Globe replication subobject, and
is responsible for basic replication services, such as group membership, replica
failure detection, and state merging after network partitioning. The execution
daemon is the equivalent of the Globe object server, and is responsible for
creating and removing replicas; it interacts with the replication management
client a GUI interface allowing administrators to manage replicas, and specify
dynamic replication strategies for their object groups.
Other projects employing Java remote objects groups for replication in-
clude [46] and [47]. In general the advantage of this approach is that it results in
a modular replication architecture which allows multiple replication strategies
to be easily integrated. The disadvantage is that replication is not completely
transparent to clients. For example, in the case of Jgroups, clients need to in-
teract with a subclass of the generic group proxy class; in this case, backward
compatibility for RMI clients may be a problem.
The second approach for supporting replicated remote Java objects is based
on RMI interception. In this case, a software layer placed below the RMI
transport layer is responsible for intercepting method invocations and broad-
casting them to the replica group. This technique is employed in the Aroma
project [151], which relies on the Totem group communication system [30] for
multicasting method invocations to replicas. The main advantage of the in-
terception approach is that is completely transparent to clients, which allows
backward compatibility for legacy RMI applications that need to make calls to
replicated remote objects. The disadvantage is that it leads to a less modular
replication architecture; because replication is handled at a very low level in the
network stack (below the transport level), it is difficult to capture method invo-
cation semantics (for example reads vs. writes) in order to implement complex
replication strategies.
10.3.2 Java/Java RMI/Jini—security mechanisms
In this section we examine security mechanisms used for securing Java dis-
tributed applications. The foundation for such mechanisms are the platform
protection, authentication, and access controlmechanisms part of the Java
platform. On top of these, RMI and Jini build their own security infrastructure,
mainly dealing with client authentication and access control, and (to a certain
extent) with trust management.
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Java platform protection
Java uses a combination of static and runtime checking in order to enforce plat-
form security. The static checking part is called bytecode verification; essentially
before any Java class is loaded by the JVM, the bytecode of that class is verified
to ensure certain safety properties:
• Format checks: the bytecode consists of legitimate JVM instructions, and
is organized according to the Java class format specification.
• Type checks: there are no illegal type conversions in the bytecode, class
inheritance rules are obeyed, method invocations are correct in terms of
parameter types, etc.
• Memory checks: the bytecode does not violate the Java language access
restrictions (for example private fields are not accessed outside the object),
etc.
• Control flow checks: jump instructions in the bytecode do not cross func-
tion boundaries, there are no jumps in the middle of an instruction (for
instructions longer than one byte), the code does not end in the middle of
an instruction, etc.
A class that has passed the bytecode verification can be safely loaded. This
does not mean the code is trusted to follow the system’s security policy, but
instead, it guarantees the code will not interfere with the runtime checks per-
formed by the JVM in order to enforce this policy.
Once a Java class is loaded, its runtime behavior is constrained by the JVM’s
security policy with respect to that class. At runtime, this policy is encoded as a
special java.security.Policy object which is initialized when the JVM is started.
The way this initialization is done is implementation dependent (i.e. from a
file, database, etc.). Conceptually, the JVM security policy can be represented
as a set of statements, each statement granting certain rights to a group of
Java classes. In order to store rights, Java introduces a special abstract class
java.security.Permission. Specific rights are expressed as subclasses of Permis-
sion, and include rights to access files (FilePermission), manipulate network
sockets (SocketPermission), control the behavior of the JVM runtime (Run-
timePermission), control the graphical display (AWTPermission), and change
the security policy itself (SecurityPermission). Developers can also create ad-
ditional permissions by directly subclassing the Permission class, or one of its
standard subclasses.
Permissions are associated with code sources, which represent sets of classes
with the same security properties. A code source is identified by a an URL and a
set of digital certificates. A given class is part of the code source if its bytecode
has originated from the URL associated with the code source, and has been
signed using the private keys corresponding to the public keys in the associated
certificate set. When a new class is loaded, the JVM first determines its code
source. Using this code source, the JVM then searches the security policy for
the actual permissions that should be assigned to that class.
Inside the JVM, permissions are not directly assigned to classes, but rather
to protection domains. A protection domain is a special object (instance of the
java.security.ProtectionDomain) which encodes permissions associated with a
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given class for a given execution instance. When an execution thread accesses
a given class for the first time, the class is associated with a protection domain
part of that thread (a new domain may be created if necessary). The permis-
sions associated with the domain are mainly determined by examining the JVM
security policy with respect to the code source for that class, but may be aug-
mented to take into account the identity of the principal running the thread (we
will discuss principal authentication later in this section).
Finally, during program execution, the security policy is enforced by the
JVM, which monitors each access to protected resources (as determined by
the various Permission subclasses). For each access, the JVM examines the
protection domain associated with the class of the object requesting the access,
as well as the protection domain of all the other classes in the execution stack.
Access is granted, if the action is allowed in all those domains. This ensures
that untrusted code cannot elevate privileges by invoking methods of trusted
classes. Furthermore, privileges are downgraded when trusted code makes use
of less trusted classes.
The Java authentication and authorization service
The platform protection mechanisms described so far provide code-centric access
control; while this is useful for protecting local resources in a single-user system
where untrusted code may be dynamically loaded, it cannot enforce differenti-
ated access rights in a multi-user system. To address this, Sun provides the Java
Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) [124] which is integrated with
standard Java distributions starting with version 1.4. JAAS allows authenti-
cation and access control in a multi-user workstation environment. Using
the services provided by JAAS, both RMI and Jini can support authentication
and access control in a distributed environment.
With JAAS, a user running a thread in a JVM is represented as a standard
javax.security.auth.Subject object, consists of a set of Principal objects, each
representing an authenticated identity for that user (a user may have multiple
identities). Applications enable the authentication process by instantiating a
LoginContext object, which in turn references a number of LoginModules objects,
each corresponding to a given authentication technology. Each login module
then performs its authentication function (based on a password, smartcard,
etc.) and returns a Principal object; the LoginContext combines these objects
into a Subject object which is then associated with the execution context.
In order to support this user-centric access control model, the Policy class
is extended in order to handle statements granting rights to principals. In the
most general form, a policy statement may grant a given right to a combination
of code source and principal, meaning that the given code can perform the privi-
leged action only when executed by the given principal. When classes are loaded
by the JVM, their protection domains are constructed as an intersection of the
privileges granted based on the class codesource, and the privileges granted to
the subject associated with the execution thread. JAAS also supports imper-
sonation, by providing a static method doAs part of the Subject class. This
method takes as input a Subject object, and a set of actions represented as a
standard java.security.PrivilegedAction interface; doAs executes these actions if
they are allowed for the given subject under the security policy, or throws a
security exception otherwise.
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Java RMI and Jini—
authentication, access control and trust management
Neither Java RMI nor Jini provide a standard security architecture. Instead,
there are a number of (mostly academic) projects attempting to secure dis-
tributed Java object middleware [83, 44, 157, 138]. We examine in detail two of
these efforts.
In [157], an architecture for securing Java RMI distributed applications is
presented. The authors focus on three security goals, namely client and service
authentication, secure communication, and client authorization. Client and
service authentication is implemented by having a two step RMI proxy resolution
process: in the first step, the client retrieves a generic authenticator proxy which
is signed using the service’s public key. The client verifies the signature on this
proxy (which authenticates the service), and uses the authenticator to pass its
credentials (public key certificates) to the service. The service then generates a
dedicated session proxy which includes the session key, and exports the actual
service interface; the session proxy is encrypted under the client’s public key and
returned to the client. The client is authenticated if it is capable of decrypting
the session proxy, which then connects to the service using the session key.
In order to enable secure communication, the standard RMI transport layer
(TCP) is replaced by the SSL suite. Finally, the service makes use of the
facilities provided by the JAAS to enforce client access control. When the client
is authenticated, a new Subject object is instantiated, and stored inside the
execution thread handling communication with the session proxy. This Subject
object holds the Principal objects corresponding to the authenticated client
identity. Upon each client method invocation, the server thread performs the
requested action as a doAs call (see previous section), using the Subject object
corresponding to the client. In this way, only methods allowed for that client
(under the security policy) are executed; in case of illegal method invocations,
a security exception is thrown.
A similar approach is presented in [83] for securing Jini distributed services.
In this case, the service is also authenticated by signing its proxy with the service
key. The signed proxy, together with the service key, and possibly additional
digital certificates for that key are passed to a user security manager running
on the user’s computer, which is capable of applying trust management metrics
in order to determine the amount of trust the user should place in the service.
The authors of [83] mention third-party certification, PGP-like recommender
models, and direct inspection of service certificates as possible trust management
mechanisms that could be supported by their architecture. This approach bears
certain similarity to the trust management mechanisms we advocate for Globe
DSOs.
For client authentication, a slightly different approach is used (compared to
the RMI security architecture presented in [157]): in this case, the user has one
main authentication public/private key pair (the user key); for each service, the
user’s security manager generates a new key (the service access key), which is
then incorporated into a service-specific client certificate, signed with the user
key. The service proxy is initialized by passing it the service access key, the client
certificate, as well as the attribute certificates issued by the service for the user
(which encode the rights granted to the user for that service, as we will explain
next). In this way, the user key can be (indirectly) used for authenticating to
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multiple services, without directly exposing it to potentially untrusted proxy
code. The user also has the ability to grant selective privileges to the proxy
code with respect to his host platform, by using the standard Java platform
protection mechanisms (i.e. treat the signed proxy as a code source, and grant
it the desired privileges using the Java policy object). Once the two parties
have authenticated, the TLS protocol is used for ensuring the confidentiality
and integrity of the communication channel between the service and the proxy.
An interesting aspect of this security architecture is the way the service en-
forces access control on client requests. Similarly to Globe, client rights are not
stored in a central ACL, but rather encoded in user attribute certificates, which
bind the user key to the rights granted to the user. The service receives these
attribute certificates from the client proxy during authentication, and processes
them in order to extract all rights granted to the user. The service then con-
structs the Permission objects corresponding to these rights (presumably, the
authors use subclasses of the java.security.Permission class in order to encode
custom permissions—such as selective invocation of the service’s methods—but
this is not explicitly discussed in the paper). In the end, all Permission objects
derived from the user’s attribute certificate are associated with the execution
thread handling the user’s request; from that point, the standard Java security
mechanisms are responsible for enforcing service access control.
Byzantine fault tolerance
We are not aware of any project extending either Java RMI or Jini in order to
support Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT). Such functionality could presumably
be added on top of RMI/Jini extensions providing support for object replica-
tion [46, 47]. For example, in the case of replication techniques based on object
groups (such as [46], see Section 10.3.1) the generic group proxy functional-
ity could be expanded to support BFT operations (selecting a replica quorum,
counting replica votes, etc.).
A project that specifically deals with supporting BFT distributed Java ob-
jects is Fleet [136], which uses the state machine replication approach [176] for
achieving Byzantine fault tolerance. Although the authors of [136] acknowledge
RMI/Jini as the main frameworks for supporting remote Java objects, they do
not built their BFT mechanisms on top of these, but instead develop their own
Java remote object middleware. As such Fleet is pretty much a self-contained
academic project, and much narrower in scope compared to RMI and Jini.
10.3.3 Conclusion
Java has been promoted as a technology for developing and deploying cross-
platform applications. As such, the most important feature in its security ar-
chitecture is platform protection. In addition to this, the Java Authentication
and Authorization Service provides a good foundation for implementing client
authentication and access control for the numerous object-based middleware
technologies developed on top of the Java platform (such as RMI and Jini).
Finally, higher-level security services, such as trust management and Byzantine
fault tolerance, are mostly left to be implemented at the application level.
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10.4 Grid Middleware—Globus
In the late 1990s, computational grids have emerged as a solution for handling
massive, computationally intensive applications, mainly related to life sciences
(e.g. protein sequencing, complex molecular simulations, weather prediction,
etc.). Such applications are typically handled by means of parallel processing
(the main problem is divided into many simpler problems which are then solved
concurrently). However, such massive parallel processing requires a hardware
infrastructure that is way above the economical reach of an average research
institution. As such, economies of scale can be achieved by having research
institutions link their computing infrastructure via high speed networks. The
resulting federated infrastructure is known as a computational grid, and pro-
vides the equivalent of a (virtual) super-computer architecture that is able to
distribute process execution in a parallel fashion across individual machines.
In order to achieve seamless integration of resources in such a heterogeneous,
federated environment, grid architectures rely on a grid middleware layer. The
most important function of such grid middleware is to provide a common, high
level, application development and deployment environment; given that grids
mainly target massively parallel applications, the focus in grid middleware is
on parallel programming. In addition to this, grid middleware also handles
non-functional issues related to the administration of federated resources; this
introduces a number of interesting security problems.
In this section we examine Globus [87]—by all accounts the most widely
used Grid middleware—focusing on its security architecture, and the way this
relates to the Globe security architecture.
10.4.1 Globus—Technical overview
Globus is the grid middleware designed by the Globus Alliance [16]—an inter-
national research consortium that includes the Argonne National Laboratory
and the Swedish Royal Institute of Technology. The actual implementation of
this specification is the Globus Toolkit (GT).
Globus’ designers have followed a bottom-up approach, focusing on user
requirements and fast deployment of essential grid tools. Their main motivation
in following this approach has been to provide value from the early stages of
the project, and thus ensure a wide user base; at the moment, Globus is the
dominant grid middleware, so this goal has been pretty much accomplished.
The downside of the bottom-up design approach is that there is no well-
defined high-level Globus architecture, and this becomes obvious when com-
paring the various releases of the Globus Toolkit (four so far). Essentially,
each of these releases defines a (more or less) different operational model. At
the two extremes, GT.v01 is a CORBA-like (parallel) RPC-based middleware,
while GT-v04 is Web-services middleware. We will examine these two cases,
since they could offer some insight on how Globe itself may evolve towards Web
services.
Globus Toolkit Version One
From a high-level point of view, GTv01 is distrubuted middleware based on
parallel RPC. Its tools are organized in five main modules:
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• Resource location and allocation module. The tools in this module provide
mechanisms for expressing application resource requirements, locating the
resources that meet these requirements, and scheduling resource usage.
One tool in this module is the Metacomputing Directory Service (MDS).
The information stored by the MDS includes:
– Configuration details about grid hosts, such as amount of memory,
number of CPUs and their speed, number and type of network inter-
faces available.
– Instantaneous performance information, such as point-to-point net-
work latency, available bandwidth, and CPU load.
– Application-specific information, such as memory requirements (based
on previous execution runs).
The functionality provided by this module is somewhat similar to that of
the Globe Infrastructure Discovery Service.
• Communications module. The tools in this module provide basic commu-
nication mechanisms, essentially implementing a wide range of (mostly)
application-level protocols, including message passing, remote procedure
call, distributed shared memory, data streams, and multicast. The Globus
Toolkit implementation of all these protocols uses low-level parallel RPC
primitives provided by the Nexus Communication Library [88]; in addition
to parallel RPC, Nexus also provides rule-based selection and combina-
tion of the methods—such as transport protocol, compression method, and
quality of service—used to perform communication. From this description,
we can see that the functionality provided by the Globus communication
module is similar to that of the Globe communication object.
• Authentication module. This component provides basic authentication
mechanisms for identifying both users and resources. All the tools in
this module provide a standard API compatible with the Generic Security
System [129]. Higher level security services, such as access control, rely
on the tools provided by this module.
• Process creation module. The tools in this module allow to initiate com-
putation on a resource, once it has been located and allocated. Their task
include setting up executables, creating an execution environment, start-
ing executables, passing arguments, and managing process termination.
This is similar to the functionality provided by the Globe Object Server.
• Data access module. The tools in this module facilitate access to remote
storage. The emphasis here is on parallel file systems and I/O libraries.
All the tools in this module implement a standard remote I/O (RIO)
interface, which provides transparent remote access, and global naming,
using a URL-based naming scheme.
A variety of parallel programming interfaces have been ported to Globus, and
they make use of the low-level modules described above. These programming
interface include a complete implementation of the Message Passing Interface
(MPI) [105], and parallel versions of C++, Perl, and Fortran. The advantage
of this approach is that legacy programs written for these environments can be
easily ported to the Globus platform.
218 CHAPTER 10. RELATED WORK
Globus Toolkit Version Four
GT.v04 is the latest reincarnation of the Globus Toolkit; its high-level architec-
ture is centered around Web services. Legacy services are re-used by providing
Web-service wrappers around them. As a general observation, the whole con-
cept is very much “up-to-date” with the latest trends and fashion in distributed
middleware, but the line separating the actual Globus architecture (as designed
by its original creators), and the growing body of Web services/grid community
standards becomes increasingly blurred, to the point where it becomes difficult
to separate novel research contributions from engineering exercise. Nevertheless,
the scientific relevance of GT.v04 should not be underestimated; as the leading
grid middleware, it has gone way beyond the pioneering research project stage;
instead it can be seen as world-wide playground for experimenting with the
latest Grid/Web services technologies. We provide an overview of GT.v04, as
described in [89].
According to [89], GT.v04 consists of three sets of components:
• A set of service implementations implementing basic middleware function-
ality, such as execution management, data access and movement, replica
management, monitoring and discovery, and credential management. Most
of these services are Java-basedWeb services, and represent either new ad-
ditions to the toolkit (for example the Web service-based Replica Location
Service [89]), or are obtained by providing Web service wrappers around
legacy (pre-v04) Globus services. The original (pre-WS) implementations
of some of the legacy services are also included in the toolkit, in order to
support legacy applications.
• Java, C, and Python containers for user-developed services. These con-
tainers provide WS-interfaces for handling security, discovery, and state
management, according to WS standards such as WS-Notification [109],
WS-Policy [49], and WS-Trust [110].
• A set of client libraries that allow client programs to invoke operations on
both standard GT.v04 services, as well as on user-defined services.
From a functional point of view, the main areas covered by by GT.v04 are:
• Execution Management—the Grid Resource Allocation and Management
service (GRAM) [85] provides WS interfaces for initiating, monitoring,
and managing the execution of arbitrary computations on remote hosts.
The interface allows the initiator to express remote resource requirements
(memory, network, CPU), define data access patterns, and specify the
executable and its arguments. GRAM also provides WS interfaces for
monitoring the running status of remote tasks.
• Data Transfer and Access—the Globus implementation of the GridFTP
specification [29] facilitates reliable, secure, and high-performance memory-
to-memory and disk-to-disk data movement. GridFTP provides a foun-
dation on which higher-level tools for data transfer and access are built:
– The Reliable File Transfer (RFT) service [133] allows management
of multiple concurrent GridFTP transfers.
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– The Replica Location Service (RLS) [69] is a decentralized system for
locating and accessing replicated files and datasets.
– Data Replication Service (DRS) [68] combines RLS and RTF, and
allows management of data replication.
• Service Discovery and Monitoring—GT.v04 implements the WSRF and
WS-Notification specifications [109], which define standardized mecha-
nisms for associating XML-based resource properties with network en-
tities and for accessing these properties via both push (subscription), and
pull (query) mechanisms. Every GT.v04 service implements these spec-
ifications; user-defined services can also be configured to register their
properties with their container. All this information is also collected and
aggregated by the WebMDS—the WS-enabled version of the MDS service
(first introduced in GT.v01). GT.v04 also provides a variety of command
and control tools for facilitating service discovery and monitoring, includ-
ing command-line, browser-based, and WS interfaces.
• Security—the GT.v04 security architecture mostly deals with trust man-
agement, authentication, authorization, and secure execution. We exam-
ine this architecture in detail in the nest section.
10.4.2 The Globus Security Architecture
The Globus security architecture (GSI) has continuously evolved over the past
decade, more or less in sync with the rest of the Globus Toolkit; [91] and [185]
provide a good overview of this evolution. There are three main design goals
behind this effort:
• Support for multiple security mechanisms—the motivation here is to allow
Globus to interoperate with the (legacy) security infrastructures deployed
by organizations participating in the Grid effort.
• Dynamic creation of entities, and granting of privileges to those entities—
Grid users should be able to securely access federated resources without
the need for administrator (human) intervention on each and every access
request.
• Dynamic establishment of trust domains—Grid users and organizations
should be able to associate in collaborative groups where participants are
granted rights according to their function in the group.
Similar to Globe, Globus uses public key cryptography as the basis for au-
thentication; the requirement is that each participating entity (user, organi-
zation) holds a (long-term) identity certificate issued by a CA. GSI defines a
common credential format, based on X.509 identity certificates; in order to
address the interoperability requirement, GSI also introduces the concept of au-
thentication gateways, which translate between GSI certificates and local (site)
authentication mechanisms (for example, [185] recommends the Kerberos Cer-
tificate Authority for translating between GSI and Kerberos realms).
In order to address the second and third requirement, GSI introduces the
concept of a virtual organization (VO). A VO is essentially a dynamic trust
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domain, consisting of a group of users, and a security policy describing the
rights granted to those users by the VO. The local security policies of the various
administrative domains part of the Grid only need a mapping between the VO
identity and a local identity. The actual rights of a given VO participant with
respect to a Grid administrative domain are the intersection of its rights (as
granted by the VO), and the rights granted to the VO by the Grid domain.
Given this high level design overview of the GSI, we now turn to functional
requirements. For the rest of this section, we examine how GSI addresses the
five sets of security requirements identified in Chapter 3.
Authentication
As explained earlier, Globus uses public key cryptography as the basis for au-
thentication. Globus entities (users, services) are assigned long-term X.509 iden-
tity certificates. The GSA does not mandate any specific CAs for issuing these
certificates; instead, each user and Globus site is free to decide which CAs it
trusts when authenticating other Globus entities.
GAS uses delegation [64] in order to support dynamic creation and and
usage of Grid services. A user-proxy-init tool [158] is used to generate short-
term proxy credentials from the long term identity credentials. Both Globus
users and services create such proxy credentials on all the hosts where they are
present; as a result of interactions among Globus entities, additional “proxy-
proxy” certificates may be generated. For example: a user U creates a proxy
UH1 on a host H1, and uses it to access a service S1, represented by a proxy
S1H2 on a host H2. While processing the user request, S1 needs to contact a
service S2, represented by a proxy S2H3 on a host H3; to allow this, UH1 will
generate another proxy UH1S1H2 to act on U’s behalf on H3.
GSA proxy certificate have a common format as described in [180]; this
format is derived from the standard X.509.v03 certificate [108]. In essence, a
long-term identity certificate and the proxy certificates derived from it form cer-
tificate chains, similar to those used in Globe. The SSL/TLS protocol suite [79]
is used for authentication and secure channel establishment. GSA also provides
interoperability with legacy authentication infrastructures, through a SSLK5D
tool, which converts GSA certificate chains into local authentication tickets.
SSLK5D can handle Kerberos, DCE, and Andrew file system authentication
realms.
Finally, in order to support single sign-on from a Web browser interface,
GSA provides the MyProxy on-line credential repository [158]. MyProxy al-
lows Globus users to create medium-term (lifetime in the order of weeks) proxy
certificates, which are stored (password-protected) on a Web-accessible server.
Users can then access their credentials from any host on the Internet using the
Java-basedMyProxy client program running on a standard Web browser. Upon
successful user authentication (password-based), the MyProxy server issues a
short-term proxy certificate to the browser client; the client can then use this
certificate to access Grid services in the standard way. The proxy certificate
issued by MyProxy is short-term (hours) and only valid for the host where it
has been requested; this reduces the risk of credentials hijacking when users
connect from marginally trusted hosts.
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Trust Management
In order to facilitate trust management, GSA introduces the concept of Vir-
tual Organization (VO). A VO groups a number of Globus users working to-
gether towards a common goal. For example, this can be a group of scientists
from different, independent, institutions working on a common project. VOs
facilitate trust management by reducing the number of one-to-one trust re-
lationships required: each VO defines a security policy describing the rights
granted to each VO member; in turn, Globus resources define their own se-
curity policies which grant specific rights to individual VOs. In the end, the
rights of a given Globus user with respect to a Globus resource is the inter-
section of the rights granted by the resource to the VO on whose behalf the
user is acting on when using the resource (note that a given user may par-
ticipate in multiple VOs), and the rights granted to that user by the VO. As
such, the maximum number of direct trust relationships required is reduced
from (total number resources)× (total number users) to (total number V Os)×
((total number users) + (total number resources)). This is a clear advantage,
considering that the number of users and resources is expected to be orders of
magnitude higher than the number of VOs.
The actual implementation of this trust management model is the Commu-
nity Authorization Service (CAS) [163]. The CAS is a server program imple-
mented as a Globus service. In the simplest case, there is one CAS server for
each VO; [163] mentions the possibility of replicating the CAS server for scalabil-
ity and reliability, but does not elaborate on the actual replication mechanisms.
VOs are assigned (long term) Globus identities, represented as Globus identity
certificates which are stored and managed by the VO’s CAS server. The CAS
implementation provides a number of tools for adding new users to the VOs and
granting them rights.
The major limitation of the Globus trust management model is that it does
not address the issue of how VOs and resource domains decide the actual rights
they grant to each other. At the moment, this is presumably done by out of
band mechanisms (e.g. the VO administrator contacts all the resource domains
the VO needs to use, and negotiates the required rights). This is clearly not a
scalable approach. [185] mentions two emerging Web Services standards—WS-
Policy [49] and WS-Trust [110]—as possible solutions for further streamlining
the trust management process, but does not give any details on how these may
be integrated in the overall GSA.
Access Control
As explained in the previous section, GSA defines access control policies in
terms of three types of entities: resources, users and virtual organizations (VOs).
Essentially, the rights associated with a user accessing a resource on behalf of a
VO are the intersection of the rights granted by the resource owner to the VO,
and the rights granted by the VO to the user. In addition to this, GSA also
gives resource owners the ability to grant/deny rights to individual Globus users
(regardless of their VO membership). This later feature is mostly intended for
“black listing” (banning certain users known to have caused problems in the
past). Given this model, secure resource access works in Globus as follows:
• The user logs on a Globus terminal; as a result, a user proxy is created on
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that terminal (e.g. a user proxy certificate derived from the user’s identity
certificate—see Section 10.4.2).
• The user authenticates, using her proxy credentials to the CAS server (see
previous section) serving the user’s VO. The CAS server determines the
user’s rights in the VO by consulting its policy database.
• The CAS server issues the user a signed policy assertion containing the
user’s identity and rights in the VO. The user’s proxy generates a new
proxy certificate for the user which includes the CAS signed assertion as
a noncritical X.509 extension.
• The user uses the newly generated proxy certificate to authenticate to a
resource. The resource authenticates the user by means of normal GSA
authentication (see Section 10.4.2), and applies the resource policy with
respect to that user (e.g. blacklisting). It then parses the VO policy asser-
tion, intersects that with its own policy regarding the VO and determines
the actual rights granted to the user.
In its design, the GSA access control model is policy language-neutral. GSA
only defines a X.509 extension field (for the proxy certificate) that specifies the
policy language used by the CAS. [163] mentions Controlled English [34] and
ASL [112] as possible choices for the actual implementation.
The main limitation of the GSA access control model is its lack of support
for reverse access control, which means that Globus users cannot specify differ-
ent levels of trust for resources that handle their requests. Essentially, Globus
implements a flat (all or nothing) reverse access control model which is enforced
by theMetacomputing Directory Service (MDS) [76]. The MDS (which is similar
to the GIDS service in Globe) works as follows:
• The are a number of information providers (presumably at least one for
each organization part of a Grid) which collect information about resources
available for sharing. For example this may include host types, operating
systems, amount of memory, network bandwidth and so on.
• Each VO operates an aggregate directory service which collects resource
information from a configured list of information providers. This configu-
ration is mainly done manually (by the VO administrator), although [76]
mentions some mechanisms for automating this process.
• For each request a user part of a VO queries the VO’s aggregate directory
to find resources that could handle that request. Once resources are found
they are accessed following the standard resource access protocol described
earlier in this section.
With this resource discovery model, all resources that can be accessed by
a VO are equally trusted. On one hand, it can be argued that in a mainly
academic/research environment such a simple reverse access control model may
be sufficient. On the other hand, even in such an environment, competition
can be very strong (competing groups—VOs—working on the same research
problem, industrial research labs competing for intellectual property, etc.), so
more flexible reverse access control mechanisms would be useful.
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Platform Security
Platform security is supported in Globus through the usage of dynamic virtual
environments (DVEs) [115]. Essentially, a DVE is an isolated execution environ-
ment, which can be dynamically created by a Globus user on a (remote) Globus
host; once a DVE is in place, it can host the user’s (remote) applications and
execute them in a controlled manner.
DVEs are created by DVE factories, which are modeled as standard Grid
services. Each host part of a Globus Grid exports such a DVE factory service,
which provides a standard WS interface for users to request creation of DVEs
on that host. This works as follows:
• The user connects to the DVE factory service, authenticates by means of
her Globus proxy credentials (see Section 10.4.2), and requests the creation
of a new DVE.
• The factory checks the local policy database to determine whether the user
is allowed to request the creation of a DVE, and (if the user is allowed)
the amount of local resources she can use.
• The factory creates a new DVE and initializes it with the resource limits
determined at the previous step.
The newly created DVE exports a standard Grid service interface which
can be used to request execution of remote programs, monitor them, as well
as inspect and manage the DVE’s properties (for example request the increase
of resource limits, if the DVE policy permits it). Any actions performed by
hosted executables are first validated against the DVE policy, in order to ensure
resource usage does not exceed the limits set at initialization time. The types
of resources that can be controlled include CPU time, memory, disk quota,
and network bandwidth usage, but depending on the actual mechanism used to
implement the DVE, only a subset of these resource controls may be enforced.
As for possible mechanisms for implementing a DVE, [115] identifies three
broad categories: standard Unix accounts, sandboxes, and virtual machines.
The simplest mechanism is to associate each DVE with a separate Unix ac-
count, and enforce resource limits by means of standard Unix protection tech-
niques. The downside in this case is that resource control granularity is very
coarse (i.e. network and memory usage cannot be restricted). Sandboxes, such
as the VServer [15], and virtual machines such as VMware [21] provide more
flexibility in controlling resource usage, but introduce significant performance
overhead [115].
Byzantine fault tolerance
GSA does not provide direct support for Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), and
we are not aware of any work attempting to build BFT mechanisms on top
of GSA. Presumably, such BFT could be achieved by means of state machine
replication, using the data replication mechanisms that Globus already supports.
We believe the reasons why BFT was overlooked in the GSA design are related
to the Globus trust model where all resources that can be accessed by a given
VO are equally and fully trusted (i.e. no reverse access control).
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10.4.3 Conclusion
Globus is a mature Grid middleware, and is becoming the de-facto standard in
this area. From a suctional point of view, there are similarities between Globus
and Globe, especially in terms of the types of middleware services they provide
(replica location services, resource discovery service, etc.). The main difference
between the two is that Globe is designed around an object model which aims
to provide a unified high-level architecture for the application is supports, while
Globus is designed as a toolkit which aims to provide maximum interoperability
with existing technologies.
In terms of the security architecture, both Globus and Globe take public
key protocols as the basic building blocks for authentication, while also sup-
porting symmetric key authentication mechanisms. However, in Globe, spe-
cialized symmetric key authentication protocols are introduced for performance
reasons, while Globus provides support for legacy symmetric key authentication
protocols (Kerberos for example) in order to ensure interoperability.
Both Globus and Globe reject the notion of centralized trust; instead, they
both support flexible, dynamic trust domains (the VO trust domain for Globus,
and the DSO trust domain for Globe). However, there are differences on how
trust is distributed inside these trust domains. In Globus, all resources part of
a VO are assumed to be fully and equally trusted, and this simplifies both the
access control model (no need for reverse access control), and the fault tolerance
requirements (no Byzantine faults). In contrast, Globe supports different trust
levels both for DSO users and for DSO replicas (replicas can be viewed as DSO
resources in Globus terminology), hence the need for reverse access control and
Byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms.
Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusions
This last chapter concludes our thesis; it is organized as follows: in Section 11.1
we summarize this thesis, in Section 11.2 we present our conclusions and lessons
learned from this research, and in Section 11.3 we point out directions for future
work.
11.1 Summary of this Thesis
In this thesis we have covered the following:
In Chapter 1 we have introduced the research issues motivating this thesis,
namely the current lack of understanding of security problems that arise in the
context of wide area distributed applications that make use of replication and
third-party platform hosting. Our proposal was to design a comprehensive secu-
rity architecture for wide-area, object-based middleware. We have argued that
designing such an architecture would allow us to identify and address these new
security problems in a systematic way. To make our discourse more concrete,
we have decided to focus on the Globe, a wide-area, object-based middleware,
specifically designed to support object replication and third-party platform host-
ing.
In Chapter 2 we have introduced the Globe architecture, including an overview
of the Globe distributed object model, the middleware services provided, the
object life cycle, and the operational model from the point of view of application
owners, infrastructure providers, as well as end users.
In Chapter 3 we have analyzed the potential security threats that could
arise in a system like Globe, taking into account the (possibly contradicting)
points of view of the various classes of participants involved (application owners,
infrastructure providers, end users). Based on this analysis we have identified
a comprehensive set of security requirements, to serve as basis for our security
architecture design.
We have presented this security architecture in Chapter 4 and showed how
it meets the identified requirements. At the end of that chapter we have also
described the lifecycle of a secure Globe DSO, including the way objects and
replicas are created, the way new users register with objects, and the step by
step procedure for secure remote method invocation.
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In chapters 6 to 8 we have presented a number of novel security techniques
specifically designed for wide-area, replicated applications:
• In Chapter 6 we have introduced a novel symmetric key authentication
protocol relying on an oﬄine trusted third party.
• In Chapter 7 we have presented an access control policy language support-
ing reverse access control, and Byzantine fault tolerance policy statements.
• In Chapter 8 we have presented a novel mechanism for providing Byzantine
fault tolerance, based on probabilistic auditing.
In Chapter 9 we have described the secure Globe prototype implementation,
together with extensive performance measurements.
In Chapter 10 we have discussed related work, focusing on other security
architectures targeting distributed object middleware, including CORBA [26],
DCOM/.NET [81, 48] and Java [103].
The purpose of this last chapter is to present the lessons learned from this
research, and point out directions for future work.
11.2 Lessons Learned
In this section we summarize the most important lessons learned while working
on the design and implementation of the Globe security architecture.
The first lesson we have learned is that a good security design should allow
implementation/runtime-level tradeoffs between assurance and performance. Per-
fect security is impossible; as such, it is desirable to have flexible security mech-
anisms that can be adapted to various application settings in order to strike
the right costs/benefits balance. Probably the best examples here deal with
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT):
• When state machine replication is used for dealing with potential malicious
replicas, the obvious tradeoff is on the composite target. As explained
in Chapters 7, a composite target consists of a number of replicas that
execute the same method invocation request. The client originating the
request accepts the result if the majority of replicas in the composite target
agree upon it. In this case, having more replicas part of the composite
target improves assurance, since more malicious replicas would have to
collude in order to pass an incorrect result to the client. At the same
time, a larger composite target implies more resources dedicated to handle
a given request. By adjusting the size of the composite target (using the
fine-grained access control policy statements described in Chapter 7), DSO
administrators can strike the appropriate tradeoff between their assurance
needs and infrastructure costs constraints.
• The audit-based BFT mechanism described in Chapter 8 offers another
useful tradeoff point. Here, the tradeoff is between preventing Byzantine
failures altogether, and merely detecting them and taking corrective ac-
tion after the security breach. When looking at this problem (dealing
with Byzantine failures) strictly from the security researcher’s point of
view, the above-mentioned tradeoff becomes quite hard to comprehend,
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since preventing faults seems always better than detecting and correcting
them. However, from a system designer/service operator point of view,
hundred percent failure prevention may not always be so desirable. For
example, when the system has to deal with very large numbers of low-
value transactions, having a state machine replication BFT scheme would
be an overkill, since it would greatly increase the amount of computing
resources required (and would also add a lot of security overhead/latency
for each transaction—see the discussion at the beginning of Chapter 8).
In this case, a more lightweight mechanisms for detecting and correcting
Byzantine faults would make more economic sense.
Another lesson is that despite widespread use, public key cryptography is
not the “silver bullet” for securing wide-area distributed applications. The cur-
rent hype associated with PKIs is mainly due to the SSL/TLS protocols which
are perceived as the security backbone for Internet electronic commerce. How-
ever, our performance measurements (see Chapter 9) have shown that for certain
types of workloads (e.g. those consisting of lightweight transactions), public key
operations can be a performance killer. In the near future we expect security
to play an increasingly important role in many emergent wide-area distributed
applications (for example P2P, web services, Internet routing). As such, it is
important that the performance implications of public key authentication pro-
tocols are well understood. As a cautionary tale, PKI-based security extensions
for the Border Gateway Protocol have been proposed as early as 2000 [117].
However, because of the unacceptable performance penalty due to public key
operations [116, 189], BGPsec has yet to be widely adopted and deployed (as
of 2006). The net result is that the protocol that controls Internet routing is
pretty much insecure.
Finally, we have also realized that in order to have any impact on the real
world, grand, visionary, research projects require extremely careful long-term
planning, exemplary commitment of energy and resources, and a relentless effort
to promote and disseminate results. In the end, the quality of the research
has only limited impact on the success of a given project; significantly more
important factors are the quality of the advertising/PR activities, the extent to
which major industry players decide to “jump on board,” and, not least, luck.
Globe is a prime example of a grand, visionary, project. Its original goal
was nothing less than to come up with a radically new model for design-
ing/implementing/deploying wide-area distributed applications. After more
than ten years since the project has started, we must admit that Globe has not
changed the world; in fact, it is unlikely that many people outside the academia
have ever heard of it. In the end, Globe’s goal has proven too ambitious to
be carried out by a small number of (very bright) researchers at the Vrije Uni-
versiteit in Amsterdam. Having a larger academia/industry consortium behind
Globe might have given it more clout, but it is not obvious it would have made
it an instant success (as a cautionary tale, CORBA had very significant indus-
try/academic backing, yet failed to dominate distributed computing). In the
end, the distributed object model adopted by Globe has fallen out of fashion,
and its niche in the distributed computing world is now slowly being taken over
by Web services and service-oriented architectures [38].
Although it should not be dramatized, this lack of real world impact in the
case of Globe has made our security research related to this project significantly
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more difficult to carry out. Security is an inherently practical discipline, and
applying it on a hypothetical system architecture requires a fine balancing act.
As a concrete example, when doing the performance measurements on the Globe
prototype, a severely restraining factor was the lack of Globe applications that
could be used for the various tests. In the end, we believe we came up with
an elegant solution of having series of micro-benchmarks for measuring the se-
curity overhead under various types of workloads (see Chapter 9, Section 9.4).
However, life would have been much easier should we had thousands of different
Globe applications already deployed in the real world and waiting to be profiled!
Despite these problems, we believe that many of the new ideas that emerged
while designing the Globe security architecture have applications that go way
beyond Globe. Two examples are worth mentioning here: the symmetric key
authentication scheme described in Chapter 6 has been adopted (and patented!)
by Philips, as part of their Authorized Domains DRM solution for home net-
works [62], while the audit-based Byzantine fault tolerance mechanism described
in Chapter 8 has been adopted as part of the Globule [166] user-centric content
delivery network. This gives us the confidence that this thesis contains addi-
tional “unpolished” gems, which may eventually find their way to the real world
in one form or another.
11.3 Future Work
There are a number of possible directions for future work:
The first priority would be to implement the audit-based, Byzantine fault
tolerance scheme described in Chapter 8, and integrate it with the secure Globe
middleware. Having such an implementation would not only be a useful proof-
of-concept, but, most importantly, would allow us to perform performance mea-
surements in order to determine the scalability of the scheme. Recall from Chap-
ter 8 that in order for the scheme to be cost effective (compared to other BFT
mechanisms, most importantly state machine replication), the auditor should
be able to audit the results produced by a large number of (marginally trusted)
slave replicas. Having a prototype implementation would allow us to simulate
various types of workload on a large number of slaves, and determine how many
of these slaves can the auditor handle. Because the current lack of Globe appli-
cations that could be used to simulate realistic workloads, one possibility would
be to employ the same micro-benchmarks used in Chapter 9.
With respect to platform security, we believe there is plenty of additional
work that can be done. More specifically, there are two directions that should
be explored in greater detail:
• Mechanisms for better containment of replicas, and fine-grained resource
management. Right now, the Globe prototype uses the platform security
mechanisms offered by Java, which only allow isolated execution of repli-
cas (inside the same Java VM), and secure partitioning of the file system
(e.g. each replica gets its own temporary directory). It would be use-
ful to integrate additional Java extensions (for example JSeal [183]) with
the Globe prototype, in order to allow mechanisms for fine-grain manage-
ment of object server (GOS) resources (e.g. memory, CPU time, network
bandwidth).
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• Mechanisms allowing automated negotiation of GOS resources when new
replicas are created. This would likely require implementing the trust man-
agement policy constructs and data structures introduced in Chapter 5,
Section 5.2.2, as part of the GOS and DSO trust management modules.
Finally, research on trusted computing platforms [20, 97, 164], is one security
area which we believe will become increasingly important in the following years.
Trusted computing platforms hold the promise to revolutionize the way many
security-related issues are going to be addressed (examples include intrusion
detection, Byzantine fault tolerance, and digital rights management). It would
be interesting to examine how security mechanisms based on trusted computing
platforms could be integrated with the Globe security architecture. For exam-
ple, in the case of Byzantine fault tolerance, reliance on a trusted computing
platform could make irrelevant the distinction between trusted and marginally
trusted hosts. In this case, remote attestation [164] could be used to determine
the exact hardware/software stack for a remote host; at that point, hosts run-
ning a stack known to enforce certain security properties would automatically
be trusted, regardless of the individual/organization operating them.
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Samenvatting
Introductie
Vanaf de jaren ’60 heeft de wereld van de computertechniek zich ontwikkeld
van een klein aantal overdrevenmainframes en langzame punt-tot-punt verbindin-
gen tot miljoenen goedkope microcomputers (”PCs”) die verbonden zijn door
snelle breedband links (het Internet). De combinatie van alomtegenwoordige en
goedkope computers en sneldraaiend, breedband netwerken heeft als catalysator
gewerkt voor de ontwikkeling van gedistribueerde systemen in de jaren ’80.
In de meest algemene zin is een gedistribueerd systeem een verzameling van
onafhankelijke computers die zich aan de gebruiker voor doet als een enkelvoudig
coherent systeem. In het ontwerp van gedistibueerde systemen worden typisch
de volgende doelen na gestreefd: het behalen van schaalvoordelen door gebruik-
ers aan te sluiten op afgelegen systeemelementen, het behalen van transparantie
in het gebruik van deze afgelegen systeemelementen, en de algehele schaal-
baarheid te garanderen.
Om de bovengenoemde doelen te bereiken, zijn gedistribueerde systemen
uitgedacht met een ontwerp van drie lagen:
• De bovenste laag—gedistribueerde toepassingen.
• De middelste laag—middleware—de lijm die ervoor zorgt dat alle compo-
nenten samenwerken.
• De onderste laag—de hosts (OS/hardware) en de netwerken die ze aansluiten.
De middleware-laag voorziet in een object model met de gedistribueerde
toepassingen die erboven werken. Als onderdeel van dit model worden bron-
nen voorgesteld als objecten waar alleen toegang toe is via standaard interfaces.
Dit garandeert dat applicaties niet worden lastig gevallen met de interne werking
van afgelegen systeemelementen, of met de laagniveau netwerkprotocollen om
er toegang toe te hebben, maar in plaats daarvan gebruiken ze ’remote objects’
door simpelweg hun methodes aan te roepen. De middleware-laag is verantwo-
ordelijk voor het localiseren van de bron, de aanroep te sturen en het resultaat
terug te sturen.
Probleemverklaring
Een belangrijk aspect in het ontwerp van welk gedistribueerd systeem is
beveiliging. Vergeleken met een computer zonder netwerkverbinding is het
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beveiligen van een gedistribueerd systeem veel moeilijker omdat interacties tussen
verschillende delen van het systeem via onbeveiligde netwerken plaatsvinden—
dit brengt nieuwe gevaren met zich mee zoals verlies van communicatieve in-
tegriteit en/of vertrouwelijkheid—en omdat er geen almachtige partij is die vei-
ligheid afdwingt.
Eerder werk over de beveiliging van gedistribueerde systemen heeft zich
geconcentreerd op het bewijzen van authenciteit en de toegangscontrole. Hoewel
deze aspecten heel belangrijk zijn, pakken ze niet alle beveiligingsproblemen
aan die kunnen voorkomen in het ontwerp of de werking van moderne gedis-
tribueerde applicaties. Recenter zijn er een aantal operationele modellen voor
gedistribueerde applicaties verschenen, zoals ’content delivery networks’, netwerk
gegeugen, ’computational grids’, ’peer-to-peer’ en ’massive multiplayer games’.
Hoewel heel verschillend van elkaar, hebben deze nieuwe operationele modellen
twee gemeenschappelijke kenmerken:
• Data- en applicatiereplicatie—er zijn verschillende kopien (’replicas’) van
dezelfde applicatie op verschillende hosts geplaatst; deze kopien werken
samen aan de gemeenschappelijke applicatiedata (’state’) om het appli-
catiedoel te bereiken.
• Veranderende data en applicaties naar derde partijplatformen—de hosts
waarop applicatiereplica’s werken zijn niet vanzelfsprekend onder de con-
trole van de applicatiebeheerder; in plaats daarvan kunnen ze verschaft
worden door minimaal betrouwbare derde partijen.
In reactie op al deze technologische veranderingen zijn diverse applicatiespec-
ifieke oplossingen bedacht. In contrast hiermee, onderzoeken we in dit proef-
schrift Globe—generiek gedistribueerde object middleware—dat ontwikkeld is
om al deze nieuwe technologische ontwikkelingen onder te brengen op een gener-
ieke manier. Doel van dit proefschirft is het veiliger maken van de generieke
gedistribueerde architectuur van Globe.
Data- en applicatiereplicatie en migratie naar derde partijplatformen hebben
een aantal gevolgen voor de beveiliging:
• Het model van controle op de beschikbaarheid van informatie wordt com-
plexer omdat het moet omgaan met tenminste drie klassen van spelers: de
service provider, de leverancier van de infrastructuur en de klanten. Repli-
catie kan leiden tot een situatie waar sommige replica’s betrouwbaarder
zijn dan andere; derhalve, kan het nuttig zijn om een beschikbaarhei-
dsmodel te hebben dat het aan banden leggen van de uitvoering van de
meest veiligheidsgevoelige handelingen bij de betrouwbare kopien toestaat
(het reverse access control probleem).
• Sommige kopien kunnen zich kwaadaardig gedragen (Byzantine-faulty gedrag);
derhalve, is het belangrijk om tolerantie in te bouwen voor Byzantine fault-
gedrag dat toestaat dat gekopieerde services goed functioneren zelfs in de
situatie waar sommige kopien zich kwaadaardig gedragen.
• Platformbeveiligingsmechanismes zijn nodig om zich te verweren tegen
gevaren die gevormd worden door een code uit externe en onbetrouw-
bare bronnen, gevaren die opduiken wanneer infrastructuurproviders ap-
plicaties van derden hosten.
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Samenvattend heeft het verschijnen van nieuwe operationele modellen zoals
content delivery networks, grid computing, netwerk geheugen, massive multi-
player games en peer to peer file sharing networks de behoefte van datarepli-
catie gentroduceerd en van veranderende data en verwerking naar derde parti-
jplatformen. Dit brengt een serie van nieuwe beveiligingsproblemen met zich
mee zoals de behoefte aan platformbeveiliging, tolerantie voor Byzan-
tine fault en complexere modellen voor de beschikbaarheidscontrole.
Bovengenoemde zaken zijn de focus van de beveiligingsarchitectuur die in dit
proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd.
Bijdragen
Grof weg kunnen de bijdragen van dit proefschrift in drie categorien worden
ingedeeld:
Ten eerste geven we een uitgebreide gevarenanalyse voor het brede spec-
trum van gedistribueerde applicaties die optreden in computeromgevingen die
gekarakteriseerd worden door replicatie over wide area-netwerken, mobiele code
en computerinfrastructuur van derden (de setting zoals beschreven in het voor-
gaande gedeelte). Gebaseerd op deze gevarenanalyse kunnen we een set beveilig-
ingseisen vaststellen die relevant is voor middleware architectuur die zich richt
op zo’n omgeving. Zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 3 vallen deze eisen in vijf
categorieen uit een:
• Trustmanagementeisen
• Authenticiteitseisen
• Toegangsbeheereisen
• Byzantine fault tolerantie-eisen
• Platformbeveiligingseisen
Ten tweede presenteren we een uitgebreide beveiligingsarchitectuur die deze
eisen behandelt (Hoofdstuk 4). Onze ontwerpstrategie is het gebruikmaken van
bekende beveiligingstechnologien/-mechanismen die we behandelen als bouwste-
nen. Dit bevat bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van bekende protocollen voor authenti-
catie zoals het SSL/TLS-pakket, bekende Byzantine fault-tolerantiemechanismes
zoals state machine-replicatie of bekende platformbeveiligingstechnieken zoals
sandboxing of codewaarmerken. Uiteindelijk geloven we dat, ondanks het herge-
bruik van zulke low-level bouwstenen, het resultaat (ons beveiligingsarchitec-
tuur) heel origineel is (“Het geheel is meer dan de som der delen”!).
Om dit proefschrift concreet te houden, is deze beveiligingsarchitectuur afgestemd
op de Globe middleware. Echter, we geloven dat ons ontwerp vrij algemeen is;
de basisprincipes zouden toegepast kunnen worden voor elk object-gebaseerde
middleware voor wide area-netwerken waarvoor replicatie, decentralisatie en het
hosten op platforms van derden de doelen zijn. Verder is ons beveiligingsontwerp
gemplementeerd als deel van de (Java-based) Globe prototype. Als onderdeel
van dit proefschrift voorzien we ook in uitgebreide prestatiemetingen (Hoofd-
stuk 9), die laten zien dat beveiliging geen onoverkomelijk prestatieverlies tot
gevolg heeft.
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Ten slotte wordt er in dit proefschrift een aantal nieuwe beveiligingstech-
nieken geintroducreerd, die speciaal ontworpen zijn voor wide-area gerepliceerde
applicaties. Deze bevatten:
• Een nieuw authenticatieprotocol gebaseerd op een symmetrische versleutel-
ing dat vertrouwd op een oﬄine geverifieerde externe bron (Hoofdstuk 6).
• An access control policy language supporting reverse access control, and
Byzantine fault tolerance policy statements (Hoofdstuk 7).
• A novel mechanism for providing Byzantine fault tolerance, based on prob-
abilistic auditing (Hoofdstuk 8).
Policy Language Grammar
<Policy>:: <VersionField> <Declarations> <Role_hierarchy>
<Access_control> <Execution_control>
<SignatureField>;
<Access_control>:: "Access Control:"
<ACStatement>+;
<ACStatement>:: <RoleSubject> "canInvoke" <MethodName>
"underConditions" <Condition>;
<AttributesDecl>:: "Attributes:" <AttributeDescription>+;
<AttributeDescription>:: "Attribute:" <AttrName>
"IssuedBy:" <RoleName>+;
<AttrName>:: <NameString>;
<CDTFieldDecl>:: "Field:" <FieldName> <TypeExpr>;
<ComplexDataType>:: <NameString>;
<ComplexDataTypesDecl>:: "ComplexDataTypes:"
<ComplexTypeDescription>+;
<ComplexTypeDescription>:: "CDTStruct:" <ComplexDataType> "Fields:"
<CDTFieldDecl>+;
<CompositeRoleSubject>:: <RoleGroup> |
<RoleGroup> "&&" <CompositeRoleSubject>;
<Condition>:: <RelExpr>;
<Date>:: "Year:" <PositiveInteger> ("Month:" <PositiveInteger>)?
("Day:" <PositiveInteger>)? ("Hour:" <PositiveInteger>)?
("Second:" <PositiveInteger>)?;
<Declarations>:: <RolesDecl> <AttributesDecl>? <ComplexDataTypesDecl>?
<MethodsDecl> <FunctionsDecl>?;
<DelegateStatement>:: <RoleName> "canDelegate" <RoleName>;
<DerefAttribute>:: <AttrName>;
<DerefParameter>:: <ParamName> |
235
236 POLICY LANGUAGE GRAMMAR
<DerefParameter>"."<FieldName> |
<DerefParameter>"["<ZPositiveInteger>"]";
<Digit>:: "0"|<PositiveDigit>;
<Execution_control>:: "Execution Control:"
<ECStatement>+;
<ECStatement>:: <RoleExpr> "canExecute" <MethodName>
"underConditions" <Condition>;
<FieldName>:: <NameString>;
<FloatEx>:: <FloatEx> "+" <FloatEx> | <FloatEx> "-" <FloatEx>
| <FloatEx> "*" <FloatEx> | <FloatEx> "/" <FloatEx>
| <FloatEx> "^" <FloatEx> | "-" <FloatEx>
| "(" <FloatEx> ")" | <FloatLiteral> | "&" <StrEx> ;
<FloatRelExpr>:: <FloatEx> "<" <FloatEx> | <FloatEx> ">" <FloatEx>
| <FloatEx> "<=" <FloatEx>
| <FloatEx> ">=" <FloatEx> ;
<FloatLiteral>:: <IntegerLiteral>"."<ZPositiveInteger> ;
<FunctionCall>:: <FunctionName>"(" <StrEx>* ")";
<FunctionsDecl>:: "Functions:" <FunctionDescription>+;
<FunctionDescription>:: "Function: <FunctionName> "Parameters:"
<ParameterDecl>+;
<FunctionName>:: <NameString>;
<IntegerLiteral>:: <ZPositiveInteger> | "-"<PositiveInteger>;
<IntEx>:: <IntEx> "+" <IntEx> | <IntEx> "-" <IntEx>
| <IntEx> "*" <IntEx> | <IntEx> "/" <IntEx>
| <IntEx> "%" <IntEx> | <IntEx> "^" <IntEx>
| "-" <IntEx> | "(" <IntEx> ")" | <IntegerLiteral>
| "@" <StrEx> ;
<IntRelExpr>:: <IntEx> "==" <IntEx> | <IntEx> "!=" <IntEx>
| <IntEx> "<" <IntEx> | <IntEx> ">" <IntEx>
| <IntEx> "<=" <IntEx> | <IntEx> ">=" <IntEx>;
<MethodsDecl>:: "Methods:" <MethodDescription>+;
<MethodDescription>:: "Method:" <MethodName> "Parameters:"
<ParameterDecl>+;
<MethodName>:: <NameString>;
<NameString>:: {Any string starting with a-z, A-Z, or underscore,
followed by any number of a-z, A-Z, 0-9 or
underscore characters};
<ParameterDecl>:: "Param:" <ParamName> <TypeExpr>;
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<ParamName>:: <NameString>;
<PositiveDigit>:: "1"|"2"|"3"|"4"|"5"|"6"|"7"|"8"|"9";
<PositiveInteger>:: <PositiveDigit><Digit>*;
<PrimaryTarget>:: <RoleGroup>;
<RelExpr>:: "(" <RelExpr> ")" |
<RelExpr> "&&" <RelExpr> |
<RelExpr> "||" <RelExpr> |
"!" <RelExpr> |
<IntRelExpr> | <FloatRelExpr> | <StringRelExpr> |
"true" | "false" ;
<RoleExpr>:: <CompositeRoleSubject> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> "auditedBy" <RoleName> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> "doubleCheckedBy" \
<PositiveInteger> "%" <Role> |
<CompositeRoleSubject> "auditedBy" <Role> \
"doubleCheckedBy" <PositiveInteger> "%" <RoleName>;
<RoleGroup>:: <PositiveInteger> "*" <Role>;
<Roles_hierarchy>:: "Roles Hierarchy:"
<DelegateStatement>+;
<RolesDecl>:: "Roles:" <RoleDescription>+;
<RoleDescription>:: "Role:" <RoleName> "RoleId":
<ZPositiveInteger>;
<RoleName>:: <NameString>;
<RoleSubject>:: <RoleName> | <CompositeRoleSubject>;
<SecondaryTarget>:: <RoleGroup> ||
<PositiveInteger> "Percent" <RoleGroup>;
<Signature>:: {Digital Signature};
<SignatureField>:: "Signature:" <Signature>;
<StrEx>:: <StrEx> "." <StrEx> | <StringLiteral> | "(" <StrEx> ")"
| <DerefParameter> | <FunctionCall>
| <DerefAttribute> | "\$" <StrEx> ;
<StringLiteral>:: {see section 4.3.1 of RFC 2704} ;
<StringRelExpr>:: <StrEx> "==" <StrEx> | <StrEx> "!=" <StrEx>
| <StrEx> "<" <StrEx> | <StrEx> ">" <StrEx>
| <StrEx> "<=" <StrEx> | <StrEx> ">=" <StrEx>
| <StrEx> "~=" <RegExpr> ;
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<TypeExpr>:: "Scalar" | <ComplexDataType> |
<TypeExpr>"["<PositiveInteger>"]";
<VersionField>:: "Version:" <IntegerLiteral>
"Issued:" <Date> "Expires:" <Date>;
<ZPositiveInteger>:: <Digit>+;
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